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Abstract 
This thesis begins by asking how alienation can be 
distinguished from objectification. By examining the first 
chapter of Capital I and the Grundrisse it is discovered 
that Marx's theory of labour hinges on an understanding of 
the psychic process of the subject. In order to universalize 
Marx's method the thesis shifts to Husserl's examination of 
the subjective process of judging. The latter is 
understood in this thesis as structurally equivalent to 
Marx's understanding of labour. It is discovered that the 
meaning of any act of judging/labour is irreal. Alienation 
is thus discovered to be the naive belief in the factual 
existence of irreal objects of consciousness. 
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It is self-evident, therefore, that it 
((Marx's method)) must be constantly 
applied to itself, and this is one of 
the focal points or these essays. 
Georg Lukacs in the 
"Preface" to History and 
Class Consciousness. 
Doing good theory is the art of describing things 
clearly. At the same time, we might add, it is necessary to 
have a clear idea of what it is one wishes to describe 
before the actual process of description can take place. In 
this way, clarity of thought becomes the a priori condition 
to any clear description. If ideology is understood as 
illusion, then an ideologized understanding of the 
phenomenon which one wishes to describe may lead to a clear 
description of the phenomenon in question, but it will be a 
clear description of an illusion, not a description of the 
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actual phenomenon. The question of how to move beyond such 
ideological illusions is the central question in relation to 
Marx's method. 
At the same time, the question of how to arrive at 
a clear understanding of phenomena is not restricted to the 
2 
realm of theory, for not everyone\is interested in putting c.r<*»v»rv>«>>fW 
tfieTr^ ) understanding of things down on paper. But 
understanding things clearly is as much a desirable thing in 
day to day life as it is in the world of intellectual 
discourse. Theory expresses clarified understandings in a 
particular way. Clarified understanding may be expressed in 
other ways as well. What theory shares with these other 
activies is the initial grounding in clarified 
understanding. This understanding acts as a foundation or 
what Marxists refer to as an infrastructure which is 
invisible in factual terms but which acts as the sense 
bestowing presupposition for any particulars which are 
predicated on this infrastructure. This infrastructure will 
remain invisible to those who restrict themselves to a 
knowledge which one-sidedly directs itself to facts, the 
meaning of which is presupposed. The actual source of the 
meaning of these facts lies in the infrastructure itself and 
so the infrastructure must be clarified initially if any 
description of what is predicated upon it is to make sense. 
Just as in the building of a house, where the 
quality of the foundation will determine the edifice which 
rests upon this foundation, the quality of a theoretical 
foundation will determine the quality of what is predicated 
upon it. Some foundations are sound. Others are not. It is 
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the initial understanding of the nature of this 
infrastructural norm which is the prior necessity to the 
creation of theory or any other activity. It is this 
understanding of the character of norms which grounds any 
true understanding of the world which we as subjects share 
mediately or which we have individually as the worlds which 
we imagine in the free play of our fancies. 
While a clarified understanding may be expressed 
in mediate form, an ideological illusion, that is the 
misperception that facts are self-explanatory, may find 
expression not only in theoretical way. Just as it is with 
clarified understandings which may find expression in many 
ways, an ideological illusion is as likely to find 
expression in other aspects of our lives as it is to find 
expression in a the objective form of theory. Precisely 
because an ideological illusion is just that, the person who 
finds himself understanding his world ideologically stands 
the chance of being caught in the contradictory situation of 
believing that what is not true but is only illusuory is 
actually true. The transcendence of ideological illusion 
will correspondingly be a liberating thing. A theoretical 
description of something which is clearly and truthfully 
understood carries with it the implication that this freedom 
from illusion has been accomplished. It can stand as an 
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examDle for how such a move may be performed. We understand 
the moving impulse in Marx's theory to be this transcendence 
of illusion. 
The justification of this point of view is 
difficult to provide since Marx never wrote anything on such 
a transcendental move itself. If one assumes, as we have, 
that Marx does point towards the liberation of mankind from 
the illusions of ideology, then this should be implicit in 
his work. The problem which this essay addresses itself to 
is the question of how what is implicit can be made 
explicit. As well, since it is assumed that Marx relates a 
clear idea of what capitalist society actually is, the first 
moment of Marx's method of description itself would be the 
performance of such a transcendental move. What Marx 
provides us with in his descriptions is the second moment. 
In approaching the problem of accounting for the first 
moment of Marx's description, we will address ourselves to 
the second moment first. This may seem to be a confused way 
of approaching the issue. However, what we hope to 
accomplish in this paper is the clarification of a confusion 
which seems inherent to those who move from Marxist texts to 
explain Marx's texts. Since it is assumed that an 
explication of Marx's method is primarily of concern to 
Marxists who themselves will be starting from Marx's 
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follow the dictates of an arbitrarily devised system. In 
this way, Marx's dialectical description may be understood 
as a description of process and as such, is phenomenological 
description.While it is true that Marx's description refers 
to material objects, we shall treat these as objective 
indecies to Marx's description rather than seeing them as an 
explanation of Marx's description in and of themselves. The 
illusion which Marx discusses in relation to the generation 
of the mode of production is an illusion which is created in 
the subject's own mind and by the subject himself. This will 
be demonstrated in chapter two of this essay. If Marx's 
description is not understood as a description of a 
consciousing process through which an alienating illusion is 
generated, then any interpretation of Marx's theory which 
understands what Marx describes as something other than 
consciousing process will be caught in the countersense of 
maintaining that the illusion which he describes really 
takes place. Thus, if we are to make sense of Marx, the 
dialectic must be seen as process. If this is not done, 
Marx's theory will be absurd from the outset. 
But if Marx's theory can be made sense in this 
way, it should be compatible, at least in methodological 
Intent with Husserl's theory which finds its project in the 
description of process itself. What we hope to show in this 
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thesis is the methodological compatibility of Marx's method 
and that of Husserl. 
The first problem with which are confronted, 
however, is one of how we can move beyond the parochial 
restrictions which can take place if what is understood as 
important to Marx's method is its economic and political 
content rather than its essential meaning. In effect we are 
confronted at the outset with the problem of ideologizlng 
Marx's method, as seeing it as merely the ideological 
reflection of an appearance 
3. The Marxist problematic. 
Thus, at the outset, Marx's method presents us 
with a dilemma: Marx claims that theory is simply the 
ideological (1) reflection of the mode of production. As 
ideology, theory is invalid. Marx himself does theory, 
however. It follows that Marx's theory, qua theory, is 
ideological. Hence, Marx's assertion concerning theory is 
itself invalid. 
This is a tidy dismissal of Marx. However, this 
assignment of Marx's theory to the trashbin, and on his own 
terms at that, is a superficial one. To begin with, such a 
dismissal of Marx on Marx's own terms must accept Marx's 
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assertion concerning the invalid nature of theory before we 
can apply it to Marx's theory as a case in point. Such a 
carte blanche acceptance of Marx's assertion avoids the 
premise which underpins this assertion. 
Implicit in Marx's theoretical claim that theory 
is invalid lies the question of what ideology is, to begin 
with, and how theory would lose its credibility by being 
ideological. By dismissing Marx in the above way, the 
essential question of the problem Marx is speaking about 
is completely circumvented. 
To be fair, however, it must be noted that if Marx 
himself cannot show what it is that he means when he uses 
the term ideology, any attempt to do Marxist theory will 
eventually end up in skepticism since nothing can be said 
about society from such a theoretical perspective without 
being ideological. It would therefore be absurd to assert 
anything as true in a theoretical way. The knife cuts both 
ways here. 
Nevertheless, in Marx's own theoretical assertion 
lies an implicit claim to the validity of theoretical 
assertions. True, this is a tacit assertion, but 
nevertheless, it is there. If we can find out what it is 
about ideology that invalidates its claim to truth, then we 
may be able to draw into focus what it is that would lend a 
theory validity. 
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The second differentiating aspect in relation to 
Marx's theory is what makes it a different kind of theory 
from the ones which Marx criticizes as ideological. Marx 
claims that what the theory which he criticizes as 
ideological does is accept a state of affairs which men 
themselves create as if this state of affairs was itself 
objectively valid simply by merit of its "existence". What 
exists "now" (2) is accepted as pregiven. It is accepted as 
if it were heaven-sent, as if it were dictated from above. 
In such a theoretical approach to questions of knowledge the 
factual state of affairs itself is accepted as a 
self-explanatory phenomenon which acts as a norm for any 
system building or discussion which follows on the 
acceptance of the meaning of these facts. This norm itself 
remains unquestioned, however. It stands as an unexamined 
presupposition. Marx's analysis of the mode of production 
does not accept the mode of production as pregiven. Rather, 
Marx asks how it is that this state of affairs, which men 
themselves have created, has come into being. The key 
concept in Marx's theory is thus labour. 
Marx claims that man realizes (verwirklicht) (3) 
himself in the social world through his material activity. 
Through this activity man creates objects which are useful. 
For Marx these objects can have any use-value whatsoever. 
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However, they must be material objects, for unless we are 
about to allow the intervention of a spiritual being like 
Hegel's Geist, men must make their Intentions manifest in a 
material way to make themselves socially understood. In 
positing himself in the social world through the material 
objects which he creates, man objectifies himself. Such an 
objectification can be alienating if the labouror sees what 
he has created as something which takes on a "being for 
itself" . As such, it becomes a fetish object. Society, 
which is the product of men's labour as well, can similiarly 
become a fetish object. In actuality a fetish object has its 
origin as meaning what it does for the subject in the 
subject's own constitution of it. Part of the meaning of 
this object, as a fetish object, is that it is conceived of 
as determinant of its own meaning. The subject himself 
constitutes this as the meaning of the object, however, and 
so the acceptance of an object as self-determinantly 
meaningful, as a being for itself, is countersensicle. If 
the subject accepts this countersensicle or 
self-contradictory state of affairs as valid, then we can 
say that the subject's understanding is premised upon mere 
appearance and as such, is ideological. This applies both to 
his understanding of the world in which he lives and to the 
place which he understands himself to occupy in such a 
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world. A theory whioh similiarly aocepts the appearanoe of 
the social reality without enquiring into its origins in the 
subject's constitution of it as standing outside of him in a 
pregiven way, will only be a reflection of an ideological 
appearance. 
Thus, ideology, has its material referents in the 
social world, but it itself is not a material question. It 
is a question which concerns itself with the awareness which 
the subject has concerning the objects which he produces in 
his labour. Marx's method is therefore implicitly one which 
differentiates between the ideological and the 
non-ideological as a function of the consciousing processes 
of the subject involved. What inevitably draws this analysis 
into the social world is the concrete object which is 
produoed by the subject's labour and which a number of 
subjects may share in an empirically evidencible way. The 
question of ideology, however, is one which is concerned 
essentially with the psyche of the subject. 
If we look back to the dilemma which initiated 
this discussion, we can see that the necessary 
differentiation between Marx's theory and the theory which 
he criticizes will also be one which finds its basis in 
terms of the awareness of the subject qua producer. The 
differentiating moment will correspondingly be one of 
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whether or not the subject as the producer himself is 
alienated in his activity, or whether the material 
objectifications which he produces through his material 
activity can stand as they are with no hypostatization or 
reification occurring in relation to such objects. 
However, Marx himself never explained how it is possible 
that objects can be realized without such an hypostatization 
occurring. The prime example of the application of Marx's 
method is that of the critique of the fetishization of 
commodities which occurs in the first chapter of Capital I. 
But, as with Marx's statement in regard to ideological 
theory, which is the explication of an ideological 
understanding of reality in abstract and theoretical terms, 
only the implication of something which reflects a 
non-ideological consciousness is present. There is no 
clarification of what it is that makes such a transcendence 
of ideology possible. Finding no textual evidence on this 
issue, Marx's reader may either reject what Marx has to say 
out of hand, or else he may accept what Marx has to say in 
an equally straightforward and naive fashion. However, it 
is possible to read what Marx has to say and to judge for 
oneself. This implies that the reader himself has 
transcended whatever assumptions of pregiveness he may have 
concerning the social world which Marx describes. What this 
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amounts to is a trascendence of the ideological mode of 
understanding which Marx ostensibly criticizes. The reader's 
own consciousing processes are, in this way, a functioning 
equivalent for the potential trascendence of the ideological 
presuppostions which is implied in Marx's method. 
In this way, we are confronted with a question for 
Marx. But, as well, this question is a question for the 
reader of Marx. The final measure of whether or not Marx 
accomplishes what he sets out to do rests with the reader as 
he too is a potentially ideologized subject. 
We must remember, however, that Marx does a 
negative critique, not only a negation, but a critique which 
says "not this" in its description of an ideological mode of 
understanding. But if "not this", then what? Marx leaves 
this up to the person who reads his works, which is both a 
blessing and a curse, for it assumes that the right decision 
will be made by the reader. Marx, however, never indicates 
what such a transcendental move beyond the realm of 
presuppositions would entail. It is this lack of any clear 
statement of what this would entail which puts Marx's whole 
enterprise in question. Without such a statement, Marx can 
be made to mean virtually anything that one wants him to 
mean, and in no small part, this may account for why so many 
commentaries have been written on his works. 
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But there is a point at which the interpretation 
(4) of Marx's work must decide what it was that Marx 
intended to do. Clearly, Marx was politically motivated. He 
may have had some deep-seated urge to kill his father in a 
sublimated fashion. Perhaps he had a miserable sex life and 
wanted to take this out on the bourgeoisie by means of his 
acid wit. Such speculation can go on ad infinitum without 
ever resolving the question. What we are interested in here 
is not some sort of psychological rationalization for what 
Marx did. Rather, we are interested in what may be seen as 
the intention behind the work which Marx realized. As Lukacs 
puts it in the "Preface" to the original edition of History 
and Class Consciousness: 
The goal of these arguments is an 
interpretation, an exposition of Marx's 
theory as Marx understood it. (5) 
And again in "Reification and the Consciousness of the 
Proletariat" in the same collections of essays: 
Our intention here is to base ourselves on 
Marx's economic analyses and to proceed 
from there to a discussion of the problems 
growing out of the fetish character of 
commodities, both as an objective form and 
also as a subjective stance corresponding 
to it. (6) 
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What follows in this thesis is an attempt to move 
within what we understand as the spirit of Marx's method . 
The intention which we assume that Marx had as the moving 
force behind the writing of his works is the liberation of 
man from the alienation of the world of appearance. 
This thesis, then, is in sympathy with Lukacs's 
project in History and Class Consciousness. Although we do 
not wish to dwell on this for long, we can learn something 
from Lukacs*s attempt. We are aided in this respect by 
Lukacs's own self-critique of the collection of essays which 
was published as a new "Preface" to the 1967 edition of this 
work. In this self-critique, Lukacs says that he failed to 
distinguish between those objectifications which were 
alienations and those which were not. In other words, he 
encountered the same problem, structurally speaking, which 
we did at the beginning of this introduction. The solution 
to the problem of alienation which Lukaqs proposed in the 
original edition of History and Class Consciousness was the 
identification of the potential for the proletariat to 
become the "identical subject-object". Briefly stated, the 
proletariat was conceived of by Lukacs as that element of 
society which was totally negated in the relations of 
production. However, the proletariat was conceived of as 
human while at the smae time it was totally negated in 
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in relation to its humanity. As the living embodiment of the 
contradiction of capitalist society in which people negate 
themselves in their objects (viz., alienate themselves), the 
proletariat had the unique role in the history of man to 
realise this contradiction within itself. While the 
bourgeoisie could, by means of the mode of production which 
it controlled, objectify the proletariat by forcing it to 
act out the part of a mere element of the machinery of 
production, the proleatariat had no recourse to such an 
abrogation of responsibility. When the proletariat became 
conscious of the negation of the humanity which it had come 
to represent, this would mark the beginning of an awareness 
of what it meant to be truly human. The role of the 
proletariat would be to liberate mankind from its 
illusions. This would be possible because of the 
proletariat's previous historical role in the mode of 
production. Because the proletariat had been both the object 
of the bourgeoisie's reification and, simultaneously, an 
actual subjectivity, the dawning of the awareness of the 
proletariat would bring with it the knowledge of the system 
from the inside out, so to speak, and thus, the capitalistic 
system would hold no secrets for this class. Since the 
world of fetishized appearance would hold no secrets for the 
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proletariat and it would therefore be in the position to 
liberate mankind from its alienated state. 
But as Lukacs says, such a solution to the problem 
of alienation failed to make the necessary distinction 
between alienation and objectification. With the 
transcendence of all alienation in the proletariat's 
becoming the identical subject-object, the object which had 
been alienated from man would be returned to him. However: 
...when the identical subject-object 
transecends alienation it must also 
transcend objectification at the same 
time. But as, according to Hegel, the 
object, the thing exists only as an 
alienation from self- consciousness, to 
take it back into the subject would mean 
the end of objective reality and thus of 
any reality at all. (7) 
What such a solution to the problem of alienation 
represents, to use Lukacs*s own words, was an attempt to 
...out-Hegel Hegel, ((and as such)) it is 
an edifice boldly erected above every 
possible reality and thus attempts to 
objectively surpass the Master himself. 
(8) 
By not accounting for objectification in its non-alienating 
form, Lukacs must stop the dialectic in order to stop the 
alienation of capitalist society. The dialectic does not 
stop on a theoretical requirement, however, for the 
dialectic is not a "system" into which elements can be 
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jammed as into so many pidgeon holes. The dialectic is 
experiential process, and if all objectification came to a 
halt, then there would be no objects to experience if what 
Lukacs proposes were true. Lukacs's solution therefore 
fails to give us a satisfactory answer as he himself points 
out. 
However, Lukacs raises rather than solves the 
question of how a flow of experience is possible without 
alienating something. This remains unanswered. The 
question of what a reality free of alienation would be like 
is the central question in any attempt to describe the world 
which Marx ostensibly hoped for after the long-sought 
revolution of mankind. Since a reality in which there is no 
experience is unimaginable, some solution to this problem 
must be provided. If it is not, and this can only be 
provided by a description of objectifications which are not 
hypostatizations, then Marx's whole enterprise is for 
nought. Moreover, as part and parcel of this, we are faced 
with the problem of what kind of object can be posited 
without its status as an object acting as an inherent 
alienation to the subject. 
We alluded above to the actuality that in reading 
Marx the subject himself must put aside any political 
considerations if he is to gain access to an awareness of 
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what a world free of pregivens would be like. Such an 
awareness would theoretically free the subject from any sort 
of ideological illusions about himself in relation to a 
reality which, prior to such a move, would present itself as 
a
 fait accompli. In this way, the consciousing processes of 
the subject who decided to make this move could act as a 
field of enquiry itself. Such an investigation would be 
necessary in order to theoretically describe such a move 
beyond the world of fetishization. 
This is where our appeal to Husserl takes place, 
for Husserl's phenomenology is an attempt to employ the 
subject's own experiences as a field of enquiry. There is a 
clear distinction between Marx and Husserl in relation to 
their areas of interest: Husserl never concerned himself 
directly with questions of a particular social reality, nor 
did he restrict his investigations to questions which 
concerned themselves exclusively with material objects in 
the way that Marx did. However, it can be argued that unless 
we are willing to allow for some kind of metaphysical 
agency, such as Hegel's Geist or Rousseau's "General Will", 
material objects must act as the mediating factor between 
subjects who find themselves in material bodies and in the 
material world. With this stated, what we must attempt to do 
is to understand how these material objects themselves can 
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be understood without granting them some sort of 
ontological, metaphysical status as is the case with 
Feuerbach's sensualism. (9) 
According to Husserl, objects exist as objects 
with meaning. The subject himself produces these. The 
irreal object which the subject produces has a meaning and 
may have a direct correlate in the form of an empirical 
object or fact. However, this material object cannot be 
seen as producing its own meaning. Husserl thus treats all 
objects as equal inasmuch as any object has meaning, and 
this meaning is produced by the subject. Two points arise 
here. First, Husserl is not a naive subjectivist. The 
meaning which I constitute of a material object ,for 
instance, does not make it anything other than what it is. I 
may constitute (i.e., determine the meaning of an object as 
meaning whatever I posit It as meaning) a material object as 
an illusion. The reality of the situation for the judging 
subject is determined by the subject as a constituting 
agent. The object which the subject deals with in such a 
constitutive act is "his" object, inasmuch as the meaning 
which he constitutes the object of his perception to have is 
the meaning which he assigns to it. The object "is" for this 
subject, inasmuch as the subject has it as such. The subject 
may be wrong, but if what we are interested in is an object 
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which by its nature of being an object is not alienated from 
the subject, we now have one. In no way does this deny the 
factual existence of the material world. What it does is 
allow us to examine objectifications which are not 
alienations; it allows us to account for the ideal being of 
meanings. These meanings may have factual referents. 
However, these factual referents should not be used to 
account for the ideal being of the meaning which the subject 
has of them. In this way Husserl starts from a position from 
which we can observe the creation of objects with meaning, 
either as alienations or as objectifications free of a 
reified character. On the other hand, the existence of 
alienation can be presuppossed, but then some sort of scheme 
must be devised in order to extricate us from a problem 
which is not actual but is rather illusory. Marx as wishing 
to transcend. 
The presupposition of this illusion effectively 
posits it as a pregiven state of affairs and this draws 
together what we understand as the intent of Marx's method 
with that of Husserl, for the thrust of Husserl's 
"transcendental phenomenology" is the trascendence of all 
pregivens. To illustrate this point we will include a rather 
long quotations from his Experience and Judgment. 
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To speak more precisely, the retrogression 
to this transcendental subjectivity ((the 
subject who has transcended all 
pregivens)) consituting the pregiven world 
takes place in two stages: 1. In the 
retrogression from the pregiven world with 
all of its sedimentations of sense, with 
its science and scientific determination, 
to the original ((the world of pure 
experience)). life-world 2. In the 
retrogressive inquiry which goes from the 
life-world to the subjective' operations 
from which it itself arises. For the 
life-world indeed is nothing simply 
pregiven. It is also a structure which we 
can question regarding the modes of its 
constitution. Here, also, we already find 
logical operations of sense — no logical, 
to be sure, in the sense of our 
traditional logic, which always has as a 
foundation the idealization of being-
in-itself and 
being-determined-in-itself...but in the 
sense of an original logical operation 
which is primarily oriented to 
determination,i.e., on acts of cognition 
in the limited and relative horizons of 
experience in the life world. But the 
logical productions of sense are only a 
part of that which contributes to the 
structure of the world of our experience. 
Also belonging to this structure are 
practical and affective experiences, the 
experience of willing evaluating, and 
manual activity ((my emphasis)), which on 
its part creates its own horizon of 
familiarity involved in practical 
association, evaluation, etc. But 
belonging equally thereto are all the 
activities of sense experience, without 
which we could not arrive at the 
constitution of a world-time and a 
world-space, and of spatial things, 
co-subjects, and so on. If we follow this 
up to the lowest constitutive operations, 
which belong, first of all, to the 
constitution of a possible life-world, 
then what follows is the constitution of 
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objective time, of physicomathematical 
nature and its it-itself. The 
elucidation of the whole interpenetration 
of the operations of consciousness which 
leads to the constitution of a possible 
world (of a possible world:this means that 
it is a question of the essential form of 
the world in general and not of our 
factual real world) is the task of 
constitutive phenomenology.(10) 
If the world which subjects share is the product 
of their material activity but this world is also a world of 
meaning, then the source of this meaning must as well be 
investigated so that meaning will not be accounted for by 
the "fact" of what is materially produced by these subjects. 
This means that imagination must be accounted for. It is 
clear that Marx draws a distinction between the concrete and 
the abstract, or what is another way of putting this, 
between the world of imagination and the world of social 
reality. This distinction, however, should not be seen as 
denying imagination, since the material world is itself the 
product of human labour, and as such, it is the end result 
of human imagination. What must be done ir) relation to any 
social reality if the appearance of this is to be 
transcended, is that society as it is objectively shared 
amongst subjects must not be thought of as the only possible 
social reality which subjects might share amongst 
themselves. 
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If Marx wishes to replace the society whioh he 
confronts, then a substitute for this old society must be 
conceivable as another possibility. We are not concerned in 
this essay with what this "new" society might look like in 
terms of its factual particulars. What we are interested in 
is establishing that it is possible to conceive of a society 
which is essentially different from the capitalistic one in 
which we now live. 
Thus it is the abstract aspects of Marx's 
dialectic which demand to be drawn forward if Marx's method 
as the method by which illusion is to be transcended is to 
attain credibility. What we hope to accomplish by drawing 
this side of the dialectic forward is not a denial of Marx, 
but is rather an attempt to complete what we understand as 
the moving intention in his work. This intention finds its 
telos in the transcendence of alienation, not only as it can 
be evidenced in capitalist society, but as it can be 
evidenced in any conceivable situation whatsoever. This 
demands a move to the abstract, but a move which avails 
itself to an eventual "concretization" in the actual, lived 
experience of the subject; as a unity of the abstract and 
concrete facets of the subject's experience in any "now" of 
his becoming. 
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4. The structure of the thesis. 
In order to do the above we must first make it 
clear that our interpretation of Marx's intention is not 
simply a fabrication. Since the method Marx employs 
attempts to raise the level of the subject's awareness, 
seeing it applied may give us the best access to what Marx's 
method is supposed to do. We have, as well, Marx's statement 
of method in the "Preface" to the Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy . In this passage, Marx states 
that what conditions men's consciousnesses is the mode of 
production. But the "mode of production" is itself produced 
by men. It is not the same thing as the means of production 
which exists as a material fact. This too is produced by 
men, but -Marx makes a distinction here which we want to hold 
to and to follow through. Since, according to Marx, (11) it 
is the mode of production which gives rise to the production 
of an ideological consiousness, the way in which men, as 
cognizant subjects, produce this mode of production will in 
itself be a production of sorts. 
This is also a necessary distinction, because of 
the mechanistic interpretations which may be seen as moving 
out of Engels' deterministic "dialectical materialism" which 
tends to view the mode of production itself as a material 
and pregiven fact. (12) 
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To accomplish this, we shall trace the development 
of Marx's theory of the fetishism of commodities through the 
first chapter of Captial. However, we shall move from this 
text at this point to the working notes on Capital, the 
Grundrisse (13) because of Marx's eventual fetishization of 
labour which occurs in Capital (14). From this point, the 
production of capital in general as the mode of production 
will become the theme of our enquiry. We shall discover that 
the production of capital is performed by the subject, qua 
labouror, as a function of his consciousing processes; that 
is, in his lived-time. Capital, therefore, is no fact, 
although facts may be arranged in accord with the 'demands' 
which capital appears to impose upon those who function 
within a reality in which the pregiveness of capital is 
ideologically accepted as the actual. But at this point Marx 
leaves us at loose ends, for he does not explain how an act 
of production can take place without such a fetishistic 
positing of the meaning of a material commodity, or of 
capital, taking place. 
It is at this point that we shall make the move to 
Husserl. In the text of the chapter on Marx, we will 
characterize labour as a judicative activity. The 
significance of this is two fold. First, it is, as Marx 
says, the quality of labour which is absorbed or occluded by 
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the appearance of capital as a pregiven state of affairs. 
Thus, it is the qualitative aspect of labour which the 
subject apparently reifies when he confronts capital as his 
negation in the production process. Secondly, the very real 
problem of developing a common categorial object between 
Husserl and Marx occurs at this point. In order to enable us 
to employ the concept of labour which is central to Marx's 
enquiry, we shall have to expand this concept to the level 
of any labour whatsoever. In its abstract, universal form as 
any labour whatsoever, labour presents itself as the 
activity of judging. This runs contrary to what, for an 
instance, Habermas claims as the region of Marx's concept of 
labour. (15) But such an expansion of this concept need not 
runs at odds to Marx's own particular application of it. As 
we saw in the above quotation from Experience and Judgment, 
material labour need not be eliminated in such a move. 
Neither would material labour lose any of its social import 
in expanding the category of labour in this way. In effect 
what happens if we do this, it chat material labour becomes 
a subset of the universal category of any act of production 
imaginable. We believe that this is a necessary move if all 
pregivens are to be transcended,which strikes us as the 
ultimate intent of Marx's method, even if the 
political-programmatic aspects of Marx's particular aspects 
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which emerge from Marx's investigations of the particular 
problem of economics seem to contradict the possibility of 
performing such a transcendental move. However, if such a 
transcendental move is performed, then we can move into 
Husserl's investigations of Judgments as judgments 
concerning anything whatsoever. 
Before we get into this question in relation to 
what Husserl has to say about it in Formal and 
Transcendental Logic (16) we shall have to make a 
digression. 
Husserl's Prolegomena to the Logical 
Investigations (17) bears certain similarities on a 
paradigmatic level to Marx's critique of bourgeois theories 
of economics. Husserl points out that psychologism, ( which 
is his characterization of the attempt by Hume and the 
sensuo-empiricists who follow in Hume's footsteps to ground 
logical principles in psychology), begs its own question by 
assuming that the facts of an experience can be used to 
justifiy the holding of logical laws. The facts, so it 
seems, are used as an explanation of the holding of logical 
principles. As Husserl points out, this puts logical 
principles in a position of contingency to the occurrence of 
particular sets of facts. By so doing, psychologism reduces 
logical principles to the level of probabilities. Such a 
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position is absurd because one of the logical principles 
involved here is truth. If truth is reduced to a mere 
probability, then the truth of this psychologistic 
contention must itself be no more than a probability. Hence, 
psychologism is absurd because it denies the holding of the 
principle of truth. 
The relation which this holds to Marx is two-fold: 
First, as we have characterized it , sensuo-empirical 
objects which are accepted by psychologism as 
self-explanatory facts, have the same logical status as do 
the facts of commodities. Since commodities are understood 
within an ideologized mode of understanding as determinant 
of their own meaning, a similiarity can be seen between the 
fetishism of commodities on one hand, and a fetishism of the 
facts of experience on the other. Secondly, what Husserl 
accomplishes in this critique of psychologism may be 
understood as a paradigmatic justification of the mutual 
exclusiveness of quality and quantity which Marx insists 
upon. Indeed, Marx claims that it is the "suspension" of the 
actuality of this essential difference which allows the 
production of capital to take place. (18) While Marx asserts 
this essential seperation he does not demonstrate this 
anywhere. Husserl does. Because he does so in relation to 
logic, which is essential to understanding at no matter what 
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level, Husserl's analysis may be seen as holding in any 
particular instance whatsoever. 
For Husserl, however, this justification of the 
Aristotelean "forms" is necessary but inadequate in itself. 
To see how Husserl extends this analysis we move with him 
into the investigation of judgments. This brings us back to 
the original line of arguement. However, we return to this 
in the knowledge that Marx's admonition against any 
collpasing of the ideal and the real is logically justified 
as well as seeing that, on logical grounds, the collapsing 
of the ideal and the real is an essential moment to any act 
of reification. 
In F.T.L., Husserl extends this analysis to the 
sciences. He claims that any judgment whatsoever, no matter 
what it concerns, deals of meanings. Meanings are abstract. 
As abstract they are irreal. Hence, what the scientist 
judges is not strictly speaking something concrete. 
However, Husserl is careful to point out that there is a 
difference between a technology and a science since 
science finds its telos in the clarification of the whether 
or not a judgment can be fulfilled as true or not. Since 
judgments are always made in relation to meanings produced 
by the subject himself, science advocates a move beyond the 
establishment of categories as ends in themselves; or, to 
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use Marx's expression, as fetishises. Technology does not 
acknowledge this and prefers to deal with categories as if 
they were really existent things, if not in theory, then at 
least in practice. This leads to a degeneration in 
scientific endeavour which is the theme of Husserl's Crisis 
(19), a book which has relevance to our present discussion, 
but which lies somewhat outside of it. 
It is at this point that Husserl advocates his 
phenomenological reduction. Rather than attempt to move to 
deeply into the actual workings of this phenomenological 
"move", we have chosen to briefly sketch the potential 
results of making such a transcendental shift beyond all 
pregivens to a level of awareness in which objects as they 
are perceived by subjects in their actual lived process may 
be apperceived essentially. Since in social life such 
objects of meaning will have really existent, or what 
Husserl calls transcendent as opposed to transcendental 
objects, as referents to any judgment made in the social 
sphere, we end up back in the social world of shared 
empirical objects. When "I", as a constituting subject, 
constitute the meaning of a perceived object I have this 
perceived object as that about which I constitute a meaning. 
This factually existent object cannot be held to be the 
source of this meaning constitution since I am the one who 
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In actuality constitutes my meaning of this object. In this 
constitutive activity, I produce a judgment which is given 
with this real object in my experience, but which is not 
this factual object as a being for itself. This much is 
clear because the qualitative and the quantitative are 
irreducible, one to the other. They are mutually implicative 
in any experience, but must be kept mutually exclusive in 
relation to any explanation. Nevertheless, in a social 
situation an empirical object will correspond to the meaning 
which I constitute this social object to have for myself. 
This empirical object can be shared in an empirical, and 
thus, social, way. Inasmuch as I have this factual object 
as meaning something, I can assume that the other has it as 
a meaning as well, because, amongst other things, we share 
language and material objects which sustain our lives such 
as food and shelter. 
If we, as subjects, had no empirical objects to 
mediate between us, we could never communicate one to the 
other. For instance, I, as the writer of this sentence, 
constitute it to mean something. At this point in time, I am 
sharing it with someone else. If whoever is reading this 
thesis right now wishes to deny this, then, if I am to call 
him an ass, he should not be offended. While the meaning of 
these words cannot be accounted for by their factual 
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existence, they could not be shared without them. To 
demonstrate this 
,and now we ask what I meant when I wrote the last line. 
By means of empirical objects which are 
comprehended by subjects not as fetish objects, but as 
objects with meaning, we end up back in the social world in 
accord with what Husserl says in Experience and Judgment 
about the constitution of this as a phenomenon amongst 
others. But now, after at least indicating the potential for 
a clear explanation which a transcendental approach provides 
to us, we also have at our disposal, a new possiblity for 
the "concretization" of Marx's dialectic as the 
concretization of this dialectic with the lived, intentional 
experience of the subject. This being the case social labour 
becomes judicative activity which has a material object of 
some kind as a correlate. In this way, we see a possiblity 
for justifying Marx's statement in the Grundrisse that 
writing music is "damned hard work",(20) without having to 
contend with the objections of those who understand labour 
as something only productive of capital, which would seen to 
be the line which logically follows from Engels' 
bastardization of the dialectic. 
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Throughout this thesis, our intent is to 
radicalize Marx's method. What we do throughout is to apply 
Marx's method to his own theoretical constructs and 
deductive schemes. What happens to the programmatic elements 
of Marx's politics of class and interest the reader will 
find in the conclusions of this paper. 
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Chapter Two 
The Production of the Mode of Production. 
A. The Fetishization of commodities. 
1. The mode of production as the factor which 
conditions men's consciousnesses and the 
methodological necessity to transcend this. 
Georg Lukacs begins his essay on "Reification and 
Class Consciousness" (1) by saying that Marx's method, as it 
is put forward in the first chapter of Capital I, can be 
universalized. In other words, rather than this particular 
example of the application of Marx's method standing by 
Itself as the ultimate culmination of Marx's work, it should 
be understood as a penultimate demonstration of the capacity 
of this method to get at the truth of given states of 
affairs. As we know from the "Postface" to the second 
edition of Capital in which Marx acknowledges his debt to 
Hegelian dialectical methodology, Marx also says that the 
method of enquiry and the method of description, while 
obviously interrelated, are different things. (2) What we 
have before us in Capital is the method of description but 
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what we need to draw forward from this description is the 
other aspect , the method of enquiry. This would be next to 
impossible unless we also had at our disposal Marx's own 
statement of method in the "Preface" to the Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy.. (3) 
In this passage Marx claims that the social forms 
in which political issues are fought out are ideological 
reflections of the mode of production. The latter, claims 
Marx, is what actually conditions men's consciousnesses, but 
this conditioning process is not understood as such by those 
so conditioned. (4) But surely, the key to understanding the 
actual source of conditioning lies not only in the 
identification of the fact which conditions the prevailing 
social consciousness. The character of "capital" as the 
conditioning factor in capitalist society must be looked 
into in order to avoid the possibility of granting capital 
an objective status on its own account. If the latter were 
to be done, we would have effectively made capital into an 
abstract category devoid of content; its power to condition 
men's consciousness would have been granted a metaphysical 
status and what we would have on our hands would be a 
situation of alienation: The real power in society would be 
conceived of as being beyond man's grasp, just as an 
ontologically secured Geist would be. 
37 
There is plenty of textual evidence to demonstate 
that Marx himself held the latter view. (5) However, what we 
are interested in in this essay is how man can be liberated 
from such a condition, which after all, would be the 
teleological end of any true revolutionary activity. Without 
this, there is no sense whatsoever to any of Marx's 
writings. We must also remember that Marx was writing for 
the proletariat, an element of society which he believed had 
been reduced to a cretinism through its role in the 
capitalist mode of production. (6) As he says in the 
"Preface" to the C.P.O. , he feels that man is conditioned. 
Who could be more conditioned than the proletariat? And if, 
in fact, he is writing for those already conditioned by the 
appearance of the mode of production as something which 
stands as an irrefutable objectivity, as totally pregiven, 
how is he to raise the level of consiousness of this social 
group? If capital can be demonstated as not being "pregiven" 
(7), then, hopefully this can be accomplished. This will be 
the light in which we will approach Marx's description of 
the generation of capital. However, we must remember that 
this will entail a penetration of the pregiven or objective 
character of capital as a fact. If this cannot be 
accomplished, then the facticity of capital as a 
conditioning force outside of man and hence, beyond man's 
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control, will not have been transcended . The alienation 
which Marx hopes to transcend through this exercise will 
remain intact. 
The source of conditioning is capital. The source 
of capital will thus be the source of conditioning at what 
we might call a more primitive genetic level. (8) Capital, 
as a mode of production, must itself be produced in some 
way. It follows that the production of capital will also 
reveal the production of ideologized or conditioned 
consciousness. 
Capital, however, is a particular mode of 
production. As Marx is careful to point out through his 
examination of the objective history of mankind, it is only 
one mode of production amongst others which have existed. 
(9) If we wish to broaden Marx's method so that it becomes 
universally applicable, we will therefore have to move to an 
abstract level of understanding since only an abstract 
concept is universally applicable. Clearly, the totalization 
process through which the abstract and the concrete are 
drawn together in a synthetic move, (10) can occur only when 
the abstract is concretized. However, the move to the 
abstract is a necessay one even though it must be remembered 
that it is not an end in itself; it is a place which demands 
visiting, even if one cannot live there in an authentic 
fashion. 
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2. Community as made possible by material 
realization. 
We will start our enquiry into Marx's method by 
briefly citing what he has to say about his own starting 
point in the world of mediate facts. This world is the world 
in which subjects come together. It is the material basis 
for an intersubjective world. It would be clearly 
metaphysical to account for this intersubjective 
understanding by means of some kind of general will (12) and 
Marx insists that: 
To be avoided above all is establishing 
"society" once again as an abstaction over 
against the individual. (13) 
Marx accounts for community, or what is understood 
in this thesis as the general network of intersubjective 
understandings, by claiming that it is not an ontological 
Geist which acts a mediation between men who, but that it is 
men create their own mediations. (14) In realizing what one 
wishes to express in material form, in objectivating ones's 
meaning, men factually create a world of material 
mediations which, at the same time, is a world of meaning. 
If, as it has been claimed, men understand each other 
through the mediations which they create, then an 
examination of these mediations or objective "expressions" 
40 
as the products of meaning understanding beings can lead to 
an understanding of how men, as knowing subjects, understand 
themselves as well as others. Thus: 
It is apparent how the history of 
industry, industry as objectively 
existing, is the open book (( viz. 
expression)) of man's essential powers, 
the observably present human psychology, 
which has not been thus far grasped in its 
connection with man's essential nature but 
only in an external utilitarian way ((sic. 
the subjective act of labour is occluded 
behind the appearance of the Objective)) 
because in the perspective of alienation 
((sic. with the Objective accepted as 
pregiven)) only the general existence of 
man — religion or history in its 
abstract-general character as politics, 
art, literature , etc. ((viz., grasped as 
self-determinantly meaningful))—was 
grasped as the actuality of man's 
essential powers and his human generic 
action. We have before us the objectified 
essential powers of man in the form of 
sensuous, alien, useful objects in 
ordinary material industry ((Thus))... 
A psychology for which the book, that is 
the most observably present and accessible 
part of history, remains closed cannot 
become an actual, substantial and real 
science. (15) 
Marx asks us in the C.P.O. (16) to start from the 
particular product of capitalist production, the commodity. 
To refer to the commodity as a particular, however, is 
something of a ruse on Marx's part, because the commodity 
which Marx presents us with is not a fact, but is replete 
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with both its material or concrete aspects as well as its 
qualitative aspect as something which is judged to be useful 
by the subjects involved with it. Moreover, commodities are 
the end result of a human, productive process. So too, we 
might add, is capital. As we shall see, the commodity, as a 
material object, acts only as an index (17) to the 
production of capital. We shall return to the commodity as 
an index for our enquiry after we examine the relations of 
production out of which commodities arise. 
3. Capital as apparently pregiven. 
The productive process is not individual in the 
sense that one individual produces everything which he needs 
and all other individuals do similiarly. Rather, as Marx 
points out, there is a collective effort amongst individuals 
which presupposes a division of labour. The development of 
the means and mode of production, ( and the correlative 
development of the division of labour) is an objective 
historical and cumulative process. Its development spans 
many generations. 
The individual comes into the world 
possessing neither capital nor land. 
Social distibution assigns him at birth 
((because of his lack of capital and 
land)) to wage labour. (18) 
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If the wage-labour relation is simply accepted as 'the way 
things are•, so to speak, and there is nothing which can be 
done abour this, then these mediate circumstances, the 
'facts of life' for the wage labourer, will appear as 
immutable; as objective restrictions to the labourer. 
However, the question now becomes one of how the apparent 
objectivity of these facts of life in capitalist society 
come to be 'objective'. How do they attain their apparently 
immutable status? Certainly the relations of the production 
of the worker's livelihood precede him in an objective 
historical way; he is born into a society which is pregiven 
inasmuch as he is confronted with historically embedded 
traditions. The worker must provide himself with a 
livelihood. Since he has no way of making a living except 
by hiring himself out by the hour,he either does this or he 
makes no money. In the latter case, he has no livelihood. 
Thus, along with those who find themselves in a similiar 
situation, these workers 
inevitably enter into definite relations, 
which are independent of their will, 
namely relations of production appropriate 
to a given stage in the development of 
their material forces of production. (19) 
Such a positing of the inevitability of this kind 
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of self-understanding by the labourer, as a knowing subject, 
is presupposed by Marx. In doing so, Marx presupposes the 
alienation of the labourer. This is in accord with his 
assumption of the cretonism of the labourer which is the 
result of his position within capitalist society. We must 
remember that at this point, the worker is unaware of the 
fallacy of the pregiveness of capital as an objectivity. In 
order to break free of this mistaken perception we must 
demonstrate at the outset that an unquestioned acceptance of 
the self-determining nature of capital as an immutable fact 
is mistaken. 
4. The acceptance of the appearance of capital as 
pregiven leads to ideological explanation. 
Although capital is not a machine, nor in itself 
anything material, it does have material effects. It is 
among other things, also an instrument of production: 
capital makes things possible within the material, and hence 
the social, world. To the person born into a society in 
which capital already plays the role of a facilitator in the 
productive process, it, too, may appear to be pregiven as a 
functioning element of that general, social relation. In 
relation to those who move within this apparently pregiven 
situation, capital may well appear as a 
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general, eternal relation of nature; (( 
but this is if one were)) to leave out 
just the specific quality which alone, 
makes 'instrument of production' and 
stored up labour into capital. (20) 
If one were to move within an attitude in which 
the pregiven, objective appearance of capital were to be 
accepted as actual, this would result in capital itself 
appearing as an alien power in relation to the 
labourer.Capital would have the status of being meaningful 
in itself and the meaning of the worker would be relative in 
relation to the fixity of the fact of capital. This apparent 
quality of capital to determine not only its own meaning, 
but also that of the labourer would be accepted by a 
labourer who accepts the appearance of the factual world as 
reality, as already there;as simply the way things are. 
Moreover, from a theoretical standpoint, this presupposition 
of the ontic quality of capital as a meaning for itself, and 
hence, as an objectively valid meaning, allows bourgeois 
theorists to treat this medate phenomenon as a natural law 
upon which society is founded. (21) The presence of capital, 
accepted presuppositionally as an objective fact with a 
self-justifying meaning is felt in everyday life.(22) It has 
a behaviour which can be evidenced empirically in everyday 
life through fluctuations in the standard of living and 
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stock markets. This behaviour of objective facts forms the 
focus of study in what we know as economics. The social or 
intersubjective state of affairs with which one is 
confronted at this point is, however, a collective 
relationship amongst individuals. It is in this 
relationship that people sustain their lives. 
The totality of these relations of 
production constitutes the economic 
structure of society, the real foundation 
((infrastructure)) on which arises a legal 
and political superstructure and to which 
correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness. The mode of production of 
material life conditions the general 
processes of social, political and 
intellectual life. It is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their 
existence, but their social existence 
which produces their consiousness. (23) 
The capitalistic mode of production will therefore 
produce its own corresponding superstructural or ideological 
perceptions of reality grasped, in this case, in terms of 
its reified forms. 
Thus, for Marx, ideas , conceptions and 
consciousness, as they are apparently understood, are 
reflections within the pregiven frame of reference. True, 
men 
are the producers of their conceptions, 
ideas, etc., but these are real, active 
men, as they are conditioned by the 
definite development of their productive 
forces and of the relationships 
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corresponding to these up to their highest 
forms. Consciousness can never be anything 
except conscious existence of men in their 
actual life process. If men and their 
circumstances appear upside down as in a 
comera obscura, this phenomenon is caused 
by their historical life-process.(24) 
Existence, for Marx, is clearly prior to essence. 
The logic of this is straightforward: I cannot think if I am 
not alive. As one's life literally depends upon the means of 
production, the form which that means of production takes is 
easily identified as a normative good since it maintains 
one's existence. This good also appears to the subject (in 
this particular case, the labourer), as pregiven. Conflicts 
over what mode of production a society will adopt locate 
themselves in the superstructural world of men's objective 
expressions. Marx adds to this that people who are involved 
in these conflicts remain essentially unaware of the true 
cause of this conflict inasmuch as they understand the world 
around themselves ideologically, purely in relation to its 
pregiven objectivity - as appearance. We have yet to 
ascertain, however, just what this conditioning mode of 
production is. If it is not pregiven, how does it come into 
this position of acceptance as being so? If a subject 
confronts capital as historically pregiven, and his personal 
history is temporally preceded by capital's existence, then 
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simply accepting this as a fact of the times would be enough 
to justify capital's precidence. However, this does not 
account for the production of capital, it only accounts for 
the apparently objective pregiveness of capital. If we were 
to accept this account we would be involved in a begged 
questions since we would not have accounted for the initial 
historical production of capital. 
5. The generation of capital "in general". 
It can be argued that the production of capital at 
any one time must be identical at an abstract or universal 
level to the first objective historical moment when capital 
was produced. Capital in general may thus be seen to have a 
universal character which any particular capital also 
shares. (25) 
Now, particular capitals, that is the capital 
realized in particular industries, interact on the money 
market. No distinction is made in the money market between 
capital realized in the steel industry or that realized in 
the manufacture of shirt bottons. We can see that this is 
the case in multi-national corporations: the capital 
realized in one industry can be reinvested in an enterprise 
which is in its particular aspects, totally different from 
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the enterprise in which it was originally generated. 
Similiarly, capital realized in yesterday's production is as 
valid a form of capital as that realized today, or, 
ostensibly, tomorrow. Capital in general, while an 
abstraction, thus has an apparent existence (26) and its 
effects are felt in the economy. Structurally speaking, 
then, what can be said of one particular capital can be said 
of any other particular capital if this is raised to a level 
of abstraction. The meaning of capital remains constant 
throughout any particular moment of the productive process. 
This must hold, otherwise different capitals could not 
interact at a general level. 
If it is possible to imagine the production of 
capital at a purely abstract level of discussion, then we 
will be able to ascertain how any capital at all can be 
generated. What is more, and this brings back to our 
original point of departure with concern to the apparent 
pregiveness of capital, the generation of capital, as what 
it is, would have to have been structurally identical in the 
first historical instance of its production as it is in any 
contemporary generation of capital. If this were not the 
case, we would not be producing capital, we would be 
producing something else. (27) 
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6. The bracketing of the pregiveness of capital as 
an objective, historical phenomenon. (28) 
In effect, this makes the initial historical 
moment of the production of capital structurally equivalent 
to any other particular moment in which capital in general 
is produced. The arguement that the labourer who comes into 
contemporary society is simply coping with the facts of life 
(29) in a capitalist world and so the acceptance of the 
pregiveness of capital is sensible thing for him to do, 
loses its objective historical weight in light of this. If 
what occured in the original moment in which capital was 
generated was identical "in general",(that is, at the 
abstract level),to what is produced now ,then the production 
of any particular capital in any moment, any "now" will be 
the same, theoretically speaking, as it was then. This is 
what allows particular capitals which are produced in 
different industries and at different times to interact in 
the economic reality of capitalism. Since capital produced 
yesterday can interact freely with capital produced today, 
and ostensibly, that which will be produced tomorrow, the 
responsibility for the generation of capital cannot be 
passed back historically as if the first objective 
historical moment in which capital was produced could be 
used to extricate the subject who produces capital "now" 
from any responsibility for what he is currently doing. 
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Consequently, any moment in which capital is 
generated can stand as a paradigm for the generation of 
capital. Since any moment in which capital is produced is 
structurally identical to any other, irrespective of its 
location in objective time, what we will be presented with 
in any moment ,(that is, any "now"), in which capital is 
produced, can be seen to be identical to the first objective 
historical moment in which capital was produced. Thus, the 
insulation of capital behind the appearance that its initial 
generation, which we are now seperated from in an objective 
historical or merely factual way, becomes absolutely 
neutralized; it has so significance. If capital at one time 
did not exist, then it at one time was not pregiven, either. 
What we will do if we create capital for the first time, at 
a theoretical level, is to create that appearance of 
pregiveness which appears to the ideologized labourer as if 
it has always been thus and so. This is essentially what 
Marx does in the first chapter of capital. As such, this 
explication can act as a paradigm of the generation of the 
apparent pregiveness of any phenomena. 
7. The production of capital as a subjective 
performance. 
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Since what Marx is describing is the emergence of 
an appearance, it cannot be claimed that the 
sensuo-empirically existent objects to which Marx turns his 
attention in and of themselves demand that the labourer, 
understand them in the way in which the latter does. These 
objects, as material objects, have no will of their own and 
so cannot be seen to actively condition the subject who 
involves himself with them. Such a claim would be pure 
metaphysics. The emergence of this appearance must 
therefore be seen as something which may involve these 
factually existing sensuo-empirical facts, but which cannot 
be accounted for by these facts as beings "for themselves". 
To do so would attribute to inert material objects, the 
ability to dictate to subjects what they, the inert objects, 
mean. Marx points to the ludicrousness of such a conception 
of a world in which objects are active and subjects are 
passively conditioned by these apparently active objects. 
(30) The emergence of the meaning which I have of these 
objects therefore cannot be seen as being of these objects 
as objects "for themselves", since this would attribute to 
inert, sensuo-empirical objects, a geistige quality. Thus, 
what we are now looking at is a subjective process of the 
constitution of the meaning which the subject may assign to 
these objects, but which the objects themselves, as inert, 
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can never be seen to account for, as this would assign to 
inert, sensuo-empirical facts, the ability to determine 
their own meaning. (3D 
8. Genetic. phenomenological description and 
psychological description in Marx. (32) 
Marx describes this phenomenon from two different 
vantage points. One is a genetic phenomenological 
perspective which allows the description of the logical 
structures of this phenomenon; that is, the way in which the 
subject constitutes the sense of this phenomenon for 
himself. This is accomplished by tracing out the genetic 
development of how the meaning of an object, in this case, 
capital, emerges. 
The second starting point is to describe the 
psychological effects which the subject undergoes as a 
result of having phenomenologically constituted the meaning 
of the capital in the way he has; and, one should add, in 
this subject's belief that his understanding of capital as 
pregiven actually makes it pregiven. Because the subject 
constitutes what captial means for him himself, this is a 
self-contradictory position to take. But, then again, Marx 
is describing a self-contradictory situation. The situation 
which arises as a result of naively accepting this 
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contradiction as sensible and what is more, in understanding 
oneself in relation to this absurdity, is what Marx 
describes as alienation. (33) 
Both the structural, genetic, description of the 
generation of capital and the descriptive psychological 
description of the effects which such a naive attitude 
towards capital produces, have the same fetishised 
structure. In the former, the genesis of the fetish 
structure is descibed. In the latter, the results of the 
subject's belief in this fetishized appearance are dwelt 
upon by Marx. 
9. The genetic description of the production of 
capital. 
i. The generation of money; the commodity seen as 
the basic unit of wealth in capitalistic society. 
The generation of capital presupposes the money 
form. The money form is the symbolic expression of the 
fetishization of commodities.(34) Thus, the Capital begins 
with a discussion of the commodity as a staightforwardly 
accepted thing. Commodities, says Marx, have two basic 
characteristics: they may be understood as what they are, 
that is as use-values which, such as food, which satisfies 
the subject's hunger, or art, for instance, which satisfies 
the subject's aesthetic sense. 
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The commodity is , first of all , an 
external object, a thing which through its 
qualities satisfies human needs, wherever 
they arise, for example, fron the stomach, 
or the imagination makes no difference. 
Nor does it matter here whether directly 
as a means of subsistence, i.e., an object 
of consumption, or indirectly as a means 
of production. (35) 
But a commodity may also be understood as having 
its value in what it is not; that is , as something to be 
exchanged for a commodity with a different use-value. When 
these objects are understood as exchange-values relative to 
other commodities rather than as use-values in themselves, 
not only the characteristics of the object as a use-value 
are obscured, but also the particular form of human labour 
which has altered this object is obscured as well. For 
instance, when a bolt of linen is transformed into a coat, 
(36) the subject's labour through which this transformative 
process is realized is put out of sight, or occluded, if the 
commodity becomes an object of value as what it is not; that 
is, when the commodity comes to be understood not as a 
use-value, but as an exchange value. 
ii.the commodity enters the exchange relation as the 
apparent measure of its own worth; the consequent 
occlusion of the quality of labour. 
The quality of the transformative labour which 
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remains with this commodity as a different use-value is, as 
an exchange-value, expressed only abstractly as a quantity 
of human labour involved in the alteration of this 
commodity's use-value. The difference between a bolt of 
linen and a coat, viewed as a use-value, is the quality of 
the tailoring (37) which is invested in the garment by the 
tailor. The difference between a bolt of linen and a coat, 
viewed as an exchange-value, ( that is, as its capability of 
transforming itself through exchange Into something which it 
is not), is the quantity of objective or abstract 
labour-time required to effect this transformation from one 
use-value to another. Or put more simply, the former 
relates to craftsmanship, the latter to man-hours, 
understood as an analytic category devoid of subjective 
content. 
The meaning of exchange-value is subjectively 
constituted, however: 
...when Galiani said: "value is a 
relation between persons..." he ought to 
have added: a relation concealed beneath a 
material ((viz., occlusive)) shell. (38) 
iii. Commodities confront each other in exchange as 
apparently self-determinant of their own value. 
Moreover, this exchange relation is a relative 
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phenomenon in its measure, in that the quantative measure of 
commodity "A" is calculated relative to that of commodity 
"B", the latter being the commodity which the former 
'becomes' in its exchange for the latter. That is, a 
commodity's market value, as the buyer's cost, is relative 
to what he, the buyer, offers in exchange for it, (sic, the 
buyer's own exchange commodity.) In the process of exchange 
the exchange-value, as a subjectively constituted relation 
which may be intersubjectively agreed upon, justifies the 
cost (viz. exchange-value) of commodity A relative to 
commodity B. The latter is relative to the former, as an 
exchange-value , and from the other side of the relation, 
that is of the other subject involved in the exchange, this 
relationship holds in reverse. (39). At this point, we are 
engaged in a simple barter process. 
The cost to the producer of the product, however 
(and he need not necessarily be the merchant), is dependent 
upon the quantity of labour-time invested in the production 
of the commodity. The value of this magnitude of this labour 
time, is itself relative to the amount of labour time which 
another producer invests in his product, but this now 
appears to be a quality of the products exchanged, not of 
the labourer who enacts these transformations. 
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The simplest value-relation is evidently 
that of one commodity to another commodity 
of a different kind ((i.e., a different 
use-value. )) (40) 
If this simple relation of exchange is approached from the 
position of one "pole" of the exchange relation of the 
other, either commodity can take the role of the equivalent 
to the role of the other pole of the exchange relation. The 
latter would play the part of the relative pole. 
Whether a commodity is in the relative 
form or in its opposite, the equivalent 
form, entirely depends on its actual 
position in the expression of value. That 
is , it depends in whether it is the 
commodity whose value is being expressed, 
or the commodity in which value is being 
expressed. (41) 
This relation might be otherwise expressed by 
saying that these two objects representing "congealed 
quantities of human labour", (42) but as the commodities 
themselves confront one another in the moment of exchange, 
it appears that in the value relation of one commodity to 
another the 
first commodity's value character emerges 
here through its own relation to the 
second commodity. (43) 
iv. Digression:Within this thesis labour is 
understood as qualitative inasmuch as the 
distinction between one use-value and another is a 
judicative activity which involves a judging of 
use-values, where the latter are understood as 
themselves qualitative. 
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The assumption of the fact of this appearance is 
not aided by the actuality that, for Marx, human labour 
creates Value, but is not value itself. (44) Labour creates 
the value of objects as commodities but this labour only 
appears in these commodities abstractly when they are 
understood as exchange-values. Marx will continue to 
describe the emergence of the factual characteristics of the 
commodity as an exchange-value. However, the presupposition 
which underpins this examination is the presupposition of 
the qualitative character of labour. True, in the labour 
process a material object is realized, but this is the 
material realization of an idea. (45) As well, if these 
material objects are the realization of ideas, then it is 
the labourer's (sic. subject's) meaning as an idea which is 
expressed in the labour process. In relation to the example 
of the transformation of the linen into a coat, the labourer 
must first distinguish the linen as a material object 
capable of expressing his "idea" in material form as the 
coat. In all of this, the objective facts of neither the 
linen nor of any other material use-value account for how it 
is that the subject, as a labourer in this case, can discern 
that these use-values are capable of being the material 
vehicle for his expression. It is the labourer who 
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inevitably makes this decision. The labourer must judge for 
himself since the facts do not undertake any activity for 
themselves in determining their own use-value. 
It may be argued that production is mimetic; this, 
however, is a condition of mass production. The situation 
which we are treating at this juncture is a "first 
instance". If, in our present particular example of the 
linen and the coat, no coats existed before, then this 
cannot be a mimetic moment since there is simply nothing to 
mime or copy in this case. More will be said in relation to 
this, below. However, we can say at this point, that what 
disappears in the occlusion of the use-value by the 
exchange-value is not merely the utility of the objects 
concerned . As products of labour what is occluded is the 
human judgement involved in what, at base, is a creative 
act. 
It is through this occlusive misperception that 
the exchange value of commodities appears to find its source 
in the act of exchange itself rather than in the act of 
creation or, as we have put it , in the act of the material 
realization of the subject's idea. The resulting collapsing 
of quality and quantity and the acceptance of this as a 
valid premise from which to deductively move is a necessary 
precondition for the production of capital. If this premise 
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is allowed to stand as valid, the precident for the 
collapsing of the qualitative and quantitative will have 
been established and capital, which is an idea, will be seen 
as transubstantiable. 
v. The emergence of the money form as the abstract 
expression of all possible exchange values. 
Up to this point Marx has described what he calls 
the simple form of value. His analysis up to this point has 
not entailed any phenomena which could not be witnessed in a 
simple act of barter. However, the elucidation of this 
barter situation outlines the genetic structure involved in 
a fetishized understanding of the exchange of one commodity 
for another. In its expanded form, the exchange relation 
(through which it appears that exchange-value becomes a 
material fact which has an independence of meaning in 
relation to the subjects involved in it), is examined in 
regard to the exchange of a multitude of possible 
commodities. In this expanded relation, the function of the 
relative pole of the exchange process becomes the pole to 
which all exchange values become equivalent. The selection 
of a particular commodity as the relative pole is ad hoc. 
In this relation 
each commodity...figures in the expression 
of value of the linen ((Marx's example of 
the relative pole of the relation)) as an 
equivalent, hence, as a physical object 
possessing value. (46) 
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It is a small step from here to the establishment of the 
general form of value in which one particular commodity is 
chosen as a constant against which the equivalent value of 
all other commodities as values comes to be assessed. It is 
in this general form that commodities first play their role 
as objective meanings which relate to one another on the 
basis of their value as facts with a being for themselves 
rather than in relation to the value assigned to them by the 
subjects involved. In this moment, they all come to be 
measured, one commodity against another, as equivalent to 
one fixed standard, to which each of them is , in its own 
turn, equivalent. The commodity which acts as the constant 
in this relation, that is, the commodity to which the 
expressed value of all other commodities is relative, is 
still a commodity itself and therefore cannot measure its 
own worth. This means that if linen, for instance, is the 
socially accepted means of fixing the measure of exchange 
value, then linen cannot be used to express its own value. 
• Money thus comes into being through the social 
custom of designating one commodity, in the case of most 
cultures, gold, as the universal measure of all other 
commodities. (47) And, as Marx points out, there is a 
special difficulty in understanding money as a social ( 
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which is to say, abstract) (48) relation. The difficulty 
which Marx is speaking about arises, because the money 
relation, which is actually an intersubjective phenomenon 
appears to be an interobjective relation which takes place 
between the objects (or money as the abstract expression of 
these) which subjects own. While it is true that money has a 
material presence gold and silver in the strictly objective 
character, are not money. In societies in which gold and 
silver were present in great amounts, such as Aztec Mezico 
or Incan Peru, gold and silver were not used as money (49). 
Money, however, is not simply exchange-value since 
money is seen to have an objective existence: 
...it is not only an ideal notion, but is 
actually presented to the mind in an 
objective ((sic, factual)) mode. A 
measure can be held in the hand...(50) 
Money thus has two meanings: first, it is ideal in that it 
is the abstract expression of any commodity which is 
understood as an exchange-value, and as such it exists only 
in an ideal state; (51) on the other hand, it is 
re-presented in a material form, and hence appears as an 
objective, material thing. So while 
exchange value is = to the relative labour 
time materialized in products, money for 
its part, is = to the exchange value of 
commodities, seperated from their 
substance. (52) 
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Within a society in which the exchange relation, 
that is, the values realized in this relation, become what 
is valued by the individuals in that society rather than 
the use-values of commodities , the simple (and potentially 
innocent), function of money as a mediation between 
commodities ceases. 
10. The alienation of labour as a logically 
necessary moment in the money relation; alienation 
of labour as the psychological parallel to 
fetishization. 
While it is clear, in Marx's view, that a 
fetishism of commodities situation emerges as a matter of 
course from an exchange relation, money might function as a 
simple mediation which, if properly understood, could act in 
its abstract role in a money-commodity exchange quite 
harmlessly. This relation can be expressed as M-C where 
"M"=money, and "C"=commodity. The subject, as a consumer, 
has money which he or she exchanges for a use-value. The 
subject's intention in this act would be the acquisition of 
a commodity for the satisfaction of some need or other of 
this subject. However, in its material form, money appears 
to be brought into real existence. M-C relationship is 
examined, then we find that money loses its apparently 
innocent function because this relation presupposes that the 
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imaginative ideas may be realized through material 
productive process in a material form, but these factual 
commodities which are realized in such a productive process 
are not themselves judgments; they re-present or express in 
material form, the judgments which the labouring subject 
himself makes. 
11. The occlusion of the qualitative (viz., 
judicative) ability of the labourer in the wage 
labour relation. 
The wage-labour exchange takes place between the 
capitalist, (or, in a more contemporary setting, the 
corporation which is only the abstract legal form which 
represents the interests of the ideal capitalist), and the 
labourer. Within this relation it is presupposed that the 
labourer's ability to make judgments is quantifiable as an 
exchange-value as is any other commodity. Thus the 
commodification of labour as human labour is a 
self-contradiction. 
In order to enter into an M-C relation, the 
labourer must enter into a social relation of production 
which is premised upon a self-contradiction. If the 
collapsing of the qualitative and the quantitative is 
allowed as possible at this level then the validity of the 
wage-labour relation will also appear to be the actual case. 
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Its pregiveness will have been tacitly accepted as valid. 
The acquiescence to the apparent pregiveness of the money 
relation qua wage labour must be allowed if the wage labour 
relation is to be workable. Since this relation is founded 
on a fallacy, what follows upon it will, consequently also 
be a fallacy. 
12. The pre-eminence of mediate (viz. factual) 
evidence in capitalistic society allows the 
capitalist to claim the complicity of the worker by 
merit of the worker's production of commodities as 
facts; the proof of the contention that quality can 
be transubstantiated into quantity. 
What is more, the reproduction of this fallacy as 
what is socially viewed as true, need not involve the 
labourer as an agent who is aware of the actual or true 
conditions which are involved in the generation of the 
reification of his ability to make qualitative distinctions. 
That is, the labourer need not be conscious of what is in 
actuality occuring, since by his very participation in this 
wage labour relation, he is an accomplice to the affirmation 
of the apparent validity of this relation. Since his ability 
to make jugements has already been occlusively assumed in 
the emergence of the money form as valid, his capacity to 
make judgements will be presupposed at an occluded level 
throughout the whole process. This means that if only the 
empirical aspects of this productive process are examined 
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in order to theoretically explain the productive process, 
then the actual meaning of process will be occluded by the 
presupposition of the apparent self-explanatory nature of 
the objects; that is, the commodities and their abstract 
expression in the money form which are also involved in this 
process. Since the labourer's ability to make judgements is 
not in and of itself a fact, the actual meaning of labour 
is never even considered by bourgeois economics, enamoured 
as it is by "facts". As well, since the qualitative aspect 
of the labour process is invisible to such an attitude, the 
worker can be presupposed as a functioning part of the total 
machinery (and when this is viewed from both the "soft-ware" 
and "hard-ware" aspects of modern production, this could be 
refered to as the productive "system"), of the productive 
process. He need not make his ability to make judgments 
evident in his presence in the work place. As long as he 
does his job in the total process of mlmetically duplicating 
objects, he will have satisfied the requirements of the 
wage labour relation. In this way, the corporation need not 
have the conscious co-operation of the labourer in order to 
implicate him in the contradiction which it perpetuates, 
since it buys his soul (his ability to make judgements) 
behind his back (56), so to speak, and uses the factual 
objects which the labourer produces as factual evidence to 
prove the labourer's assent to the process. 
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Of course, the labourer does not go unrewarded for 
his complicity in this act of production. He is paid a wage. 
This wage, as a sum of money, appears to have a factual 
validity of its own. However the validity of money is only 
an appearance and one which is derived initially from the 
negation of the labourer's ability to make judgements, 
either in the material, productive process itself, in which 
the labourer realizes material objects, or in the process of 
the generation of the money form. Thus, when the labourer 
exchanges his money for the commodities which he consumes in 
the course of his daily life, (an exercise through which, in 
the context of bourgeois society, the subject realizes 
himself), he is actually buying back his sense of self 
which was previously alienated by him in his acceptance of 
the role he was to play in the larger social money relation. 
In this way the labourer negates his own ability to make 
qualitative judgments in his participation on the 
wage-labour, money relation. This occurs in both his 
production of commodities and in his purchasing of them, 
since his participation in the money relation at any moment 
of this will appear as his validation of this relation. 
13. The constitution of the capitalist social 
reality is not 'fixed' in an objective historical 
fashion, but is re-constituted in every 
phenomenological "now". 
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The social money relation, as an actually abstract 
intersubjective understanding, has no real existence. As in 
the case of money , however, this abstract meaning is 
symbolized in material form; for example, in the actual bank 
buildings and in the written legal records of debts paid and 
in laws, etcetera. These material objects, as facts, have no 
will of their own, and hence, can impose no meaning upon the 
subjects involved in social interaction. It follows, that as 
an ideal meaning, as an idea, this social reality must be 
recreated by the subjects involved in this social-abstract 
relation every day. 
However, we might point out here that the money 
relation as the basis of capitalistic society, is not 
something which, once accepted as pregivenly valid, needs to 
remain as an unexplored premise. As an abstract phenomenon, 
the value of money actually is present only in the subject's 
imagination. True, this abstract idea may find expression in 
some way, but this quantitative expression is not the 
quality which it expresses. Because the validity of capital, 
like that of money, is derivitive from a judgment performed 
by a subject, the validity of both capital and money, as 
they appear to be, must be the result of a decision made by 
those involved in the relations of production. To use 
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Husserl's expression, this apparent validity must be 
reconstituted by subjects as cognizing, but not necessarily 
fully conscious beings, from one moment to the next. As Marx 
says every new day the social world, (based as it is on the 
mode of production which cognizing subjects themselves 
constitute as a meaningful and valid phenomenon), is once 
again made manifest as what reality is through their 
participation in the social world of capital. (57) 
16. The psychological description of alienation an 
its corresponding phenomenological correlates as 
hypostatizations: the fetishism of commodities. 
The situation which Marx has posited and the one 
which we have been following, is that of a subject whose 
understanding of the actual remains at an apparent or 
ideological level of awareness: an awareness, (or more 
correctly, a lack of this) in which the subject who accepts 
the money relation in its fetishized form as objectively 
valid. In so doing, the subject reifies his own ability to 
make judgments. In this condition, the subject's 
understanding of himself presents itself as it does in 
religion, where 
the spontaneity of human imagination, the 
spontaneity of the human brain and heart, 
acts independently of the individual as an 
alien, divine, or devilish activity. 
Similiarly, the activity of the worker is 
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not his activity. It (( is perceived as 
belonging )) to another. It is the loss 
of his own self. (58) 
The presuppositions which allow the above 
absurdity to hold together as a deductively coherent whole, 
are "numerically" (59) identical to the ones described in 
the development of the money form; that is, a reified 
understanding on the part of the subject of his own ability 
for judicative activity. What is different in the two 
descriptions is that in Marx's description of the money 
form, he describes the genesis of the delusion. In his 
description of alienation, he describes the results of the 
subject's believing that this delusion is actual. In the 
latter case Marx is describing what it feels like (77) to 
live an alienated life: 
The results ((of granting the pregiveness 
of a world of appearance as true))...,is 
that man...feels that he is acting freely 
only in his animal functions — eating, 
drinking, and procreating, or at the most 
in his shelter and finery — while in his 
human ((judicative)) functions he feels 
only like an animal. The animalistic 
becomes the human and the human the 
animalistic. (60) 
The irony of this reified grasp of one's own meaning, is 
that this lived fallacy would not only be a contradiction if 
I were to live it In such a fashion. It would equally be a 
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fallacy for anyone else to live it as well. This is so even 
if such a contradiction is not consciously understood as 
such by the subject . The subject might well feel the 
results of accepting a contradiction as valid even if he 
does not understand its source. 
However, if the resolution of this contradiction 
which gives rise to uneasy or unhappy feelings, is sought by 
expressing oneself monetarily, then the whole cycle of 
alienation will be relnstlgated since the alleviation which 
the subject seeks in the spending of his money to make him 
feel like a "somebody" will work only in as much as the 
subject believes that the commodities which he purchases 
have an ideal status which he can obtain purely through 
"owning" them. Thus, the artistic imbecile (61) purchases 
art at Sotheby's which, in its own right, may have been 
brilliantly executed by the artist, but which the new owner 
has no hope of ever understanding. Nevertheless, the 
physical ownership of this commodity gives rise to the 
appearance that its owner now possesses the quality of this 
work. Hence, he can impress himself (or his associates) 
with his newly purchased 'understanding' of art. Thus, 
individuals with greater purchasing power appear to have a 
greater ability to judge the quality of art. They are, 
within the capitalistic context, "better people". 
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With the money form presupposed in its fetishized 
form, that is in the subject's understanding of himself 
grounded in the acceptance of himself as a commodity and as 
someone who believes himself to be is understood in terms 
of others by the commodities which he "owns", the subject 
interacts with other subjects as commodities. 
The mysterious character of the 
commodity-form ((its metaphysical 
property)) consists therefore simply in 
the fact that the commodity reflects the 
social characteristics of men's own labour 
as objective characteristics of the 
products of labour themselves, as the 
socio-natural properties of these 
things...as a social relation between 
objects which exists apart from and 
outside the producers. (81) 
It is nothing but the definite social 
relation between men themselves which 
assumes here, for them, the fantastic form 
of a relation between things.(62) 
15. Bourgeois society as a cash nexus. 
The social bond between individuals in this 
fetishized "reality" becomes money not as "measure" but as a 
social mediation: (63) intersubjective understandings are 
reduced to a a cash nexus. Thus, as Marx would say, the 
"individual carries his social power, as well as his bond 
with society in his pocket." (64) People "place in a thing 
((money)) the faith that they do not place in each other." 
(65) 
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Indeed, in so far as the commodity or 
labour is conceived of only as exchange 
value, and the relation in which the 
various commodities are brought into 
connection with one another as the 
exchange of these exchange values with one 
another, as their equation, then the 
individuals , the subjects between whom 
this process goes on, are simply and only 
conceived of as exchangers. (66) 
In this way, the subject's life is neatly 
dichotamized between the public world of exchange in which 
he can participate only if he is willing to alienate 
himself; and the private world, in which he can do whatever 
he wants, but which is effectively pointless because this is 
the world of the solus ipsa. There is an irony here because 
what is actually the social is lived at a fetishized level 
through the apparently ontologically secure and meaningful 
lives of exchange values and the actual social world is 
lived as if it were fantasy. The world of the purely 
fantastic (i.e., the world of self-determining objects), 
appears to be the actual and vice-versa. 
The illusion, however, continues. The freedom of 
the individual who functions within this apparent reality 
is, as well, lived vicariously by the subject through his 
reification of himself as it is expressed in his money. 
However, according to Marx: 
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...it is merely insipid to conceive of 
this merely objective bond as a 
spontaneous, natural attribute inherent in 
individuals and Inseperable from their 
nature. (67) 
The bond is the product of men themselves, but , within the 
world of appearance, men conceive of themselves as the 
product of their own product. Thus: 
In the money relation, in the developed 
system of exchange (and this semblence 
seduces the democrats), the ties of 
personal dependence, of distinctions of 
blood, education, etc. are in fact 
exploded, ripped up (at least, personal 
ties all appear as personal relations); 
and individuals seem independent (this is 
an independence which is at bottom merely 
an illusion, and it is more correctly 
called indifference), free to collide with 
one another and to engage in exchange 
within this freedom. (68) 
16. Description of the world of appearance as if it 
were actual leads to an ontologization of ideas. 
If the world of appearance which gains its sense 
from fetish objects is presupposed as the actual world which 
the subject experiences then a theory which describes such a 
world will not penetrate below the surface of this reality. 
Such a theoretical description can only be a "reflection" of 
what is essentially a begged question since the validity of 
the premises upon which such an ideological reality is built 
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are assumed to be valid. In examining the really existing 
facts which correspond to a social relation, the meaning of 
these facts is presupposed. In effect, no distinction is 
drawn between these really existing facts and what they are 
interpretted to mean. Since an act of interpretation must 
be undertaken by a subject, but the facts appear to be 
self-explanatory, the actual source of the meaning of these 
facts is occluded. This sort of begged question can operate 
in reverse if the meaning of these facts is accepted as 
really existing. The latter understanding of social 
relations is idealistic; the former is materialistic In 
both cases, however, the real and the irreal are collapsed. 
In the former instance, the real appears to function in 
place of the irreal; in the latter, the irreal is seen as 
accounting for the existence of the real. In both cases, 
ideas appear to be factually existent. 
This mistake is compounded because any theoretical 
explanation of social relations must appeal to the use of 
abstract, theoretical concepts. As Marx points out, the 
theoretical explanation of social relations 
can be expressed, of course, only in 
ideas, and thus philosophers have deemed 
the reign of ideas to be the peculiarity 
of the new age...(71) 
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These "ideas", either as irreal beings, or as 
self-determinant facts, take on an apparent ontic status. 
They appear to become the 'is' as opposed to the 'ought'. In 
effect, they are both the is and the ought. What 
differentiates the is from the ought is not something 
essential, but is rather only a matter of focus. (72) Again, 
in relation to money: 
It is not at all apparent on its face that 
its character of being money is merely the 
result of social process; it is money, 
((my emphasis)) (73) 
17. The apparently objective restrictions placed 
upon subjects within such a fetishized social 
reality are derived from the presupposition of the 
"is" of reality; abstract reality as ontologically 
pregiven. 
The "is" which is not actually existent is 
interpreted as such. Because of this, it takes on the 
appearance of determining the limits of reality. For the 
subject who functions within the presupposition of the 
validity of this "is", all other possible ways of 
understanding social reality appear to be mere imaginings. 
This is ironic, since this is precisely what his 
understanding of social reality is but he simply will not 
admit this. But in transcending such a belief-fixated grasp 
78 
of reality the individual would accomplish a move beyond the 
presupposition of the "is" as pregiven. He would transcend 
the illusion that what he knows as reality is anything but a 
possible interpretation of what he is confronted with in his 
day to day living. However: 
This ((transcendence of the pregiven 
character of the is)) is all the more 
difficult since ((money's)) immediate 
use-value stands in no relation to its 
((social)) role, and because, in general, 
the memory of its use-value as distinct 
from exchange-value, has become entirely 
extinguished in this incarnation 
((ontological positing)) of pure exchange 
value. (74) 
The restrictions which an individual actually imposes on 
someone else by sustaining the cash nexus reality as valid 
appears to be constituted world, as "an objective 
restriction of the individual by relations independent of 
him and sufficient unto themselves." (75) The free movement 
and exchange of money thereby takes on the appearance of the 
freedom of the individuals in that society. Correspondingly, 
the more money a person has, the freer he is. 
B.The procreation of new money by old money:capital. 
1. Brief review of presuppositions in relation to 
money as a "static" form. 
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The emergence of money as a social mediation 
presupposes the alienation of the individual labourer. The 
phenomenological structure of the fetishized commodity, as 
well as that of alienation, are essentially the same and 
both are internally contradictory in the same way. The end 
result is the corresponding metaphysical delusion that 
objects maintain a meaningful existence for themselves. 
These objects take on lives of their own, which in actuality 
are reflections of the lives of those who believe in them as 
such. In maintaining the validity of such a 
self-contradictory state of affairs is a perceptual 
transubstantiation of the ideal into a material form. And, 
however fallacious such a way of understanding reality is, 
it nevertheless forms the deductive and analytic frame of 
reference within which decisions are made. The acceptance of 
the transubstantiablity of capital effectively sets up an 
analytic norm by means of which the deductive continuity and 
consistnecy of judgments made within this presuppositional 
frame of reference can be determined. What follows is 
Marx's description of what occurs within, and appears to 
make sense within, these parameters when they are accepted 
as pregivenly valid. 
2. Money enters the exchange relation as a commodity 
of a unique sort. 
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The money relation is one of C-M:M-C, in which 
the social relationship appears to be mediated by money and 
in which the subject understands himself as a commodiflable 
thing. Circulation, however, may be looked at not only as a 







can be expressed as C-M:M-C, or as M-C:C-M. 
In the former case money ((is)) only a 
means to obtain the commodity, and the 
commodity ((is)) the aim; in the second 
case the commodity ((is)) only a means to 
obtain money, and money ((is)) the aim. 
(77) 
Inasmuch as the relationship is circular and it is 
an arbitrary decision as to which of these linear 
relationships to examine, it makes no difference which one 
is selected to illustrate this point. 
However, a specific distinction does enter 
between a commodity in cirqulation ana 
money in circulation. The commodity is 
thrown out of circulation at a certain 
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point and fulfils its definitive function 
only when it is definitively withdrawn 
from circulation, consumed, whether in the 
act of production of in consumption 
proper. The function of money, by 
contrast, is to remain in circulation as 
its vehicle, to resume its circular course 
always anew like a perpetuum mobile. (78) 
3. Profit, or merchant's capital, is realized at the 
intersticies of economic systems. Capital is the 
realization of reified "surplus-value" within the 
self-identical economic system. 
In the first relation, C-M:M-C, money serves as a 
medium of exchange. As such, it is a symbolic place holder 
for commodities. If the exchange relation were to remain as 
C-M:M-C, then it would remain a self-enclosed one. Any 
increase in the number of commodities sold would necessarily 
presuppose that they would be bought with money. However, 
the money would have had to be acquired by the purchaser 
from a previous exchange. This previous exchange would also 
have been of the type C-M:M-C, and so the volume of money, 
viewed strictly within the deductive frame of reference 
which C-M:M-C allows us, could not increase since it would 
be a self-enclosed process. This is the classic situation 
of "merchant's capital", (79) which Marx is careful to point 
out, is not the same as industrial capital. 
The profit which the merchant realizes is quite 
simply the difference between the cost of what he sells and 
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what he buys. Thus the adage: buy low, sell high. However, 
this only works if one transacts business on both sides of 
the relation; only if one acts as a 'middle-man' oneself. 
If, however, one is seen as a part of the total community, 
and the wealth of that community is expressed in monetary 
terms, the gain of one is also his loss since the loss of 
the other, as a co-member of the first actor's community, 
will also designate a loss for the first member. In this way 
we can see the absurdity of the enterprise of Milo 
Minderbinder, the archetypal entrepreneur in Joseph Heller's 
novel, Catch-22, (81) who claims that he can buy eggs at 
five cents apiece, sell them for three cents apiece and 
still make a profit because, according to Milo, everyone he 
does business with is a member of the same syndicate. If 
Milo were not a member of this syndicate, then he could 
either make a profit or realise a loss, but only because his 
transactions would cross community boundaries. But even 
here, the money which he would realise as a profit would 
have to have been produced by someone else in the first 
place which brings us back to our original problem of where 
the money could come from. Commodities are removed from the 
circulation process in their consumption; money, however, is 
not consumed. In this case, if Milo had started the exchange 
process with money instead of eggs, he would still have not 
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produced any new money in relation to his syndicate because 
the syndicate is a closed system. The puzzle, as Marx says 
in Capital (82) is that of M-C-M', where M' represents a 
greater quantity of money than was initially started with. 
The puzzle is one of "surplus-value". 
4. The dynamic character of capital is its ability 
to generate more of itself by merit of being 
capital. 
It is quite easy to understand how labour 
can increase use-value; the difficulty is 
how it can create exchange values greater 
than those with which it began? (83) 
The question now arises as to how money, as 
capital, can become more than it is when the money in 
circluation remains arithmetically tied to the existence of 
the objects whose circulation it mediates? The production of 
capital, Marx points out, presupposes the alienation of 
labour (84). If we put this in an analogous form, we could 
say that in the fetishism of commodities and the alienation 
of labour the subject finds himself reflected in his 
material objects, as in a mirror. The world of appearance, 
the reflection, is what the naive individual believes 
himself to be, but the reflection is possible only because 
he looks into the mirror in the first place. In a situation 
in which the subject accepts the appearance, of which he is 
the actual source, as though it accounted for itself, he 
84 
will depend upon the image in the mirror to relate to him 
what the meaning of the facial expression reflected in the 
mirror means. Of course, this is a question which will 
receive no answer because the mirror will not say anything 
which is not first said by the subject himself. This is an 
absurd, but self-enclosed process. When the subject walks 
away, the image leaves the mirror. 
In the relation of M-C:C-M, where money is not 
consumed in the exchange process, it appears that the image 
in the mirror carries on a life of its own. While this is 
actually false, this illusion allows capital to seem as if 
it is dynamic. It not only has a life, as the fetishized 
commodity does; it lives a life (85). Or, again, as Marx 
says in Capital (86), capital is its own process. Just as 
gossip cannot be born without lies, capital cannot be born 
without money. Or, more pithily put, capital is the tale of 
gossip which is the result of the lies which the fetishised 
commodities allow. As well, it is clear that in gossip, it 
is people who fabricate these lies (sic, fetishized 
commodities). It is also people who create the stories which 
make these lies hang together. The question which arises now 
is one which asks what it is about the subjects involved In 
the labour process which allows capital to act in their 
stead. What is capital the reified representation of? 
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5. Digression into bourgeois economics as the 
fetishized, analytic elevation of capital to the 
level of the actual and the resulting theoretical 
metaphysic 
Because bourgeois economists accept capital as 
factually pregiven, they fail to understand that capital, as 
an idea (87) Is not factually existent. As Marx says in the 
"German Ideology", it is as if the idea of gravity was what 
kept people on the ground. In their acceptance of capital as 
both ideal and as capable of becoming real, the economists 
in effect see these two realms as inter-changeable, and so 
they are involved in metaphysics of the ontological sort, 
just as idealists such as Hegel were. For Marx, they are 
simply the high priests of a new religion which has money as 
its fetish object. 
Hence the pre-bourgeois forms of the 
social organization of production are 
treated by political economy in much the 
same way as the Fathers of the Church 
treated pre-Christian religions. (88) 
Thus: 
Economists have a singular method of 
procedure. There are only two kinds of 
institutions for them, artificial and 
natural. The institutions of feudalism are 
artificial institutions, those of the 
bourgeoisie are natural institutions. In 
this way, they resemble the theologians, 
who likewise establish two kinds of i 
religion. Every relgion which is not 
theirs...((the good side))...is an I 





while theirs is an emination of God.(89) 
In this we can see the basis for Marx's statement that 
within such an ideologized consciousness, it appears that: 
...nothing ((Is)) higher in itself, 
nothing is legitimate for itself, outside 
this circle of social production and 
exchange. Thus capital creates the 
bourgeios society and the universal 
appropriation of nature as well as of the 
social bond itself by members of society. 
(92) 
As Marx points out, the telos which drives 
capitalistic society forward is not simply gain but to gain. 
This is an unfulfilable project. To think that it can ever 
be fulfilled in actuality is absurd. But this absurdity 
appears to make sense because it is premised upon the 
equally absurd notion that the qualitative can actually 
become quantified, and vice-versa. With this initial 
absurdity accepted, the telos of capitalist society appears 
to be justified, and the intention 'to gain' appears to be 
materially fulfilable. (93) 
Marx's description of the process of capital's 
"becoming" is based upon the propostion that capital is 
Only the ideal expression of the real 
((actual)) movement through which capital 
comes into being. (94) 
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Within an ideological consciousness, in which 
quality and quantity indescriminately take turns at 
occluding one another, ( or, what is simply a different way 
of putting this, in which capital appears as a "general, 
eternal,relation of nature") (95) the acceptance of the 
pregiveness this mode of production presupposes the validity 
of money, a presupposition which already accepts the 
quantifiability of quality as it is expressed in abstract 
labour time. Capital itself is conceived of as an idea 
which is conceived of within a capitalistic attitude as 
being transubstantiable into the material. This is 
evidenced in the transformation of capital into money (96) 
which is conceived of as a material thing. In the 
production process, the capital which it is assumed is 
necessary as an a priori condition to the materially 
productive act, is transformed into the commodity. When this 
commodity is exchanged for money, capital appears to have 
become the money form and hence is both material and ideal. 
The transformation of commodities into money takes place in 
the exchange relation. In this moment, the symbolic objects 
which represent captial in this exchange. are transformed 
into money. Thus, money which is presupposed as a 
self-determining fact, but which is actually a fantasy (97), 
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validates the corresponding presupposition that the idea of 
capital can be made manifest quantatively. (98) 
Marx retraces the path of the commodity within the 
productive process at great length. However, he finds no 
moment at which capital can realise its money value in 
anything but an arithmetic way. The commodity remains 
within a simple fetishised condition of maintianing its 
character as a fetish object to the labourer's being. At 
only one point, Marx claims, can capital become more than 
the initial investment of money. This point, at which M 
becomes M', when the original investment becomes more than 
it initially is, lies in the actual labouring process 
itself. (99) 
6.Objective becoming: subjective becoming; capital 
emerges as a being for itself. 
The dynamic character of capital which is seen in 
capital's apparent ability to become may be contrasted to 
money's static being. Being may be conceptually frozen out 
of time, as, for example, when one says that God exists. But 
becoming is being in the flux of time. It is thus both 
concrete in its material facticity and abstract in its 
meaning. Becoming is experiential from the standpoint of 
the consciousness which becomes. And since only a conscious 
being can experience, capital comes to have a status as a 
self-determining phenomenon. 
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In relation to simple relations of production of 
any kind, we have seen that the subject has the ability to 
transform the use-value of a commodity into another 
use-value. These objects are material; this is the source of 
their intersubjective sharedness. It is only through human 
labour that these social objects are in fact transformed. In 
this labour act we can see, with Marx, that it is in 
material labour and only in material labour that the subject 
can become in social terms. Social labour, as a material 
process, necessarily takes place in the world of objective 
time and space. This labour 
... is the living, form giving fire: it is 
the transitoriness of things, their 
temporality, as their formation by living 
time. (100) 
The subject realizes his lived experience of becoming in the 
production process. For Marx, it is the man, the cognizing 
subject, in activity, who apprehends truth as an synthetic 
unity of the concrete and the abstract. (101) 
However, in the production of capital, capital 
itself appears to be the necessary condition which precedes 
labour. Capital, which confronts labour as its anti-thesis 
in the wage-labour relation, appears, first, to drive labour 
beyond the limits of its merely human character, (its 
"paltriness"!) (102); and second, it appears as the 
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necessary precondition of the process through which truth is 
realized at the social level. Capital, as the embodiment 
of money which is grasped as immortal in relation to its 
role in the exchange-relation, appears to absorb the 
activity of the labourer and, through this metaphysical, 
sould-stealing contact, immortalizes the living process of 
the labourer in a reified form as the fetish object, 
capital. Thus, through its contact with capital and with 
the absorption of the geistlge aspects of the subject's 
process, labour, as the material expression of this process, 
is conceptually transformed and sense of the activity of 
labour itself. In its now reified appearance, labour... 
appears no longer as labour itself, but as 
the full development of activity itself, 
in which natural necessity in its direct 
form has disappeared.(103) 
In this it appears that capital, as activity itself, (104) 
has made possible the factual, material expression of labour 
as it embodies itself in the commodity ( since capital 
appears to provide the real materials to be worked upon in 
the first place). As part and parcel of capital's apparent 
acquisition of the ability to act, capital acquires the 
appearance of having the ability to transform material 
objects itself, since the worker's ability to do so has 
already been paid for and consumed as would be the case with 
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any other commodity. The labourer's ability to qualitatively 
transform objects in a purposeful fashion is the end result 
of a judicative process. If the labourer is denied this 
ability, then this appears to be the ability of capital. 
Since capital now appears to be able to make such 
judgements, at least as they are evidenced at this level of 
deductive analytics (i.e., with the fetishism of commodities 
presupposed as a valid premise), capital must also be 
capable of experiencing since judgements can only be made by 
a cognizant being. Hence, capital itself appears to become; 
to have an existence in which the material and ideal are a 
unity. 
7. Living labour as subjective process both 
preserves the capital invested and creates new 
capital. (105) 
In the production of capital, capital is both 
preserved by labour, in that the capital invested in tools 
and materials (the means of production) is not lost, and, it 
is also created. (106) Through the use of the machinery of 
the means of production, the capital invested in this 
machinery is not lost, but is preserved by subjective 
labour. It would appear to the individual who perceives 
reality within the assumption of the pregiveness of the 
validity of capital, that it is capital which makes the 
92 
process possible by its original investment in the 
machinery, etc. However, without the labourers to put this 
system of production into service, the investment is 
spurious. 
However, the act of engaging in the productive 
process on the terms of the capitalist (sic, corporation) 
also produces capital. Since capital is the abstract 
reflection of the subject's own process of becoming and the 
former appears to be more real than the latter process 
because of its assumed immortality, the labourer's actual 
lived process appears to be a subordinate phenomenon in 
relation to capital. However, in actuality, it is: 
Living labour ((which)) adds a new amount 
of labour; however it is not a 
quantitative addition which preserves the 
amount of already objectified labour ((the 
currently "existing" capital)), but rather 
i t 3
 quality as living labour 
((accomplishes this preservation of the 
invested capital.)) (107) 
8.Labour as qualitative and quantitaive: Capital 
rests on the conceptual collapsing of the 
qualitative (irreal) and quantitative (real). 
Living labour, the actual consciously lived 
experience of the labourer, viewed, by necessity as the 
labourer in the first person since to understand this in any 
other way would be to make a claim that lived experience had 
93 
something other than a subject as its experiencer, 
...is not paid for this quality which it 
possesses as living labour...rather it is 
paid for the amount of labour contained in 
itself ((i.e.,its fetishized form)). (108) 
Indeed, this qualitative function which the labourer 
performs as a judging individual, can only be bought if it 
is conceived of in a fetishized way. Ironically 
This quality ((of simply being 'living 
labour')) does not cost the worker 
anything either, since it is the natural 
property of his labouring capacity. (109) 
((Therefore)) 
Within the production process, the 
seperation of labour ((as an abstract, 
judicative process)) from its objective 
moments of existence ((its material-social 
expression or realization))... is 
suspended... The existence of capital and 
wage labour rest on this seperation. (110) 
This suspension, or repression of the actual 
irreduciblity of quality to quantity, and vice versa, allows 
the capitalist to apparently purchase from the worker, his 
qualitative ability to make judgments, since the judgment, 
in this case, now appears to be an integral element of the 
commodity, the latter now understood in its hypostatized 
form. Hence, the commodity now appears to possess factual 
quantity as well as the quality of the judgment which the 
subject exercised in his realization of it; in his 
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transformation of it from its initial use-value into its 
present use-value. In its turn, capital appears to control 
the commodity, since it is presupposed that it is capital 
which makes the materials available for the productive 
process in the first place. 
Since the capitalist controls the capital, he also 
controls the commodity. What is altered in the production of 
the commodity is its form as a use-value. The capitalist, 
however, only pays the labourer for his time as a quantity. 
He does not pay the worker for his time as a quality, as, 
indeed , this would be impossible. But in buying the 
worker's time, the capitalist appears to inevitably acquire, 
through his possession of the transformed commodity, this 
qualitative aspect as well as it appears to have been 
seperated from the worker. As evidence, the capitalist 
'owns' the commodity as a fact which has been transformed. 
The factual or real acquisition of the worker's experience 
of quality is actually an impossibility. But because both 
the worker and the capitalist fail to distinguish between 
the factual expression of the ideal as it is expressed in 
the commodity, and the ideal or qualitative character of 
what is expressed through the former, the idea which is 
expressed in the activity of labour seems to be invested in 
the factual commodity itself. Within this mode of 
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understanding, It appears that the qualitative aspects of 
the labourer's life process are at one with the quantitative 
aspects, and so, in purchasing the labourer's time as a 
quantity, the rest naturally comes with it, too. As long as 
only the empirical facts are considered, the collapsing of 
quality and quantity in relation to the activity of labour 
will not even be seen; the participants engaged in this 
wage-labour relation will not be aware of what is actually 
taking place. The facts of this relation, comprehended in 
their reified form, will appear to account for the sense of 
the whole process, with niether the worker nor the 
capitalist ever being aware of the actuality of this 
situation. 
In effect, the capitalist gets more than he pays 
for. This appears in the wage labour equation as the 
transformation which the commodity undergoes. Since the 
worker as a mere quantity has been accounted for in this 
equation, what is left over, the qualitative-transformative 
aspect, reverts to capital. This is the seperation which 
Marx is talking about and it is made possible by the failure 
to distinguish between the factually existent and the 
ideal, which is conjointly present at the same time in the 
labour process, but which is not reducible to the 
spatio-temporal particulars of that labour process. The 
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latter Is the necessary exclusiveness of quality and 
quantity. 
Neither does the ownership of the material 
commodity make any actual difference here, since throughout 
the production of capital the material commodity acts only 
as an index to the phenomenological breaking apart of the 
unity of quantity and quality which is experienced in the 
living time of the worker. This holds for money, and the 
particular amount of money which changes hands in the 
wage-labour relation as well. Since money is only the 
abstract equivalent to any commodity, possession particular 
commodity and possession of money are structurally 
equivalent, the latter being the openly abstract statement 
of any particular commodity . Money itself, as it depends 
upon the fetishism of commodities as its validating premise, 
presupposes the collapsability of the qualitative and the 
quantitative. Since what is at issue here is precisely this 
problem, the amount of money exchanged in the wage-labour 
relation is a pseudo question since it moves within the 
same presuppositions which create the problem of which we 
are treating. Thus, we can see the reason for Marx's 
relegation of Proudhoun and what has emerged from this 
movement as 'socialism' as for this kind of "money 
juggling" (111) solves nothing of the problem of 
reification. 
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In the production of a commodity, a material fact 
is produced which corresponds to this seperation. The nature 
of the commodity is of no importance to what is actually 
occuring in this relation, since what is important is not 
the commodity as a use-value, but the fact that a commodity 
has been produced under a wage-labour situation. As Marx 
says in the Holy Family, the bourgeoisie and the 
proletartiat both share the same delusion. (112) And as Marx 
points out in the Grundrisse: 
The fact is that these workers, indeed, 
are productive, as far as they increase 
the capital of their master; unproductive 
as to the material result of their labour 
((since the commodity is of completely 
secondary importance to the production of 
capital, except as an index to the fact 
that capital has absorbed the qualitative 
aspect of the worker's living time)). In 
fact, of course, this 'productive' worker 
cares as much about the crappy shit he has 
to make as does the capitalist himself who 
employs him, and who also couldn't give a 
damn about the junk. (113) 
The suspension of the structural actuality of the 
labour act is at one and the same time the failure to 
transcend the naive belief in the pregiven validity of 
capital. In the realization of capital, this suspension 
...take((s)) place ((not)) in the process 
of exchange with the worker ((i.e., in the 
paying of the wage itself)); but rather 
takes place in the process of work 
itself... (114) 
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in the labourer's activity itself which 
...is a reality only in the immediate 
vitality of the worker. (115) 
in the worker's own consciousing process. 
Moreover, if the validity of money is accepted as 
pregiven the capitalist has the last word in this relation. 
When the commodity, which appears to be the result of the 
capitalist's investment of capital, is sold, the commodity 
becomes what it is not; it is transformed into money. If 
money is presupposed as valid, then this transformation of 
the commodity into the money form appears to validate the 
initial presupposition of the material or factual actuality 
of capital since, inasmuch as money is believed to be 
factually real, and the commodity which was apparently made 
possible by capital is transformed into money, the capital 
which was invested in this commodity correspondingly appears 
to become real. In its transformation into money, capital 
thus: 
...no longer appears dissolved in its 
simple elements in the productive process, 
but as money; no longer, however, as money 
which is merely the abstract form of 
general wealth, but as a claim on the real 
((actual)) possibility of general wealth 
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— labour capacity in the process of 
becoming. (116) 
9. The mode of production as a subjectively 
constituted "reality". 
Quite simply, then, capital is an idea which is 
only apparently real. Within the capitalistic mode of 
production capital is accepted as real. This is possible 
because both the labourer and the capitalist believe it to 
be real. What conditions man is therefore his belief In the 
reality of an idea or an "ideal object" as a reified fact. 
What conditions man, and hence alienates him, is thus what 
he has posited as alienated from him in the first place. 
Since alienation demands that the subject posit something as 
exterior to himself which in actuality is not exterior to 
him, the subject, or collectively speaking, man, is 
conditioned by what he believes to be outside himself, but 
which, in actuality, he posits or judges to be there 
himself. 
However, as Lukacs says, if what is alienated from 
man is reappropriated to man, if what is only apparently 
exterior to man is realized as not extenior to man, what 
happens to the exterior world? Does the end of alienation 
mean the end of what is "exterior" to the subject? Such a 
question, however, stems from a merely negative statement of 
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the problem of alienation. This is no more than the immanent 
contradiction to the problem of alienation. What was only 
apparently exterior to the subject is now posited as 
interior to the subject. In confronting this problem, we 
are forced back to Lukacs*s inadequacy concerning the nature 
of objectification. However, we have found in this chapter 
that capital is produced in the consciousing processes of 
the subject. Nothing real is produced in the subject's mind. 
What is real in the labour relation is produced by the 
subject's hands or what ever else may be employed as a means 
of production. What the subject produces in the production 
of capital is an idea which he believes has material 
effects. It is the worker himself as who is actually 
materially active and who produces these material effects. 
And while the subject as the labourer alienates himself 
inasmuch he believes this idea to have control over him, 
what he produces in his mental activity and which 
corresponds to his material realization of this is an idea. 
What is reified, then, is an idea. To claim that an idea can 
be returned to the subject in a psychoshysical sense, is to 
believe that it can actually be reified and posited as 
something alien to him from him in the first place. Such a 
conception does not reveal alienation as an actual 
impossibility, which is what makes it a self-contradictory 
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phenomenon, but accepts it as actually possible and to be 
avoided. In the latter case, alienation is actual. If 
alienation is actual, then it is no illusion. If it is no 
illusion, then it is not self-contradictory. If it is not 
self-contradictory, then the qualitative and the 
quantitative are actually reducible one to the other and 
then alienation is no illusion, but is an actuality. 
On the other hand, if what is alienated is 
qualitative, and as such, is not factual and hence, can 
neither be psychophysically 'inside' nor 'outside' the 
subject, then it can neither be seperated nor returned to 
the subject, and this position must be maintained if we are 
to be consistent with the intention which we understand Marx 
to have which is the intention to transcend alienation. 
If we maintain the position that what is 
qualitative is not factual and hence defies any attempt to 
locate it spatially and temporally, (which are factual 
referents), then we avoid both the illusion of the 
pregiveness of capital as well as Lukacs*s potential 
solopcism. 
11. Labour as universal labour: Any conceivable act 
of production becomes judicative activity. 
If we are to transcend the illusion of alienation, 
we must somehow account for ideas themselves, for it is the 
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reified idea of capital which alienates the subject. As the 
idea of capital is produced as a function of the Judicative 
activity of the subject as he is involved in the labour 
process, we must move to the production of ideas in the 
judgment process itself if we are to understand how an idea 
may be reified or turned into a fetish. As well, if we are 
to take Lukacs at his word and see Marx's method as the 
universal method, applicable to any instance of alienation 
whatsoever, we must move to the abstract since only an 
abstract concept will be applicable to any conceivable 
situation. Before we move directly into our examination of 
the production of ideas in the judging processes of the 
subject, we will have to validate Marx's admonition that the 
qualitative and quantitative aspepts of a subject's 
consciousing processes are not reducible one to the other, 
for it is one thing to assert this and another to 
demonstrate this in an explicit, logical fashion. 
In so doing, we will maintain our analysis of 
capital at the level of generality and as such, we may 
approach the theoretical justification of capital at the 
level of an arguement form. 
In the section which follows we will show that the 
type of arguement form which is employed to justify the 
validity of capital is logically absurd. This will be done 
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by refer!ng to Husserl's Prolegomena which is critique of 
theories which presuppose the validity of the norms upon 
which they deductively build systems without examining the 
validity of the norms. 
The second section of the following chapter 
follows Husserl in his attempt to develop a method by which 
the sense of norms can be investigated as well as developing 
a theoretical justification of such a method. 
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Chapter Three 
The Transformation of Theoretical Abstractions 
from Cul-de-Sacs to Passageways. 
A. The Prolegomena. 
1. The paradigmatic parrallelism between capitalism 
and psychologism as abstract arguement forms. 
We mentioned above that the presupposition of the 
fetishism of commodities acts as the analytic premise which 
constitutes the norm for judgments concerning the continuity 
and consequence within the capitalistic way of making sense 
of things. We also noted Lukacs *s call for the 
universalization of Marx's method If this method is to 
be universalized it must be applicable to anything 
whatsoever. 
In this light, capital may be seen as making sense 
as an analytic arguement. As with any other deductive 
arguement, capital makes sense if its presuppositions are 
not questioned. Within these presuppositions (viz., 
fetishism of commodities and the alienation of labour), 
capital appears to be logically sound; that is, once the 
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presuppositions are granted as valid, the rest of the 
arguement concerning the validity of the relations of 
capital production follow deductively. The point now 
becomes one of how to make sense of these presuppositions in 
and of themselves; that is, without appealing to the 
deductions which themselves are contingent upon the assumed 
validity of the initial presuppositions. As we shall see by 
following Husserl's critique in the Prolegomena, a theory 
which does not examine the origins of its own premises, but 
which attempts to justify these premises by refering to the 
deductions which are contingent upon the validity of the 
former, is logically inadequate. 
Psychologism, which is the (logical) subject of 
Husserl's critique in the Prolegomena, is an attempt to 
justify the principles of logic as derivative from the facts 
relating to a subject's experience . The holding of logical 
laws in other words, is contingent upon the occurrence of 
particular sensuo-empirical data. At a paradigmatic level 
we can see a correspondance between a capitalistic approach 
to explanation and a psychologistic approach to explanation 
in that they both depend upon facts to explain meaning. As 
we saw with capital in the preceding chapter, the meaning of 
capital which, within a capitalistic frame of reference, is 
assumed to be inherent in the pregiven fact of capital 
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itself, actually originates with the subject. Capital, in 
its fetishized form, takes on the appearance of being 
meaningful in itself. In this way, the apparently pregiven 
fact of capital occludes the subject as its actual origin of 
its "being" as a meaningful phenomenon. 
In psychologism, the meaning of logical principles 
is similiarly accounted for not by the subject's 
consciousing processes, but by the sensuo-empirical objects 
associated with these processes subject perceives in his 
activity of understanding logical principles. The meaning of 
these 'facts of experience' is assumed as a pregiven 
property of these facts themselves. Thus, at a general 
level, psychologism and capitalism share a fact fetish in 
which factual objects which are psychophysically split away 
from the subject are seen as being meaningful for 
themselves. Husserl demonstrates such a position to be 
absurd. Since Husserl demonstrates this in relation to 
logic, and any theory necessarily depends upon the holding 
of logical laws, (1) Husserl's demonstration of the 
absurdity of such a fetishistic approach at a general, 
paradigmatic level can also be seen as a demonstration of 
the absurdity of any particular instance of such an approach 
to explanation, of which capitalism is an example. 
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2.Science as theory: theory as contextual 
interconnection. 
Husserl points out that science exists objectively 
only in theory. (2) If the understandings which we have 
through science are to be explained, it follows that the 
comprehensibility of theory must be explained.A theory of 
science is thus a theory of theory, or less criptically 
put,a theory of theory would be an enquiry into how one can 
know anything through science. It is clear that we know 
things with certainty through science. Science, or what we 
should properly call theory from now on,gains its sense from 
the way it holds together. (3) There is a certain sense to 
a theory that is comprehensible. This comprehensibility 
comes from the way the factual data are drawn together to 
form a meaningful whole. (4) Clearly, a comprehensible 
theory, one which conveys a clear meaning to the person who 
deals with it is not simply a random , amorphous collection 
of ad hoc data. The data which are assembled under the 
rubric of a theory are brought together as a contextual 
whole.In short, they have a mutual interconnection which can 
be validated by means of logical proofs. (5) 
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3. The dependence of theory upon the holding of 
logical laws. 
Husserl begins the Prolegomena by asking how one 
may focus on the unity of the sciences. What is it that 
gives the sciences their sense? He discovers that any 
science whatsoever depends upon the' validity of logical 
laws.(6) Moreover, any theory which denies the possibility 
of the holding of these logical laws in effect denies its 
own possibility of being valid. Statements such as 
"Every A is B, X is A ,so X is B." (7) 
hold for any scientific discipline whatsoever, regardless of 
any particular discipline's grounding norm. Such an empty 
logical structure would hold in either chemistry or in 
mathematics, as Husserl points out. 
It is by means of these logical structures that 
science in general validates the results of its researches. 
These validations, Husserl says, have 
in the first place the character of a 
fixed structure in relation to their 
content. ((Secondly)) connections of 
validations are not governed by caprice or 
chance, but by reason and order,i.e., by 
regulative laws.((Thirdly, these laws 
remain independent of their particular 
content or application, since)) we may in 
fact say that they may be so generalized, 
so purely conceived, as to be free of all 
essential relation to some limited field 
of knowledge. (8) 
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Husserl refers to these limited fields of 
knowledge as normative disciplines. Examples of these would 
be physics or geography, and for the purposes of this 
thesis, we can include the study of economics and politics 
as well . These disciplines are organized around a central 
theme. Husserl uses the examples of Kant's categorial 
imperative and the principle of the greatest good for the 
greatest number which is the internally uniting normative 
principle of the Utilitartians. (9) 
However, Husserl continues by stating that 
every normative and likewise practical 
discipline rests on one or more 
theoretical disciplines, inasmuch as its 
rules have a theoretical content seperable 
from the notion of normatlvlty whose 
scientific investigation is the duty of 
these theoretical disciplines. (10) 
A normative science outlines what should be or 
ought to be. If we are to say that a certain situation is a 
"good" one, i.e.,attribute to it a normative value, the 
counter position can be taken that it is a "not good" one. 
When we choose what is good or bad, we are making a 
normative decision. However, prior to stating this 
proposition, the person who states this must already have a 
conception of "good" or "not good". 
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To be able to pass the normative Judgement 
'A soldier should be brave',I must have 
some conception of a 'good' soldier, and 
this concept cannot be founded on an 
arbitrary nominal definition, but on a 
general valuation, which permits us to 
value soldiers as good or bad according to 
these or those properties. Whether or not 
this valuation is in any sense 
'objectively valid', whether we can draw 
any distinction between the subjectively 
and objectively 'good', does not enter 
into our determination of the sense of 
should propositions. It is sufficient 
that something is held valuable, that an 
intention is effected having the content 
that something is good or bad. (11) 
In the example which Husserl gives us here, the 
norm which grounds the internal sense of a particular 
discipline does not account for the distinction between the 
meaning of good and bad which remains intact independent of 
whatever normative decision is made. Husserl refers to such 
distinctions of meaning as theoretical relations. 
Theoretical principles determine the relations of the 
particular normative contents and the internal sense amongst 
complexes of normative contents. Any understanding of these 
complexes therefore presupposes a grasp of general 
theoretical structures which "connect" normative sets in 
relation to one another. The logical continuity and 
non-contradictory nature of these normative sets, both 
within themselves and in relation to other sets, is 
111 
dependent upon the holding of logical principles. In 
contrast to these latter principles, the demonstration of 
the validity of normative investigations is a mediate or 
logically predicated procedure, since these logical 
principles stand at the most primitive level of any 
validation process. (12) 
4.Logical form and normative content. 
While these theoretical principles are found to 
encapsulate particular normative contents, the validity of 
the theoretical structures is neither dependent upon, nor 
exhausted by any particular normative content. (13) The 
theoretical sense of such normative contents , however, 
depends upon the context within which one normative set 
relates to another and this context is lent to these sets 
through the understanding of theoretical principles. 
5. Skepticims are absurd. 
In order for any normative discipline to make 
itself comprehensible, for it to offer evidence of its 
validity, it must be capable of demonstrating that 
paradigmatically speaking, it holds to those theoretical 
principles upon which its own validity depends. However, a 
theory which itself 
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validates knowledge is itself a piece of 
knowledge: its possibility depends upon 
certain conditions, rooted in purely 
conceptual fashion, in knowledge and its 
relation to the knowing subject.(14) 
Since all theories assert a claim to truth — even if this 
is the truth that there is no truth — skepticisms, which 
deny the possibility of truth , are self contradictory. 
They not only deny the possibility of truth, but in so 
doing, they also deny their own possibility as valid. 
6. Theory of theory as the theory of logical forms. 
In constructing a theory of the possibility of 
validating theoretical knowledge we must move outside the 
realm of any particular normative content. The theory which 
must be developed to account for the possibility of any 
truth whatsoever must as well coincide with those conditions 
which it establishes as initially valid. If it does not 
coincide with these conditions, then it contradicts its own 
claim to the conditions which are necessary to realise truth 
and so collapses into skepticism. 
Husserl goes on to state that: 
If the judging person were never in a 
position to have personal experience and 
apprehension of his judgement's 
self-justifying character, if all his 
judgments lacked that inner evidence which 
distinguishes them from blind prejudices, 
and yields him luminous certainties, it 
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would be impossible to provide a rational 
account and a foundation for knowledge, or 
to discourse on theory or science. (15) 
7. The thesis of radical empiricism: all knowledge 
is dependent upon empirical sensation. 
Radical empiricism holds that there can be nothing 
in consciousness which is not first in the senses. If the 
question of validation is one of theory, independent of any 
particular mediate content, then the question concerning the 
evidential grounding of validations becomes a question of 
how one validates or 'grounds' the source of abstract, 
theoretical structures. These theoretical structures are 
logical structures inasmuch as their legal satus derives 
from logical necessity. If empiricism is held as the theory 
by which any theory can establish its validity, then the 
onus falls to empiricism to show that the laws of logic come 
through the senses. 
If all that consciousness has as its content is 
based upon sensory data, then the logic which the subject, 
(that is the knowing agent), must be conveyed by the 
properties or particulars, (the facts), conveyed by the 
empirical object as it presents itself to the consciousness 
of the subject. It follows that if there were no factual 
object exterior to the subject, then there could be no 
sensation of an object and the source of logical structures 
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could not be established. In this way , the empiricists' 
enquiry into the question of the grounding of logic becomes 
an enquiry which asks how the subject can grasp logical 
structure by means of sensory data. Since the study of 
logic moves to acts of knowing performed by the subject any 
enquiry into questions of logic reverts to the field of 
psychology. This move to the psyche is not unique to 
empiricistic enquiry, however. The move to the psyche, 
historically speaking, starts with Descartes. 
Descartes' question is one of how it is that I can 
know something with complete certainty. If belief in an 
existing God is suspended, then the subject is left with 
only what he has in his own mind as certain as a field of 
enquiry. If knowledge is actually metaphysically guaranteed 
by a being which itself lies beyond, or transcends the 
subject, then the whole enterprise of theory which studies 
the psyche of the subject is a waste of time since 
guarantees of knowledge would be timelessly secure and, 
intersubjectively speaking, all subjects would be 
spiritually united. The intersubjective understandings 
shared by subjects and the unity of the knowing experience 
of the subject himself are thus closely related. However, 
the real problem at this point is to attempt to investigate 
how any continuity in comprehension is possible without a 
metaphysical guarantee. 
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But the psychological methodology of the 
empiricists models itself after the paradigm of the hard 
sciences to ensure the possibility of producing "scientific" 
results. The credibility of the methodology of the "hard 
sciences" Is presupposed, however. Consequently the 
limitations of the "hard sciences" become the limitations 
imposed upon any understanding of the structures of logic 
generated through an objectivistic psychological approach. 
8. Radical empiricism is absurd. 
To remain consistent within the epistemological 
parameters set by sensuo-empiricism, no a priori can be 
established which is not contingent upon sensory 
experience. Thus the only way in which any law of logic may 
be established is by induction from the appearance of the 
factual, perceived object. But... 
induction does not establish the holding 
of a law, only the greater or lesser 
probability of its holding; the 
probability , and not the law, is 
justified by insight. Logical laws ((as 
interpreted as a function of psychology)) 
must accordingly without exception, rank 
as mere probabilities. (16) 
This interpretation of logic as merely probable 
and the consequent probability of truth as a logical 
principle, collapses into skepticism. This follows because 
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the epistemological grounding of any sort of theoretical 
structuring of the possibilities of sensible thought is , at 
its very core, is grounded in the possibility of truth. If 
truth can only be an approximation, then empiricism can only 
qualify as being approximately true. As well, by conceiving 
of logical principles as relative conditions of thought 
rather than as the self-evident grounding structures of 
validation which allow mediate data to be meaningfully 
assembled and comprehended, logical 
laws have first been confused with 
judgments, in the sense of acts of 
judgement: the laws, as 'contents of 
judgments' have been confused with the 
judgments themselves ((viz.the 
principles)). (17) Empiricism thus: 
...destroys the possibility of the 
rational justification of mediate 
knowledge, and so its own possibility as 
scientifically proven theory.(18) 
This is so because 
...mediate ((viz., normatively derived)) 
knowledge ((is)) the product of various 
validating connections, (19) 
and these connections are what lend the data assembled 
within normative theories their comprehensibility. The 
mediate knowledge produced by those involved in the 
generation of normative theories is accepted as valid by 
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empiricism as are the logical principles of validation. 
Empiricism, by accepting these logical principles thus 
contradicts itself since if 
...all proof rests upon principles 
governing its procedure , and if its final 
justification involves an appeal to such 
principles, then we should either be 
involved in a circle or in an infinite regress 
if the principles of proof used to 
justify the principles of proof were the 
same as the latter, in a regress if both 
sets of principles were repeatedly 
different. (20) 
Extreme empiricism, therefore, since it 
only basically puts its full trust in 
singular judgments of experience — a 
quite uncritical trust since it ignores 
the difficulties which so richly attend 
upon such singular judgments — eo ipso 
abandons all hope of rationally justifying 
mediate knowledge. (21) 
We can characterise the attitude which empiricism 
displays by saying that it puts the trust which it should 
place in subjects in mediate things or facts. (22) In this 
way, empiricism cannot explain how a subject, the 
consciousing agent who actually performs theoretical and 
normative judgings, actually performs this process of 
distinguishing what is certain from what is prejudicial. 
Involved in this misperception on the part of 
empiricism is a conceptual splitting apart of the subject 
and the object of which the subject is conscious. The 
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ability of the subject to perform these Judicative acts of 
distinction appear to be the result of the limits pregiven 
by the properties of the object, not something which is 
accomplished by the subject. In effect, empiricism 
, presupposes the consciousing processes of the subject.(23) 
The experience of the subject, from an empiricistic 
standpoint, can only be a reflection of the mediate factual 
data imposed upon it from the "outside", so to speak. The 
prejudicial character of this perception arises because it 
is this mediate factual data which demands evidential 
clarification, and it is precisely this same mediate data 
which demands clarification which is used as a validation 
of other mediate states of affairs. The process of judging 
which occurs in the consciousing processes of the subject is 
completely by-passed; the question is begged by assuming the 
validity of the object as something which is, in itself, 
pregivenly meaningful and which, as a meaning, is seen as 
} being pregiven and ontologically seperate from the subject. 
But,if one asks what principles justify 
I such derivation, empiricism, forbidden to 
appeal to immediately evident universal 
principles, appeals, rather, to naive, 
uncritical everyday experience, which it 
hopes to dignify more highly by explaining 
it psychologically in Humean fashion. It 
therefore fails to see that, having no 
justification, therefore, for the relevant 
proof-procedures from the immediately 
evident general principles that follow , 
its whole psychological theory, its whole 
3-
119 
mediately known doctrine of empiricism is 
without rational foundation, is, in fact, 
a mere assumption, no more than a common 
prejudice. (24) 
To continue: 
As a genuine psychologism, it tends 
always to confuse the psychological origin 
of certain general judgments in 
experience, on account of some supposed 
'naturalness', with a justification of the 
same judgments.(25) 
Even moderate empiricisms which attempt to retain 
some type of a priori grounding for validation go astray: 
Mediate judgments of fact — we may 
compress the sense of Hume's theory into 
this phrase — never permit of rational 
justification, only of psychological 
explanation. ((So that)) 
The psychological premises of the theory 
are themselves mediate judgments of fact, 
and therefore lack all rational 
justification in the sense of the thesis 
to be established. (26) 
9. The irreal is irreducible to the real. 
The distinction which Husserl calls for between 
the irreal and the real is one which is consistent in one 
form or another throughout his work. As he says in the 
Prolegomena: 
The psychologistic logicians ignore the 
fundemental, never to be bridged gulf 
between ideal and real laws, between 
normative and causal regulation, between 
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logical and real grounds, No conceivable 
graduation could mediate between the ideal 
and the real. (28) 
This is reiterated in Formal and Transcendental Logic; there 
is an " essential seperation between the real and the 
irreal." (28) Thus, if the real cannot be used to explain 
the irreal, then, correspondingly, the irreal cannot be used 
to actually explain the real, qua fact. This is of interest 
to us in this thesis, since it introduces now, in the case 
of Husserl, the same distinction which Marx makes in 
relation to the irredicibility of quality to quantity. (29) 
10.Empiricism treats facts as "beings for 
themselves." 
The sense of theory is itself abstract or irreal 
and the irreal cannot be explained within the paradigmatic 
frame of reference which empiricistic theory sets for 
itself. Since the sense of empiricistic theory is itself 
irreal, empiricistic theory cannot justify its own 
comprehesibility. Consequently, empiricism is a skepticism 
and as such is an absurdity. It follows that any theory 
which is starts its enquiry from an object will end up in an 
absurdity if the meaning of this object is assumed as 
pregiven. In Ideas Husserl says that an approach which 
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cannot replace the practice of living in 
perception ((its)) attention turned 
towards the perceived object ((viz. 
mediate phenomenon)) both in observation 
and in theoretical inquiry...(30) 
is bound to be capable of only of deduction within the 
limits defined by its own assumption of the pregiven. 
However, deduction alone can never explain the origin of its 
own premises. 
As it has been indicated, this inability may be 
located in the failure of the empiricistic approach to 
examine the source of the logical connections which 
contextually tie facts together but which are not of these 
facts themselves. By attributing to objects of perception a 
" being for themselves",(31) empiricism culminates in a 
fetishism of the material fact. 
11. The limitations of the Prolegomena. 
As Husserl points out, the chief merit of the 
Prolegomena is that it attacks empiricistic psychology on 
its own ground and , for Husserl, it accomplishes 
the supremely important ((goal)) of making 
the specific province of analytic logic 
visible in its purity and ideal 
peculiarity, freeing it from the 
psychologizing confusions and 
misinterpretations in which it had 
remained enmeshed. (32) 
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But inasmuch as the Prolgomena moves against an 
objectlvistic mode of understanding, and demonstates this 
latter's absurd character on its own ground, the Prolegomena 
is simply the negation of thesis. This situation demands a 
completing synthesis which will allow a transcendental move 
to the source of validations themselves . In doing this, the 
immanent contradiction which potentially locks Husserl's 
theory into a mere critique of one set of deductive 
principles should be transcended. In as much as the 
Prolegomena moves on the level of traditional analytic 
logic, the limitations of traditional analytics will also 
realise themselves in the Prolegomena itself. Thus, a 
transcendence of the limitations of traditional logic at a 
paradigmatic level will be, correspondingly, a transcendence 
of the limitations of the Prolegomena. 
B. The move to judging and judgment forms. 
What Husserl points towards is a radical move to 
subjectivity. This is a necessary move since the perceived 
object, qua mediate fact, in and of itself, cannot be used 
to explain the meaning which the subject understands it to 
have. What we are interested in, then, is how a fact comes 
to have the meaning which it does, and to do this we will 
have to look into the question of how the subject produces 
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the meaning of any object. (33) In order to do this we will 
examine how Husserl fleshes out the role of traditional 
analytics as a critical methodology. 
1. The relevance of this to Marx's theory. 
If we look back to the last chapter we will see 
that in Marx's conception of the labour process, the 
labouror realizes his purpose (34) through the 
transformation of material objects as the realization of an 
idea. If we take as our example of labour, one which is 
original or creative and one that is not merely mimetic, the 
worker must exercise his judgment in the transformation of 
the material object. 
If what is realized through this activity of 
material expression is the initial idea itself, and if the 
labouror grasps the object of his labour self-reflectively 
as the expression of his meaning, then this meaning itself 
is the a priori condition to this realization process. Sinoe 
we have characterized labour as an activity in which the 
labouror is involved as a judging agent, then the 
clarification of the source of the idea idea towards which 
the worker procedes in his material realization may also be 
seen as a clarification of the sense of the judging process. 
If this activity of material production involves judgments, 
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a priori, then the meaning or sense of this judgment itself 
is not to be found in the facts of the material activity of 
doing, but as conjointly given with the facts in the mental 
activity which directs the process of the realization of the 
material object. If we wish to move to a position which 
stands beyond the fetishized comprehension of facts, then we 
must attempt to understand how judgments come to be 
realized. Meaning thus logically preceeds fact in the 
activity of realization because the production of material 
facts is contingent upon the a priori condition of having a 
judgment present in order that it may be fulfilled.(35) The 
universalization of Marx's particular example of labour thus 
turns to the logic of judgments, or what is known as 
apophantics. 
2. Traditional analytic logic as a game; capital 
characterised as an analytic game. 
Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic begins 
with a detailed critique of what he calls the traditional 
approach to apophantics. A number of moments of his 
critique will help us to explain his approach to what he 
sees as having become the mere game of logic (36) , a game 
which is played without a recognition of the foundation of 
its own teleological sense. Since we have characterized 
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capital as a deductive, analytical game, which, as one might 
say, is played on a social-material level, this will 
clearly be of interest to us in relation to Marx. 
3. Levels of judgment as levels of critique. 
Husserl distinguishes three levels of possible 
judging. Because the goal of judging is the fulfilment of 
the judgment as true or as false, these three levels of 
judging will have their corresponding levels of evidence by 
which the truth or falsity of a judgement will be deemed 
either true or false at that particular level of judging. 
Contingent, or factual evidence may hold occaisionally, 
(i.e., in some situations), but its holding as ultimately 
self-evident depends upon whether of not it can find 
fulfilment at a higher level of evidencing. A description of 
what Husserl sees as these three levels of judging may 
clarify the relationship which the levels of judging hold to 
one another. 
Husserl distinguishes judgments as being 
stratified in a subordinate relation. At the first level, 
what is established is whether or not something is devoid of 
sense. 
We commonly say, for example, that we 
utter a series of words devoid of sense 
wl sn we say: "King but where seems and"; 
but we say equivalently that the 
expression "a round square" is devoid of 
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sense. Husserl reserves the word non-sense 
to designate the first type of expression 
without signification ((meaning)). Each 
word taken seperately has a sense, but the 
totality of words does not form a genuine 
proposition. ... On the contrary, the 
expression "a round square" has a sense 
for this first logical stratum. (37) 
This expression does not reach a fulfillment based 
on the evidence of the second level, however, which is the 
level of the distinct judgment. This level of judgment Is 
the level of consequence-logic and depends upon the law of 
non-contradiction. As Husserl points out in an appendix to 
Formal and Transcendental Logic , non-contradiction 
includes within Its province, "Questions of analytically 
necessary consequence ((viz. consistency)) of syllogistic 
consequence ((viz.continuity))" and these form the theme of 
traditional logic. (38) Husserl illustrates this by using 
the example of paying attention to the street in front of 
ones house "confusedly, all at the same' time".(39) In the 
course of time such a "non-articulated" consciousness of the 
street can become articulated as I subsequently become 
conscious of the street. 
...in "going through" it, as in an 
articualte manner, I become conscious of 
the windings of the steet, the trees and 
houses along it... Thus a non-articulated 
empty consciousness can become converted 
into a "corresponding" articulated empty 
consciousness, the confusedly meant 
sense-content (while entering into 
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identifying coincidence of the sort of 
peculiar "explication") becoming "spread 
out" as the explicate the meaning proper 
of the previously confused content. (40) 
The initial, vague experience, which lies at the first level 
of evidencing, is actually no more than an impression or 
something believingly accepted at first glance, as it were. 
In such a form it remains unexamined. There need be no 
attempt to move beyond this level by going into what is 
truly meant by it. Judging remains at this level of muddy 
thinking if this first judgment is believed In. Such a 
belief fixes this ungrounded opinion ((Meinung)) (41) as 
valid, at least in the mind of the one who accepts such a 
judgment with no will to understand it at any thing but the 
superficial level at which it now stands. Not only is the 
internal sense of such a judgment left inexplicit; by 
naively accepting one's judgment at this level and 
presupposing its validity, the judging subject has no way of 
relating it to any other judgment which he makes. If such a 
judgment is challenged, I, as the judging subject, have no 
way of defending it. It makes sense, but only arbitrarily. 
4.The synthetic move from opinion to proper 
judging:the distinct judgment. 
I need not believe this initial judgment to be 
true, however. I may see it as an opinion, as something 
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which has simply come to mind, and through a change in my 
attitude towards my intial judging of this state of affairs 
which had its meaning "expectantly", (42) I can make it 
distinct. The initial judgment itself is , in this second 
moment, a "proper judgment" (43) and by making the judgment 
explicit, I make make distinct or explicate, " meaning 
proper of the previously confused unitary content." (44) The 
judgment itself, as the meaning which is present vaguely at 
the first level of judging and which has now become explicit 
at the second level of judging, remains the same, however, 
since the initial unitary experience from which the second 
level is produced was originally that of the initial, 
inexplicit judgment. At this second level, the judging 
subject alters the focus of his enquiry to one of 
explication and this allows the subject to make distinct to 
himself (and ostensibly, to others through his realization 
of this understanding in language, etc.) what was initially 
only a vague opinion. 
Within vagueness itself, only blind beliefs are 
possible in the sense that the evidence which is available 
at this level of judging is completely vague. Within this 
first level of evidencing there is no possibility to make 
sense of anything except as an ungrounded opinion. As 
Husserl says," They ((vague judgings)) are indeed believings 
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and to that extent judgings; yet they are not 'proper' 
judgings." (45) Such a move, from the vague to the distinct 
may transcend the vagueness of the initial "belief". 
However, this is a synthetic move (46) which transforms the 
initial judging into an ideal object or categorial form. 
(47) By performing this synthetic move, the judging subject 
constitutes the judgment as a proper judgment. In doing 
this, the judgment which was present in the vague opinion is 
posited and understood in a different way. This performance 
takes place In the "judging subject's action as a 
sense".(48) The judgment proper is not being altered; it is 
being made explicit. To put this differently: 
Explicit judging, "distincfjudging is the 
evidence appropriate to the "distinct 
judgment", as the ideal objectivity that 
becomes constituted originally in such a 
synthetic action , and identified in the 
repetition of such an action. 
To continue: 
This evidence is an original emerging of 
the judgment as it itself, but not yet an 
evidentially experiencing (act of) seizing 
upon and regarding it thematically. 
Subsequently, what has become constituted 
((in this synthetic act of judging 
performed by the judging subject)) in this 
evidence, in this polythetic action, is 
graspable "monothetically", in one 
grasping ray; the polythetic formation 
becomes an object. (49) 
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The meaning of the judgment, at first judged in a 
non-explicit and confused fashion, now becomes distinct to 
the subject who now so judges it. In effect, a norm is 
produced at this second level of judging which provides the 
basis for constructing an analytic framework, the continuity 
and non-contradiction of which derive from the sense of this 
norm itself. 
The third level of judgment is that of "clarity" 
as contrasted with that of distinctness. In distinctness the 
judgment as an ideal object becomes explicitly objectified. 
In this, the act of judging and the judgment as an ideal 
object can be distinguished. We will recall that it is the 
ideality of such judgment forms, of which logical principles 
are a species, which Husserl, in the Prolegomena, wishes to 
demonstrate as having their own efficacy. (50) Psychologism 
collapses the act of judging with the judgment itself, (51) 
(as an ideal object), and then claims that the factual data 
associated with the act of judging may be used to account 
for the holding of these laws. In doing so, psychologism 
asserts a self-contradiction. In demonstrating this 
self-contradiction, Husserl preserves for traditional logic 
its province as the "science" of the level of distinct 
judgments, of consequence logic. 
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5. The synthetic move to clarity; the clarified 
judgment as pure meaning. 
We also must recall, however, that Husserl wishes 
to move beyond the level of analytics, the plane to which he 
claims the Prolegomena are restricted.(52) The move beyond 
analytics is the move from the evidence of distinctness to 
the evidence of clarity. 
Evidence of clarity is different from evidence of 
distinctness in that evidence of clarity is the 
evidence wherein that becomes itself given 
which the judging subject wants to attain 
"by way of" his Judgment — the judging 
subject, that is as wanting to cognise. 
(53) 
6. Traditional analytics as technology and science 
as teleologically directed towards clarity. 
In relation to labour, conceived not in the 
narrow and particular sense as simply being the labour which 
is involved merely in the production of material objects , 
but in a universal sense, we can make the distinction at 
this point between the technician and the scientist.(54) In 
attaining judgments as ideal objects, as norms, a 
corresponding technology may be established. The technician 
works within these as within a set of pregiven rules or 
norms . (55) Distinct evidences have an ideal existence for 
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the technologist inasmuch as he understands them himself in 
a distinct fashion. Within thece parameters, which need not 
be questioned in themselves for the technologist to perform 
a practical application of them, the technician can generate 
a meriad of calcualtions and deductions which have as the 
source of their efficacy, their corresponding distinct 
evidences. 
However, it is the task of the scientist to 
enquire into the source of the efficacy of these norms 
themselves. The deductions which may be obtained by working 
within a paradigm of distinct evidences, however, are 
contingently grounded upon these distinctly evidenced ideal 
objects or norms. This means that if evidence of the sense 
of distinct judgments themselves is sought in these 
deductions, we will produce the same sort of situation which 
Humean psychology finds itself in when it attempts to 
justify the sense of the data generated by its method 
through an appeal to the presupposed validity of this method 
itself, and vice versa. Within the attitude of the 
technologist, one does not go beyond or enquire into the 
source of the sence of the distinct judgments 
(i.e..categorial objects, norms) in themselves. The norms 
are correspondingly assumed to make sense simply because the 
vagueness of random data may be ordered through an 
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imposition of the "rules" of the game and so be made sense 
of explicitly . Thus, a regressive inquiry into the source 
of the meaning of these deductive may seem pointless. 
The normative organization of 'facts' which brings 
distinctness to confusion is seen as the teleological goal 
of the technician. Thus, if such a procedure works in 
organizing the facts (sic,data) to make sense, the 
technician will use his results to verify his initial 
assumption of the efficacy of the rules, An appeal to his 
mediate results will appear to him as the justification of 
his initial assumption. None of this , however, clarifies 
the source of the meaning of his norms, nor does it clarify 
the meaning of judgments as ideal objects. Only the 
applicability of such distinct evidences to the organization 
of vagueness is demonstrated. Moreover, the applicability of 
such distinct judgments lies precisely in the actuality that 
they find their originary source in the initial confusion, 
the vague opining, which they are used to organise. Since 
the judgment, as a sense, itself remains identloal 
throughout the thematic shifts in the synthesis of 
progressively higher modes of judging, the technologist's 
defence is no more than a begged question. 
The scientist, however, must clarify whether or 
not these "rules" are adequate not only in themselves as > 
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distinot, but, as well, in terms of their meaning. Suoh a 
clarification strives towards "evidenoe as the having of the 
meant itself."(56) The technistic attitude coagulates into a 
presuppositional belief with no ultimate clarification of 
evidence. The meaning of the rules, for the technician, is 
not questioned. The fact that they produce results is 
enough. The meaning of such a system itself is not made 
clear. 
In effect, what happens within such a 
technologistic attitude, which remains at the level of 
distinct evidence, is that judgments as ideal objects are 
transformed into beliefs. They are attributed to be the 
source of their own meaning and hence, are fetishized. By 
claiming that the ideal objects or norms account for their 
own sense, (which at least at this level of distinct 
evidence, they do), the possiblity of clarifying the sense 
of this norm is occluded behind the appearance of this ideal 
object as the organizational principle of the facts 
concerned in the production of this distinct judgment. 
If confusion is ordered by these principles and 
the ability to organise the vague is attributed to the ideal 
object itself, the have fetishized the meaning of this ideal 
object since the ideal object does not organise the vague 
into the distinct. It is the subject who through his act of 
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judging, organizes this confusion into distinctness. A 
classic case of this sort of fetishization is the illusion 
that capital itself organizes society as a social system, 
and that capital itself is responsible for the production of 
commodities. 
7. Capitalism as an analytic technology. 
The synthetic move from distinctness to clarity is 
seen, in this thesis, as the statement, in universalizable 
terms, of the transcendence of the pregiven appearance of 
the particular example of capital as the ordering norm of 
society. As we found through our investigation of Marx's 
method, the source of the meaning of capital is to be found 
in the subject's own production of capital, in the 
subjectively performed labour process itself. With the 
instance of capital as an example, the suspension or 
conceptual blotting out of the connection between the 
producer (sic,judging subject), and the object of his 
production ,(the clarified judgement which his 
constitutional, judging act produces),allows the capitalist 
to claim that the ideal object, capital, has an existence in 
its own right, independent of the labouror. The material 
fact of the commodity as a material object is employed as 
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the proof of capital's ability to realise itself, to become. 
The transformation of capital into the money form thus 
"proves" the truth of the the initial assumption of the 
onto-genetic, self-constituting nature of capital. 
8. The limitations of traditional logic as a 
technology. 
Husserl makes roughly the same observations concerning 
traditional logic when he says that: 
The cognitional striving — which often 
tends through a merely explicit judging 
and which the logican ( with his interest 
in scientific judging — correlatively, 
scientific judgments as judgments aimed in 
the direction of truth as cognition) has 
pre-eminently in mind — remains quite 
beside the question in the sphere of pure 
analytics; it is abstracted from ((my 
emphasis)). The identical judgments — 
whether clarified, or even at all 
clarifiable, whether or not it can be 
converted into cognition, provided only 
that it is , or can be, derived actually 
from distinct evidence — that is the 
theme...Thus the purely analytic logician 
has the essential genus , distinct 
judgement, with the sphere of possible 
judgments as his province. (57) 
If we remain entirely within this province which 
is defined by the limits of distinct evidence, all that can 
be established in relation to judgments is: 
...consequence (includedness) ; 
inconsistency (analytic contradiction, 
excludedness;; and the tertium, judgment 
compatibility, which is neither one nor 
the other — empty non-contradiction, as 
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the unifiablity of judgments that "have 
nothing to do with one another". ((Or to 
summarize)) the fundemental question of 
pure analytics can be formulated as 
follows: When and in what relations, are 
any judgments — as judgments and so far 
as mere form is concerned — possible 
within the unity of one judgment.(58) 
If all these judgments are compatible, then we can 
say that they have a unity of meaning. But if this unity 
itself is questioned, independent of those particular 
Judgings which share it as a unifying norm, formal analytics 
, within its provincial restriction to distinct evidences, 
cannot account for this. 
In this regard, Marx's explication of the relative 
nature of the commodity as a measure of exchange in the 
simple exchange relation (59) is structurally identical to 
what Husserl is saying at this point. The norm, the 
essential meaning of all commodities is thus to be found in 
money. The meaning of money is explained, within the 
capitalist arguement , by means of relating it to 
commodities as exchange values which clearly begs the 
question concerning the actual meaning of money. The reverse 
position , in which the commodity is viewed as the relative 
form, is simply this begged question in reverse. Neither the 
meaning of money, nor the meaning of the commodity as an 
exchange value is made clear by doing this, although the 
meaning of money is made explicit. 
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The unifying sense or distinct judgment which 
allows these individual instances to be understood as a 
whole, (and here we move back to the general case, with 
Husserl), is what is not accounted for in a purely analytic 
method. This character of continuity and consequence which 
allows one to understand these particular instances as 
relating as a whole (60) cannot be explained in itself by 
simply illustrating this meaning with endless 
non-contradictory examples. If this is done, this unity or 
the whole as a sense in its own right, must be presupposed 
for this exercise to make sense. 
It is thus the sense of the whole, qua judgment, 
which must be made clear and this is the aim towards 
cognition which Husserl talks about. This aim towards 
cognition culminates in the clarification of the judgment; 
as a clarification of the judgment as itself a pure sense. 
9. The sense of the judgment as a passage to 
clarity. 
The clue to this clarification of the judgment as 
a pure meaning is inherent in the distinct form of the 
judgment. (61) Or, to put this in terms of the subject who 
must perform any clarification of a judgment by means of his 
Judging activity, the clue to this clarification lies in the 
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activity of judging distinctly which itself yields evidence 
at the distinct level. As was the case in the synthetic move 
from the level of vague evidencing to the level of distinct 
or explicit evidencing, not all distinct judgments permit 
clarification, as, correspondingly, not all vague opinions 
lend themselves to explication. (62) On the other hand, all 
distinct judgments derive from vague judgments, and all 
clear judgments derive from distinct judgments. 
In this way we have a sort of genetic ladder of 
evidencing in which we can move synthetically through the 
entire process of the clarification of a judgment as a 
sense. Each judgment, in this way, has its own genetic 
history. (63) However, formal analytics, which stops its 
enquiry at the level of consequence logic, proves incapaable 
of moving to the level of clarity; because the sense of 
these norms or explicit judgments is accepted 
presuppositionally as pregivenly valid; or, at the least, 
this validity is not understood within such a provincially 
restricted attitude as the essential question which it 
actually is. However, when the truth of these judgments, as 
senses or meanings of these now explicit 
... judgments are thought from the very 
beginning, not as mere judgments but as 
judgments pervaded by a dominant 
cognitional striving, as meanings that 
have to become fulfilled, that are not 
objects by themselves, like the data 
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arising from mere distinctness ((my 
emphsasis)), but passages to the "truths" 
themselves that are to be attained." (64) 
This demands a shift of theme of enquiry from one which 
focuses exclusively on the ideal, abstract structure of the 
judgment, to one in which cognition is the theme of enquiry. 
This demands that both the abstract form and the "stuffs" 
which are indeterminant and completely variable in 
traditional analytics, are drawn into focus. This 
introduces a new set of problems, since: 
all the problems of formal logic, which, 
as formal, leave out all the non-formal 
"material of cognition," and, on the other 
hand, the somehow broader problems to be 
propounded by a logic — problems that 
take into account precisely this 
non-formal material: for example, 
questions concerning the possibility of a 
cognition of real actuality or the 
possiblity of fashioning truths about a 
real world. (62) 
10.The fleshing our of formal analytics by formal 
ontology. 
As Husserl points out, formal logic, as apophantic analytics 
in its traditional Aristotelian form, owes its 
"self-containedness" to the abstract character of judgment 
as an ideal form. (66) Any "'syntactical form*", for 
example, *S is p' or 'A is b' as the representations of the 
same syntactical form, express the identical a priori 
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principle. What Husser! calls the -syntactical stuff*-, 
are, within the traditional approach to fomal logic 




The Formal Ontological Solution to the One-Sidedness of 
Traditional Logic and the Transcendental Turn. 
1. Syntactical "stuffs" emerge as irreal objects. 
As we have seen in the preceding chapter, Husserl 
believes that the traditional approach to logic is 
inadequate because traditional analytics concerns itself 
with the ideal mechanics of logic What follows in this 
chapter is an outline of Husserl's proposed solution to what 
he sees as a one-sided approach to questions concerning the 
adequation of judgments as true or false. The issue of 
judgments leads Husserl to a situation in which an 
examination of stuffs proves necessary. Since the sense of 
labour as a human activity is to be found in the judging 
processes of the subject involved in the labour process, 
this study of judgments has a corresponding relevance to 
this paper as well. The necessity of this clarification 
which Husserl undertakes may be seen if we again look at a 
judgment executed by a subject as a function of his 
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consciousing process. The first section of this chapter 
will examine a hypothetical example of judging in which we 
hope to show why it is that the Issue of judging demands a 
fleshing out of traditional logic. 
If we take the ideal form, 'S is p', this form 
remains the same whether it has contents 'The sun is 
shining*, of 'Grass is green'. The form remains the same in 
both statements. If what one is interested in is the ideal 
form of assertions, then both the assertions which we have 
used here may be understood as identicle. In effect, they 
mean the same thing if what is focused on is their ideal 
form. 
However, if what we are interested in is not the 
form of assertions, but is rather, what the contents of 
these forms mean we can see that these two assertions mean 
different things. The meaning of the assertion that grass is 
green is not the same as the assertion that the sun is 
shining if these assertions are now looked at in relation to 
the meaning of their content. Husserl's point is that the 
formal analytic way of focusing on phenomena is one-sided 
because within this way of looking at thing3, the meaning of 
the content is presupposed. 
These contents, as Husserl points out, are 
regarded by traditional logic as indeterminantly optional. 
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To the formal analytic!an, the content of the ideal forms 
lack importance because what is important from the formal 
analytical standpoint is a grasp of abstract principles. The 
formal anaytician encounters a problem here because 'green' 
means something different than does 'shine' or 'grass' or 
'sun'. Considered in relation to what these words mean, they 
are abstract just as ideal forms are abstract. Nevertheless, 
they refer to ontological phenomena. It is the source of the 
meaning of contents which formal analyticians do not 
consider. This is what Husserl hopes to flesh out in 
considering the question of the meaning of contents. This he 
calls formal ontology. It is formal because meaning is 
abstract. It is ontological because the correleates to the 
abstract meanings are ontological. Husserl refers to the 
meanings of the contents of the forms as "stuffs".(1) 
If we consider the statement 'Lead is heavy' from 
an analytic standpoint, what emerges is the form 'S is p'. 
However, if this assertion is looked at from the standpoint 
of whether it is a true assertion or not we need to know 
what lead means and what weight means. If the formal 
analytician judges the truth of this statement without 
accounting for how it is that he knows either of these 
meanings, he will have presupposed the veracity of his 
knowledge of the very things upon which the truth of his 
145 
judgment is dependent. Before any assertion can be judged in 
terms of its truth or falsity, the subject who judges must 
know what the meaning of the contents themselves is. Husserl 
implies that Aristotle presupposed a knowledge of the 
meaning of contents in the same way. As Husserl says: 
Aristotle had a universal ontology of 
realities only; and this was what he 
accepted as first philosophy. He lacked 
also the cognition that formal ontology is 
intrinsically prior to the ontology of 
realities. (2) 
The last sentence of the quotation may be 
explained by saying that before the subject knows that 
something exists, he must know what existence means because 
his judging that something exists is predicated upon 
knowledge of the meaning of the expression "existence". In 
everday straight forward living, factually existent 
...external Objects...are originally there 
for us only in our subjective 
experiencing. But they present themselves 
in it as Objects already factually 
existent beforehand (as Objects "on hand") 
and only entering into our 
experiencing...In other words: Physical 
things are given beforehand to active 
living as objects other than the Ego's 
own; they are given from outside.(3) 
Here Husserl accepts the apparent certainty of everyday 
discovery, but if what we are concerned with is logical 
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explanation and we hold to Husserl's position that judgments 
concerning ontological objects are predicated upon an a 
priori grasp of abstract meanings, then any judgment 
concerning material objects is predicated upon knowledge of 
abstract meanings. Since Husserl claims that any act of 
consciousing is a consciousness of an object, it follows 
that meanings are experienced as abstract objects. For all 
intents and purposes these abstract objects 
... are still taken as existent; one 
"returns to them" as the same formations, 
and does so repeatedly at will; one 
employs them in a sort of practice, 
connects them (perhaps as premises) and 
generates something new: arguements, 
proofs, or the like. Thus one does 
actually deal with them as with real 
physical things, even though they are far 
from being realities.(4) 
Thus the meanings of forms and of stuffs may be 
approached as if they were real but they are actually 
irreal. 
2. Stuffs relate to real objects but are the product 
of the subject's constitutive activity. 
For Husserl, judgments are irreal. Knowledge of 
judgments as meanings is arrived at through the judging 
process of the subject. Judging is an activity; judgments 
are not active but are known through • judging. One implies 
the other, however. 
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We may contrast judgments arrived at through a 
focusing on the form of a phenomenon as having no particular 
factual correlate. 
Any judgment arrived at is a result of the 
subject's own judging processes and as such, this judgment 
is his "product". Ownership of such a product is absurd 
since something ideal defies temporal and spatial location 
and therefore cannot be the possession of any one person. 
The judgment which is arrived at through the subject's 
judging process, is, however, something which Husserl claims 
can be returned to. Such an irreal object can be treated as 
if it were an ontological object. However, the distinction 
between the object which is arrived at through the 
subject's own judicative processes and a material object 
is a necessary one. In effect, the distinction between these 
two phenomena of possession is premised upon an 
understanding of what this "as if" means. Knowledge of the 
meaning of this "as if" amounts to the distinction between 
imagination and reality which Marx insists upon if society 
is to be properly understood. In none of this is the 
efficacy of imagination in question. But simply thinking 
about the material world does nothing to change it 
materially. However, if the material is known through the 
ideal, a clear understanding of the irreal nature of stuffs 
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would be necessary before material changes could be 
meaningfully enacted. 
3.Husserl uses Nature as an example of a meaning 
with a material correlate, (a stuff). 
Husserl1uses the example of Nature to illustrate 
the distinction between a straightforward way of 
understanding a stuff as a being for itself and the way of 
understanding a stuff as something arrived at through the 
subject's judicative activity or constitution. 
To be sure, we call the unity pertaining 
to an all-embracing experience Nature, and 
that it exists and has such and such 
pecularities in itself and that it is what 
or as it is, "before" our judging. A 
priori, however,it receives the "existing" 
and the "it is as it is ",the 
"properties", the "predicatively formed 
affair-complexes", and the like, only from 
our judging, and has them only for 
possible judging subjects.(5) 
Thus, according to Husserl, Nature can have no pregiven 
meaning as a being for itself. The meaning which the subject 
arrives at in relation to Nature is arrived at through his 
judicative process. 
But once again, the "as if" of imagination comes 
into question here since all meaning is abstract. If all the 
subject knows is abstract, then will the subject simply be 
lost in a world in which everything is known as simply being 
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"as if"? Husserl claims that he wishes to explain the "'I 
can'" (6) of a situation in contrast to Hume's "as if". 
Husserl, by his own admission, (7) does not accomplish this 
in an indisputable way. It should be pointed out here, 
however, that Husserl presupposes that the subject is in a 
normal, wakeful state of consciousness (8) and so he avoids 
the neurosis which is the logical conclusion of Hume's "as 
if". Nevertheless, if Husserl wishes to transcend the 
conclusions of a Humean "as if", he needs to make clear what 
the problem is which he hopes to transcend. 
Inasmuch as we maintain the Marxist position in 
this paper that truth is experienced as a unity of quality 
and quantity, but logical explanation requires a move to the 
abstract, any explanation of truth will appear one sided 
unless the quantitative is either expressly cited or is 
implied. If explanation becomes an end in itself, then an 
"abstraction", in the Marxist sense, sets in. 
We believe that it is this same problem of 
abstraction which Husserl speaks to, In relation to 
traditional analytics, he says that the 
"abstraction" from the material content, 
this dropping of it with the variability 
of the merely identifiable, signifies 
correlatively that concept-forming in 
logic follows the categorial syntaxes 
exclusively. (9) 
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In other words, logic deals exclusively with irreal objects. 
The validity of these "forms" themselves is not an issue 
here. These forms, as it has been pointed out in the 
section of this thesis which deals with the Prolegomena have 
an ideal validity. The subject's knowledge of this, 
however, cannot be justified by merely positing these irreal 
objects as pregiven for to do so would be to fetishize them 
as self-determinantly meaningful. To continue with Husserl: 
... as long as logic remains bound to this 
concept of the formal — as long as all 
"terms" in the fundemental apophantic 
forms (and in the ((deductive)) forms that 
can be constructed out of these) are left 
as variables — it can acquire only such 
cognitions about possible truth as are 
annexed immediately to the pure analytics 
of non-contradiction... Consequently it 
cannot make even such universal 
distinctions as that between individual 
and categorial objects, or among "mere 
things", valuable objects, practical 
goods, and so forth; nor can it make any 
distinction between universalities drawn 
from individual objects — the 
universalities called genera and species 
in the usual sense — and other 
universalities. (10) 
At the level of explicit judging what it is that 
is judged about is made distinct. For the logician, the 
forms themselves become the objects judged about. But for 
the scientist, the formal ontologist, what is judged about 
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in such an act of explication, are the "stuffs" or "terms" 
which make up the contents of the "forms". But in either 
case, what is produced in such an act of explication is an 
abstract, irreal object. Thus, Husserl concludes by saying 
that: 
Our result is therefore as follows. Like 
the sciences themselves, analytics as 
formal theory of science is directed to 
what exists (Tontish gerichtet; moreover, 
by virtue of its a priori universality, it 
is ontological. It is formal ontology. Its 
a priori truths state what holds for any 
objects whatever, any objects-provinces 
whatever, with formal universality, in 
whatever forms they exist or merely can 
exist — as objects of judgments 
((urteilmflssig)), naturally... 
But what follows is really the point which must be stressed: 
since without exception, objects "exist" 
only as objects of judgments and, for that 
reason, exist only in categorial 
forms.(11) 
5. Categorial objects as "beings for themselves" in 
traditional analytics and formal ontology. 
This is where the significance of Husserl's syntactical 
stuffs begins to emerge. Material objects cannot be seen to 
determine their own meaning without engaging in a kind of 
animism of facts. Forms relate to stuffs and so, relate to 
materially existent objects. But, objects "exist" for 
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subjects only inasmuch as they are meaningfully constituted 
as being materially existent. Inasmuch as real objects only 
attain such a status for the subject as having the meaning 
of being existent in the subject's constitution of them as 
such, and this constitution involves judgments, judgments, 
in their turn, are concerned soley with meanings and hence, 
with irreal objects. 
Thus stuffs are the meanings which the subject 
judges the object of his perceiving to have. As meanings, 
stuffs themselves are irreal objects. (12) In this case 
what is judged about at a distinct level in either formal 
ontology or in formal analytics is not the objects as beings 
for themselves, but rather, the meanings which I as the 
judging subject constitute them to have. In this way, one 
only makes judgments about what these objects mean. One can 
never judge objects for themselves since without some kind 
of metaphysical intervention, I can never know what this 
object means for itself. If it does mean something for 
itself, I certainly can never know anything about it except 
as I judge it to be. This meaning which I constitute is 
abstract. In formal analytics this is more easilly seen than 
in formal ontology, because in formal ontology, the judging 
subject always has a factual object as a referent to his 
meaning. For an instance, the geometrist can draw a line or 
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a circle to correspond with his idea of a line. In such a 
case the facts can carry a direct correspondance to his 
idea.(13) However, the idea remains irreal. 
Irreality denotes something which has no factual 
existence. It follows that what natural science makes 
judgments about is not existent since natural science, as a 
formal ontology, is concerned with the judging of 
syntactical stuffs. To be sure, a material object may 
correspond to what the scientist judges, but the scientist 
judges a supposed (14) interpretation of what that really 
existent object may be understood to mean. Thus, both the 
traditional, formal analytician and the formal ontologist 
judge Irreal objects, things which in themselves have no 
actual existence. As Husserl says in Experience and 
Judgment: 
...the difficult problems which concern 
the relation of formal apophantics ((which 
has the syntactical forms as its irreal 
objects)) and formal ontology (( which has 
the syntactical stuffs as its irreal 
objects)), their correlation and their 
homogeneity, of even their inner unity, 
with regard to which their separation 
proves to be merely provisional, resting 
only on a difference of point of view and 
not of domain ((province)).(15) 
The problem of abstraction which plagues 
traditional analytics will correspondingly be a problem for 
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formal ontology unless the formal ontologist moves beyond a 
strictly theoretical, and hence one-sidedly abstract, 
understanding of what it is that he is judging. 
6. The hypostatization of exchange-value as an 
example of a fetishized stuff. 
Out of this we can see the emergence for a 
logical explanation of Marx's claim that capitalistic theory 
is a metaphysics. If I make the statement, 'This object is 
valuable,' it has the form, 'S is p*. The stuffs are 
'object' and 'valuable'. 'Object' is substantive and 
'valuable' is adjectival. Both are stuffs and as such both 
are irreal objects and their meaning is constituted or 
produced by the subject. They relate to one another as that 
which is valued and that which is predicated about the 
object. As irreal, neither stuff has a factual existence, 
although the substantive may have a really existent 
correlate in a material object. This object, as an inert 
material fact has no determining effect in this relation 
since to claim that it does would be animistic Thus, the 
object comes to be valued through a judgment produced by the 
subject. It becomes a 'valuable object' in the subject's 
judging it as such. 
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For the merchant, however, the value lies with 
what this object is not. In this guise, the valuable object 
becomes an exchange value. The correctness of the merchant's 
judgment is, in turn, completely contingent upon another 
person's judging that this exchange value is indeed a 
valuable object. The merchant's initial judgment is 
validated in the sale of the commodity. This occurs when 
the commodity is seen by the purchaser as either a 
use-value, as would be the case in straightforward 
consumption, or equally, as an exchange value, as would be 
the case with someone who wished to work as a 'middle-man'. 
In the latter case, the merchant would perform yet another 
mercantile exchange using the commodity in question as the 
factual referent or index to the judgment which he has 
produces in his judicative activity. 
In this entire relation the object itself has 
nothing to say. The veracity of the initial judgment 
produced by the merchant, that is, his judging that 'S is 
p', is itself fulfilled in his customer's judging that this 
is so. What is factually exchanged, however, is simply the 
inert material object which corresponds to the syntactical 
stuffs of the syntactial form 'S is p'. It is these 
syntactical stuffs about which judgments are made, and not 
the inert objects themselves. 
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7. Materialistic and idealistic metaphysics are 
structurally equivalent: the fetishization of 
stuffs; the fetishization of forms. 
Now, it is clear how traditional logic, with its 
focus on syntactical forms can fall into the illusion that 
categorial objects have a being for themselves, and hence 
can become a metaphysical mode for the explanation of 
understanding. The categorial objects appear to take on 
lives of their own in the mind of the judging subject, but 
this subject conceives of these now conceptually existent 
forms as having an ontological status for themselves outside 
of the subject's own constitution of them as such. Since 
any positing of meaning is necessarily a doxic positing (16) 
and, at this level of awareness this positing is not 
clarified as an assumption, what is posited at this level is 
believed to simply be the case; to be the way things "are". 
However, the illusive thing at this level of awareness is 
that the positing of the way things are as being factually 
existent occludes the actuality that what has been posited 
is actually only an interpretation of the way things "are". 
Thus, Husserl says that within the naive and technistic 
attitudes the sense of the word "pregiven" is not even 
understood. (17) Thus, with Marx, we can say that in 
capitalistic society the metaphysics of the transactions 
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which take place in everyday life occurs behind the backs of 
those involved; people move within this world as fish in 
water, never knowing what the word 'wet' means. (18) Ergo 
Hegel's Geist. The metaphysics of this is clear since what 
has no factual existence is attributed an ontological 
existence. However, demonstrating that the irreal objects of 
formal ontology may themselves be fetishized and may 
achieve a metaphysical status, is a more illusive task, 
since every stuff has its corresponding factually existent 
material object. But it would be necessary to occlude the 
supposed meaning of the stuff behind the factual appearance 
of the really existing correlate of the stuff in order to 
make the supposed interpreation of the factually existent 
object (sic. the stuff) appear to be a really existing fact. 
This is precisely what Marx claims Is done in the production 
of capital (19) and both Husserl and Marx maintain the 
irreduciabilty of the real and the irreal. For Husserl, an 
"essential separation between the real and the irreal," must 
be maintained. For Marx, quality and quantity, that is, 
essence and fact must never be seen as self-identical. (20) 
i 
8. The irreal object (idea) is posited as 
psychophysically exterior to the subject when it is 
occluded behind its objective referent. 
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As Marx points out, it is the conceptual 
suspension of this essential separation which allows the 
production of capital. When the ideal and irreal are not 
clearly differentiated but nevertheless understood as 
conjointly experienced, facts can appear to take on lives of 
their own, posited as psycho-physically outside of the 
subject's factual body. In this way, facts which are really 
outside of the subject's body appear to have a being as 
meanings outside the subject's body as well. Since facts are 
"understood", it is supposed that what is understood has 
been acquired from the 'outside' because this is where facts 
are to be found. However, this only follows if the initial 
assumption that facts determine their own meaning is 
presupposed in the first place. Since it is absurd to claim 
that the subject actually has facts as they physically exist 
inside his head, the inside/outside dichotomy appears to be 
sensible. But it is equally absurd to claim that meaning, 
which is abstract, can be accounted for by something which 
is actually psychophysically seperated from the subject 
since this leads to the kind of absurdity which we saw in 
the Prolegomena section of this essay in reference to Hume. 
In the case of natural science, the assumption that the 
meaning of the factually existing data is known for itself 
is an equally absurd proposition. However, if this is 
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assumed to be the actual case, this puts the judgments of 
the technician in a position exterior to him in a 
psychophysical sense and allows him to say that what he 
judges things to be is simply a function of the way things 
'really are'. This allows the technician a complete 
abrogation of responsibility for what he judges things to be 
This abrogation of responsibility is structurally 
identical to that of the religious fanatic who claims that 
he is only an instrument of God's will which is something 
which has a factual existence exterior to himself in 
spatio-temporal terms. 
Such an abrogation of responsibility on the part 
of someone who judges stuffs denies any responsibility for 
the judgments produced in his judging of material objects as 
stuffs. In so doing, the meaning of the objects as stuffs is 
presupposed. In all off this the suppositional character of 
the interpretation of the material world is lost, and in 
this way ones interpretation takes on not only the 
appearance of "reality" . This "reality" now appears to be 
truly existent as both real and ideal in the appearance of 
the perceived fact as a being for itself. In this way it 
appears to be factually existent and hence, impervious to 
change. 
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It is within such an attitude that the subject is 
conditioned by the mode of production. The mode of 
production as a stuff is an irreal object produced by the 
subject in his own judging activity. If the subject is 
aware that his interpretation of the material world is only 
suppositional, then he need not be conditioned by the mode 
of production. It is because Marx never described how it is 
possible to shift one's attitude and thus escape from this 
world of appearance that his method remains illusive and 
incomplete from a theoretical standpoint. Marx never 
provides us with an explanation of how it is that he can 
produce the results which he does. 
9. Idealsim and materialism can be equally 
fetishistic in relation to their respective objects; 
the immanent contradiction between fetishistic 
idealism and fetishistic materialism. 
It should be apparent from what we have said that 
the difference between a fetishistically premised 
materialism and a similiarly premised idealism is only an 
apparent one. (21) When such forms-fixated theories 
(idealisms) and stuffs-fixated (mathematico-empirical 
sciences) confront one another in debate, they are caught in 
an irrevocable "either/or" since both are valid if their 
presuppositions are granted, but both have their grounding 
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normative premise in something which is a "holy cow" which 
cannot be doubted without plunging the whole exercise into 
complete chaos. As a norm, this grounding presupposition is 
what establishes the internal sense of the normative 
discipline in question. (22) It is what allows the 
scientist, for instance, to make judgments concerning the 
consistency and continuity of the domain of his enquiry, of 
his field of investigation. 
But because the source of this norm Itself may be 
converted or transmuted in the mind of the subject into a 
fetish object, the source of the meaning of this norm, 
(which in actuality lies with the judging activity of the 
subject hismelf), is occluded. The subject as the 
constitutive agent, the labourer viewed in a universal 
sense, disappears as the source of, the meaning of these 
norms. Thus, when a debate between a formal analytician and 
a formal ontologist takes place, if neither one is capable 
of simply viewing his irreal object as a supposed meaning, 
they will become caught in an immanent contradiction in 
which the only way to resolve this conflict is the 
obliteration of the 'other side'. Since both the poles in 
this dichotomy are actually talking about the same thing, 
that is, their respective fetishes, and either fetish is 
equally absurd, no resolution can ever come out of such a 
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debate. Thus, as Marx points out, romanticism in its 
fetishized form will play the role of the negator to 
capitalism until capitalism dissolves. (23) The former is 
simply the relativistic reflection of the absurdity of the 
latter. The latter is an affirmation of the absurdity upon 
which it is premised as if it were the truth. 
10. Formal ontology and formal analytics are valid 
enterprises as long as they do not become ends in 
themselves. 
But Husserl denies neither formal analytics, which 
he refers to as the proper theory of theory with its 
province of consequence and non-contradiction as its proper 
sphere (24), nor does he deny the efficacy of endeavours 
which find their basis in a formal ontological fashion. The 
latter is what allows a mathematized approach to the study 
of nature, which is the approach which western science in 
general has adopted. What Husserl does condemn is a 
technistic approach in which the initial desire to cognise 
(25) has been set out of view occlusively through a 
fetishization of stuffs. In turning their norms into ends in 
themselves, formal ontologically focused science (and since 
they are structurally equivalent, we can include formal 
analytics as well here)... 
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Becomes a mere art of achieving, through a 
calculating technique according to 
technical rules...One operates with 
letters and with signs for connections and 
relations (+,x,=,etc.) according to the 
rules of the game, for arranging them 
together in a way essentially not 
different, in fact, from a game of cards 
of chess. ((Hence))...the original 
thinking that genuinely gives meaning to 
this technical process and truth to the 
correct results (even "formal truth" 
peculiar to the formal mathesis 
universalis) is excluded...(26) 
But this "superficialization" which "'mechanizes'" 
(27) science, according to Husserl, is only a "tendency". It 
is not an inevitability. As Husserl says: 
One is, of course, to some degree 
conscious of the difference between techne 
and science. But the reflection back upon 
the actual meaning which was to be 
obtained for nature through the technical 
method stops too soon. (28) 
The problem with techne is that it is an 
historically embedded norm,(29) and so, as with capital as a 
mode of production of "wealth", techne, as a mode of 
producing an understanding of nature, appears as objectively 
pregiven (30) and hence, it "exists" as an ontos prior to my 
constitution of it. 
11. Naive reflection does not transcend the apparent 
(sic, pregiven) but rather, moves within it. 
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The transcendence of this occluded attitude is 
thus equivalent to the transcendence of fetishization where 
we understand both occlusion and fetishization to encompass 
not only techne or capital, but any possible meaning 
whatsoever. Thus, a radical alteration of attitude (3D is 
called for. Reflections upon the abstract categories 
produced in formal disciplines and normatively applied in a 
techne will not provide us with what we need, if such a 
reflection itself moves within a naive or fetish fixated 
attitude. As Husserl says: 
In the "natural reflection" of everyday 
life...we stand on the footing of the 
world as already existing — as when, in 
everyday life, we assert: " I see a house 
there" or"I remember having heard this 
melody". (32) 
But such natural reflections do not penetrate below the 
appearance of the categories. Such a reflection, while valid 
at its own level of evidence, can offer no explanation for 
the genesis of the constitution of the irreal object about 
which something is now judged. 
Thus all occaisional (even 
"philosophical") reflections which go from 
technical...work to its true meaning 
always stop at idealized nature ((i.e., 
the potentially fetishized syntactical 
stuffs)); they do not carry out the 
reflection radically, going back to the 
ultimate purpose which ((science or 
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philosophy)) was from...((its historical)) 
beginning supposed to serve...a purpose 
which lay in this prescientiflc life 
((i.e., that is, in terms of the activity 
of judging, the level of evidencing which 
gentically precedes the level of 
ontological explication)) and was related 
to its life-world. (33) 
12. Categorial objects as "passage ways". 
If the abstract forms and stuffs are not 
fetishistically fixed as opaque objectivities, as 
self-explanatory, Husserl feels that they can act as 
"passages" (34) or "pathways" which one can follow back to 
the sense which was initially present in the opinion which 
lead the judging subject to the level of distinct judging. 
This is consistent with Husserl's method, since, as we have 
put it , there is a 'ladder' (35) of evidencings provided to 
the judging subject by the judgment-sense or meaning which 
was vaguely or obscurely present in the initial opining but 
which was not explicit at this prior level of judging. Now, 
having made this meaning distinct by moving to the abstract, 
but remembering not to truncate this investigation of 
meaning sense in a fetishistic fashion at this level of 
judging, the subject can move back ,in reflection, to the 
initial act of opining. However, having ascended to the 
166 
abstract, the subject returns to experience with the 
advantage of understanding distinctly what it was which he 
originally posited in his vague judging act. 
13. The move to the "life-world" (36) and the 
potential for the emergence of 'phenomenologism' as 
the abstract statement of all technonolgies. 
It is important to note at this point that Husserl 
does not simply continue on towards a higher level of 
abstraction. If, indeed, what Husserl was interested in was 
simply the categorial forms or irreal objects, he could 
continue on in a straight line, so to speak, from the 
abstract forms and stuffs which are made explicit at the 
second level of judging. If this were the case, then 
Husserl would simply be involved in a "double-abstraction" 
in which he goes the formal ontologist and formal 
analytician one better by performing a kind of "I told you 
so" theoretical move in which he could re-state what the 
technicians in question had established, but in a new 
jargon. Phrases like "theory of theory" and "experience of 
experience" may lead one to understand Husserl's 
phenomenology as simply an undefined abstract statement of 
the already abstract. However, theory of theory is 
traditional analytics, not phenomenology. If phenomenology 
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were only a theory of theory, then all of Husserl's 
investigations after 1900 would only be footnotes to the 
Prolegomena. 
It is possible to see Husserl's phenomenology in 
this way, and if understood in this way, a phenomenologism, 
with its new language, phenomenologese, can emerge. The 
phenomenologist s can simply become the new high priests of 
the age of technologism because their new language makes it 
possible to express in universal terms, and hence, in any 
case whatsoever, some sort of universal "truths In 
themselves" which are the ultimate, formal statement of the 
universal fetish. Within such a reification of the already 
reified the pehnomenologist would forever be one step ahead 
of the technician who would have only his one fetish object 
with its corresponding factual referent to which the 
phenomenologist could point to as a particularistic 
restriction. Because the phenomenologist could express all 
possible fetishes within the rubric of one mode of 
expression, he could correspondingly claim to be in 
possession of the universal explanation, and hence, would 
forever be advantaged. In this way, a knowledge of the facts 
of Husserl could lead the phenomenologist to think that he 
had in his possession, the ultimate tool, the ultimate, 
universal answer as it presents itself in the ultimate 
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fetish object — the universals, the "Things in Themselves" 
— these would be the ultimate fetish objects. And in their 
universality, they would be beyond the wit of anyone but the 
phenomenologist. We do not believe that Husserl has this in 
mind as the goal of his phenomenology. Whether or not 
Husserl can avoid such an abstraction is another issue which 
lies somewhat outside of the range of this paper. (37) 
14. The zigzag (viz., dialectical flow) of the 
critique of reason. 
In both the Logical Investigations and in Formal 
and Transcendental Logic Husserl says that the critique of 
reason is a zigzig. (38) Having "zigged" up to the level of 
the abstract,so to speak, Husserl now "zags" back to the 
initial experiencing to repair the rupturing of experience 
(39) which takes place in abstraction. Husserl moves back to 
the inital, unitary state of affairs which , in the process 
of making the categorial objects distinct , has been torn 
asunder. It should be pointed out here that Husserl's 
description of this return to the life world is necessarily 
a theoretical one. Since we maintain the demonstrability of 
Marx's first "Thesis on Feurerbach", what we understand 
Husserl to be describing here is a unity of theory and 
praxis. This assumption which we are making seems to diverge 
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from a strict textual interpretation of Husserl. However, if 
Husserl is asking us to actually move to experience , even 
if this is an "experience of experience", this experiencing 
can only be performed by a consciousing subject. An 
experience of experience is no less an experience than the 
initial experience was. If this initial experience was an 
activity in the constitutive sense, then, the experience of 
experience will similiarly be an activity. Even the 
subject's participation in the reading or writing of theory 
is experiential, and hence, it is an activity in the 
constitutive sense. What we interpret Husserl to mean when 
he calls for a return to the life-world is a concretizing 
move which does not simply thrust the subject back into a 
naive attitude of accepting meanings as pregiven. If this 
were the case, then one could only know truth as an 
abstraction. If truth can only be known as an abstraction, 
then Husserl himself cannot be seen as transcending the 
problem which we believe he has pointed to in relation to 
both formal ontology and formal analytics. Husserl himself 
calls for a bracketing of theoretical considerations as part 
and parcel of the transcendencence of pregivens. It follows 
that at some point Husserl himself will have to move beyond 
the purely theoretical and live. 
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14. The move back to the actual unity of lived 
experience moves through categorial objects to the 
original "it itself". 
In returning to this unitarilly experienced 
phenomenon, Husserl is not simply concretizing the abstract 
by shoving the "facts" of the experience back into whatever 
empty categorial object which the experiencing subject has 
since made distinct. What Husserl moves to to concretize 
such an abstract categorial object, is the subject's actual 
living, breathing, life experience of meaning replete with 
its hyle (40), with these now explicated in relation to what 
the subject initally and in a muddy way, posited them as 
being. The question of whether or not such a move can be 
performed in a reflective-passive mode is crucial at this 
point. However, we shall set this question aside. 
15. The move to the the life-world does not lose the 
object but allows all objects to be understood 
equally as intentional objects.(phenomena). 
At this point, we can say with Marx that 
To be radical is to go to the root. For 
man, however, the root is man himself. 
(41) 
Man, for Marx, is homo faber. (42) Man is the labourer, and 
within the context of this thesis, man, as labourer, is a 
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judging subject. However, as long as Marx (and Marxists) 
leaves the phenomenon of judging, or of labour itself, for 
that matter, inexplicit and unclarified there will be no 
hope of moving being the sort of metaphysical interpretation 
of the dialectic into which Lukacs falls. 
Only if we are no longer engaged merely in 
our simple judicative doing on the basis 
of experience (the doing in which we 
aquire the categorial formations ((irreal 
Objects)) — only if we go on to 
synthetically make our experiencing itself 
and its productions a theme of judgment, 
can we have original knowledge of the fact 
that this (harmoniously flowing) 
experiencing already bears "implicitly" in 
itself, "before" our thinking, the 
being-sense of Nature, as the same sense 
as thinking explicates. (43) 
To continue: 
The naivete of speaking about 
"objectivity" without ever considering 
subjectivity as experiencing, knowing, 
accomplishing, the naivete of the 
scientist of nature or the world in 
general, who is blind to the fact that all 
that he attains as objective truths and 
the objective world itself as the 
substratum of his formulae (the everyday 
world of experience as well as the higher 
-level conceptual world of knowledge) are 
his life-construct developed within 
himself — this naivete is naturally no 
longer possible as soon as life becomes 
the point of focus ((i.e. the lived 
experience of the subject)). (44) 
This move to "life" is not always made successfully, 
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however. Some do not succeed in making such a move. 
They do not succed because they cannot 
replace the practice of living in 
perception, their attention turned towards 
the perceived object both in observation 
and in theoretical inquiry, by directing 
their glance upon the perceiving itself, 
or upon the way in which the perceived 
object with its distinguishing features is 
presented, and of taking that which 
presents itself in the immanent analysis 
of the essence just as it presents itself 
through the subject's lived experiencing. 
(45) 
By positing all objects of whatever kind as equal in 
relation to their a priori sense, and by positing the 
subject's understanding of the being of these objects as the 
product of the subject's constitution of these objects as 
being such and such, Husserl can treat all fetishes as 
equivalent. Thus, a solution a fetishization which involves 
a material object as something which "is" will be 
structurally the same as the solution to a fetishization of 
an ideal object as something which "is". 
In both the case of an analytic empiricism and an 
analytic idealism, these objects to which the relative 
approach addresses itself, the axioms (46) from which 
deductions move, are accepted as pregiven. This pregiveness 
is actually the product of a judging performed by the 
subject. It has its sense as an object of a judgment. At the 
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level of distinctness, it is enough to explicate what this 
object qua categorial object is, but the origin of the 
meaning of this categorial object need not be clarified. 
According to Husserl, any judgment is meant inasmuch as it 
Is posited as being such and such .(47) Such a positing of 
the being of an object as meaning something is, for Husserl, 
an intentional positing. In any act of consciousing this 
intention acts as a matrix within which the hyle are 
meaningfully ordered into a sensible phenomenon. For 
Husserl, and act of consciousing (viz..process) must have an 
object which is held intentionally by the subject and, 
obviously, a subject who intends towards such an object. 
This is a unitary act which can only be split apart in 
abstraction. It has the character of 
ego-cogito-cogitatum,(48) where the ego is the subject, the 
cogito is the intention and the cogitatum is the 
intentional object. Thus, as Husserl says, the intentional 
object, which is itself, irreal, acts as a "clue" (49) or 
index which guides sense investigation from one level of 
judging to another level of judging. 
The cogitatum here is the intentional object. 
Every cogito has its coresponding cogitatum. This cogito may 
signify *I desire', 'I wish*, 'I value', or whatever, and 
this intending towards the cogitatum, or object, is what is 
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posited as its being for me, as the judging subject. As Carr 
notes: 
What Husserl seeks in Erlebnisse ((lived 
intentional experience)) is the 'origin' 
of precisely that giveness of 
objects...Not the ((factual)) being of 
objects, but their being for me is what is 
to be accounted for.(50) 
Thus: 
to say that something — anything whatever 
— is given is to say that it corresponds 
to or fulfils an intention — objectivity 
cannot be given without intention, which 
is to say that something objective is 
given insofar as it is meant as being. 
(51) 
The object was first understood as a result of the subject's 
constitution of it as meaning something; as an intentional 
object. Thus the manner in which the object is intended 
towards, as it is constitutively posited as being in the 
subject's judging activity is, at the first, staightforward 
level of evidencing, not questioned. It stands, for all 
intents and purposes, as it appears at first glance. By 
approaching the intentional object at the second level of 
evidencing, this object can be judged axiomatically, and it 
is these axioms which act as the unexamined presuppositions 
of deductive technologies. But the sense of these norms, or 
axioms, is implicit in the way the subject has the object of 
perception as being something meaningful in his first vague 
intentional having of the object; that is, as a cogitatum. 
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16. The sense of the judgment acts as the connection 
between different levels of judging. 
In terms of judging, the first encounter with the 
object will present the judging subject as "perhaps this". 
If I, as the judging subject, become curious about this 
object, I will move to the second level of evidencing to 
determine whether or not my first supposition or positing of 
this object as being what I initially supposed it be can be 
made categorially distinct. This demands a reflection on 
the cogitatum qua cogitatum. (52) If I , as the judging 
subject, cannot free myself from the first positing of 
being, I will remain within the naive assumption that my 
first positing of the being of an object as of perception as 
meaning something is 'true'. Even if I succeed in 
explicating this meaning as a categorial or irreal object, 
if I maintain that my initial opinion is unquestionably 
true, I will correspondingly maintain the same prejudice in 
regard to the categorial object which is produced at the 
second level of judging. 
If I find at the second level of judging at which 
I make this object as intended explicit, that my initial, 
vaguely posited opinion avails itself to explication as 
something distinct, this possibility exists not because of 
my abstract explication of it, but, rather, in the actuality 
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that I intended towards the perceived object (53) in such 
and such a way in my first judging act at the level of 
indistinctness. In other words, the sense which logically 
bridges the first and the second levels of judging must be 
implicit in the first level of judging itself. This sense is 
not created at the second level nor is this sense the 
product of a category which may itself be conceived of as 
being active, ( although this may appear to be the case to 
someone who is lost in the fetish world which can develop at 
this level of abstraction). The thing which is present at 
the vague level and at the distinct level as well is the 
product of the initial intentional having of the object as 
something meaningful. 
17. Genetic investigation and recovery of the sense 
through this investigation. 
If we turn our attention to the sense of the 
phenomenon which we now hold reflectively we will find that 
it is the intention with which this phenomenon was initially 
constituted which lends this phenomenon its sense. If we 
make this intention itself the theme of our enquiry, 
something emerges for us here. 
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Confining our attention to the doxic 
(belief positing) reflection possible in 
every case, we see that something new 
becomes posited in it, namely the sense to 
which reflection is directed: the 
perceptual sense, the valuational sense, 
the practical sense, or the like — in 
short, the supposed or meant as such. 
Everywhere, moreover, this sense must 
become thematic if "criticism" is to be 
instituted. All acts in a pre- eminent 
sense of the word, namely all intentional 
mental processes that bring about 
"positions" (positings, theses, 
position-takings)..., are subject to a 
critique of "reason"; and each to a genus 
of such a position a peculiar evidence 
corresponds, which, according to an 
eidetic law, can be transmuted into a 
doxic evidence. (54) 
If we take as the theme of our reflection, acts in which the 
being of the meaning of an object is posited, (that is, 
intentional acts) the intention itself emerges as the sense 
or meaning of the object which is constituted as meaning 
such and such. This intentionally performed positing of the 
being of something as meaningful may be a positing of this 
object as having its sense as practical, valuable, and so 
on. But this is only its sense as the consciousing subject 
constitutes it to be. In order for criticism to be 
undertaken, this sense itself must be made the theme of our 
enquiry. For Husserl, all acts are either constitutive of 
meaning or are mediately dependent upon such "originary" 
activity (55). In this way, all acts are either acts in 
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which meanings are produced, or are dependent (viz., 
mediate) upon such acts for their originary sense. Thus, all 
acts, at one level or another, are intentional or meaning 
positing acts. It is therefore possible on principle to get 
to the intentional core of all acts if a full genetic 
enquiry is undertaken. 
Those acts which are not originary of meaning 
themselves, but which depend for their sense upon prior acts 
of meaning constitution, still find their sense in this 
prior originary activity. Thus, every act has its own 
"history" (56) so to speak, which can be de-sedimented, 
presuppositional layer by presuppositional layer, until the 
initial or "first" originary constitutive performance is 
arrived at. It is clear that such a "history" may have 
correlative objective historical facts associated with it, 
(as, for instance, when one says "I first understood the 
Pythagorean theorem on such and such a day and in such and 
such a place,") but the genetic analysis of this phenomenon 
in question, as a phenomenon of meaning, must be undertaken 
with an attitude which transcends the contingencies of any 
particular time or place. 
Each intentional structure of consciousness has 
its own "peculiar evidence", for instance, all acts of 
valuing share the evidence of what it is to value. (57) 
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These evidences, as a matter of principle, can themselves be 
"transmuted" into evidences which oan be "doxically 
posited". Since Husserl maintains that nothing can be 
expressed, except as a doxically posited something, (58) 
this simply means that these evidences can be put into 
expressable form. (59) The significance of this for Marx's 
conception of realization will be explored below. 
18. The transcendental turn. 
(i.) The move to the first person: the 
phenomenological "I". 
Here we are confronted with a number of things: 
First, such a reflection requires a shift in attitude; 
Second, the theme of our enquiry is the act of intentional 
positing itself;third, what is derived from such a shift in 
attitude is evidence. These three things are closely 
interrelated. 
This shift in attitude is referred to variously as 
the epoche, the phenomenological reduction, or simply as 
"bracketing". The first move of such a reduction is dictated 
by the demands of what it is wished to focus upon; that is, 
intentional consciousness. Since the only subject's 
intentional consciousness to which anyone has direct access 
is his own, this demands a move to the constituting ego as 
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an I, myself. Thus, Husserl follows Descartes' example by 
moving to the ego cogito. As Husserl states: 
First of all, before everything else 
conceivable, I am. This "I am" is for me, 
the one who says it, and says it in the 
right sense, the primitive intentional 
basis for my world; and, at the same time, 
it must not be overlooked that likewise 
the "Objective" world, the "world for all 
of us" as accepted with this sense by me, 
is also "my world". But "I am" is the 
primitive intentional basis, not only for 
"the" world, the one I consider real, but 
also for any "ideal world" that I accept; 
and this holds without exeption, for 
anything and everything of which I am 
conscious as something existent in any 
sense whatsoever that I understand or 
accept — for everything that I show, 
sometimes legitmately, sometimes 
illegitimately,to be existent — including 
me myself, my life, my believing, and all 
this consciousness-of. (60) 
...that is, my whole intentionally posited being in the 
"objective" world as well as my "being" in imagination. 
(ii.) The epoch* as a radical backeting of all being 
as posited by myself, including self-image. 
Inasmuch as my life, my believing, and so forth 
are constituted by me, these phenomena as well must be 
bracketed, qua cogitationes. Their meaning, held by me to 
be the case, their 'being so' for me must be altered from a 
level of staightforward assertion to a level on which they 
emrge as suppositions which are not prior to my constitution 
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of thorn (sic as pre-suppositions), but are my product. 
Now, in reflection, these acts are recognized by me as my 
psychic possession. This includes within it, my self-image; 
my imagining of what I am, for this too is constituted by 
me. True, this may be constituted by me relative to what 
someone else is, but this other person is for me what I make 
of that person to be. The other's meaning for himself 
remains his own business. The other constitutes his meaning 
on his own. I can constitute meaning relative to what I 
believe someone else is, but this is a constitution of my 
own "being", or properly put, meaning, relative to something 
I can never know without the intervention of some sort of 
metaphysical mediation. 
If I believe that I "am" what "I am" (sic mean), 
relative to what I believe the other is, I will depend on 
the other 's meaning which, in actuality, is my own 
constitution of what I beleive the other to be. In this way, 
I occlude my own being behind this fantasy of what I 
believe, but can never know, the other to be. Thus, I 
occlude my own meaning behind the appearance of the other 
which I myself have constituted. If, correspondingly, I 
believe what the other tells me he is, and accept this as 
true without judging this assertion myself, if I take 
someone else's word for what he says he is iand I believe 
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this presupposltionally, he can lie to me until the end of 
time, and he will have the "ability" to make me believe 
anything about himself or about myself. The latter follows 
if I have constituted my meaning relative to what I naively 
believe either what he tells me about himself, or what I 
naively believe "him" to mean for himself. Thus, as Marx 
says, the shopkeeper can discern a lie from the truth 
because he does not take someone else's word for what he 
claims to be; the shopkeeper judges for himself. This is 
something, which Marx says, is still to be learned by 
philosophers.(61) 
In bracketing "my" being as a meaning constituted 
by me, Husserl transcends Descartes' arguement for the 
existence of God as the perfect ontic counterpart to my own 
imperfect being. (62) He also avoids the begged question of 
Descartes' cogito ergo sum (63) because this "sum" is 
itself, something constituted by me. Thus we have 
ego-cogito-cogitatum — I think thoughts. 
(iii.) Experience remains complete within a 
phenomenologically bracketed attitude. 
However, I lose none of the experience of these 
phenomena in bracketing their being, for what I have 
bracketed is not the facts, but the meaning which I have, 
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genetically speaking, already constituted them to mean. Thus 
the hyle are not "lost"; they remain. The world of facts is 
not lost in this suspension of being (64), for facts in 
themselves have nothing to do with how I understand them. 
The world as a fact remains, but the world of meaning which 
I constitute is bracketed. To think that the facts which I 
sensuo-empirically experience are lost in a bracketing of 
"being" is to collapse the irreal with what factually 
exists. Facts may have an empirical existence, but this does 
not determine how I will constitutively interpret them. And 
to claim that the facts, for themselves, explain anything 
about themselves is patently psychologistic and as such, is 
absurd. 
Such a bracketing calls rather for the 
Ego's non-participation in the "positing" 
(believing, taking a position as to being) 
that part of the staightforward ((act of 
perception)) in no wise alters alters the 
facts that his ((the judging subject's)) 
reflecting experiencing is precisely an 
experiencing experiencing of ((his own 
initial act of perception)) with all its 
moments, which belonged to it before and 
are continuing to take shape. (65) 
What such a bracketing accomplishes is a move 
beyond what is posited by me as prior \.o my constitution of 
it . A bracketing, however, does not deny the world. It 
rather demands that I set aside any assumptions about 
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whether or not the world I constitute as being such and such 
is or is not this way. Thus: 
In transcendental-phenomenological reflec-
tion we deliver ourselves from this 
((existentially posited, pregiven)) 
footing by universal epoche with respect 
to the being or not being of the 
world.(66) 
Since any being is intentionally posited by the me as the 
being of an object as meaning something, a counter-positing 
of its not being is simply the negation, or immanent 
contradiction, to this first positing of being. What is at 
issue is not a negation of this or an affirmation of this 
but a synthetic move to a clarified understanding of what 
was initially meant. Through such a bracketing 
...experience as thus modified, the 
transcendental experience ((i.e., the 
experience of that which is not contingent 
to any temporal or spatial location)) 
consists, then, we can say, in a looking at 
and describing the particular 
transcendentally reduced cogito 
((intention)), but without participating, 
as reflective subjects in the natural 
existence -positing that the originally 
straight forward perception (or the other 
cogito ) contains or that Ego, as 
immersing himself straightforwardly in the 
world actually executed. (67) 
Thus, in this bracketing of the being of the world 
as meant, I neither negate this world nor do I lose it in 
any way. The world is retained, but it is retained as a 
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phenomenon which I have structured as meaning what it does 
which is to say how it has its being for me. Through this 
bracketing of all beliefs I ostensibly will have achieved a 
"disinterested" or detatched attitude towards "the" world 
and the place I understand myself to hold within this 
reality or any other which I may constitute. By doing this, 
Husserl claims that I can experience, go through the old 
process, not in the sense of merely repeating the old act 
(68), but in an investigative fashion. This initial 
experience, which within the naive or straightforward 
attitude is 
taken as "normal", simply there, unbroken, 
existing in pure ontic certainty (69)... 
is now the focus of my investigation. But in my present 
going through this previous act of "doxic positing" , I now 
refrain from the positing which in the inital act of 
judging this phenomenon, made it what it 'was* for me. 
Because of this I am not simply repeating it in a kind of 
rote fashion. Having already made distinct what it was that 
I originally opined, I have something upon which to focus in 
relation to this initial act of judging. I now have the 
distinct or explicated categorial form, understood now not 
as the abstract embodiment of my initial idea, but as 
something which demands, to use the Marxist term loosely 
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here, to be "concretized". (70) The category can thus act as 
a passage way to direct the focus of my attention. As 
Husserl says, in the act of explication, the polythetic is 
made monothetic (71) By moving to the abstract, my 
experience is ordered in a logically reconstructable way. 
But the rote repetition of the initial act is not, as we 
have pointed out, to be construed as the purpose of either 
the move to the abstract, nor of the reduction itself. 
Thus, in the move back to the original lived 
experience, the initial unity of such an experience is 
recovered by the experiencing subject. To the subject who 
has never made a move to the abstract, this rupture will 
never have occured. Mind you, such a subject will also 
never have ventured past the stages of what Kosik (72) 
refers to as "vegetative" consciousness which is perhaps too 
cruel a way of putting this, but one which is nevertheless 
to the point. 
(iv.) What is evident when all pregivens are set aside is 
"self-evident" or apodictic 
What I can attain in such a clear headed return to 
the unity of experience, which now becomes my possession 
again, is an apperception of pure meanings in unity with the 
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memory of the hyle which were conjointly given with these 
essences in my initial experiencing of them.(73) What I now 
confront as meaningful will not be contingent upon any 
particular constitutive act or the particulars related to 
it, since, by having put out of play any positing of being 
whatsoever, (and this necessarily includes theoretical 
considerations as ends in themselves), what I will 
experience at this level of clarity must be essential in the 
strict sense of this word. What I will discover in what may 
also be called a totalization, (bearing in mind that all 
theoretical considerations have by this point been put out 
of play — including Hegel's), will thus be atemporal, have 
no factual existence in the fetishized empirical or 
idealistic metaphysical sense, and will defy any attempt to 
define them in terms of original location. These essences or 
qualities or species, whatever name one chooses is 
immaterial , will display what Husserl refers to as 
self-evidence. They cannot be doubted since they are what 
remains after everything which can be doubted has been 
doubted through the radical application of the epoch*; 
application, as Husserl says in the Crisis, which must occur 
at one blow. (74) 
But as Husserl notes, this way of expressing what 
is atemporal or non-contingent of the experience, is 
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"actually ((an)) overblown" way of expressing what is 
obtained. (75)In this form of expression, we run the risk of 
making what should be the quintessence of clarity into a 
turgid and potentially fetishized irreal object. 
"Self-evidence" means nothing more than 
grapsing an entity with the consciousness 
of its original ...Selbst-da ((its there 
it is!, its "eureka" moment)). Successful 
realization of this project is, for the 
acting subject, self-evidence, what has 
been realized is there, originaliter, as 
itself. (76) 
Or to put this in everyday language, "What more can you 
say?" about what you find what you do when you get to this 
point? 
This self-evidence , for an instance, may be the 
evidence which I have of the apodictic certainty of logical 
principles, for logical principles relate 
... not to what is given only in active 
evidence, but to the abiding formations 
that have been primarilly instituted in 
active evidence and can be reactivated and 
identified again and again; it relates to 
them as objectivities which are henceforth 
at hand, with which taking hold of them 
again, one can operte in thinking, and 
which, as the same, one can further shape 
categorically into more and more new 
formations.(77) 
But self-evidence relates not only to the ideal forms of 
traditional analytics. It relates to any intentional having 
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of an object, any meaning which I either can or do 
constitute. In this way the self-evident truth of valuing an 
object, for instance, a cigarette lighter, is the same as 
that truth or the essential meaning of valuing which I 
experience in valuing my social position or my 
Mercedes-Benz. What that particular object means to me in 
the moment in which I constitute it as valuable, will be 
essentially the same as when I value any other object. 
Clearly, valuing too has its modalities within it, and these 
can be explored in a sense investigation of these diferent 
modes of the intention, to value. Thus, a norm can be 
established within which such an investigation may be 
undertaken. However, this norm cannot be fixed as itself the 
source of its own meaning, for to do so would be to 
fetishize this norm, this intentional structure of 
understanding, as an abstract but apparently self-determing 
irreal object. 
Clearly, valuing is not the only phenomenon which 
may be explored in such a way. The same holds true for every 
way in which meaning can be posited, for instance, the 
"doxic modalities" of willing, trusting, being jealous, 
being afraid, loving, hating and so forth, ad infinituum. 
Thus: 
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Evidence quite universally, is indeed 
nothing other than the mode of 
consciousness — built up perhaps as an 
extraordinary complex hierarchcal 
structure — its intentional objectivity 
in the mode of belonging to the original 
'it itself. (78) 
...where the "it itself" is the Selbst-da of the intentional 
experience, experienced by me in ray conscious life. 
(v.) Self-evidences are atemporal; as qualities they 
are equally valid as what they themselves are, and 
as such, are relative one to the other. 
These self evidences are transcendental, to use 
Husserl's expression, because they transcend the 
contingencies of my experience of of space and time. True: 
The particular formative processes of 
thinking are temporally outside one 
another (viewed as real psychic processes 
in real human beings, they are outside one 
another in Objective time); they are 
individually different and seperated ((and 
here we see the grounding conception for 
psychologism)). Not so, the thoughts that 
are thought in thinking. To be sure, the 
thoughts do not make their appearance in 
consciousness as something "external". 
They are not real objects, not spatial 
objects, but irreal formations produced by 
the mind; and their peculiar essence 
excludes spatial extension, original 
locality, and mobility. (79) 
The reduction to these essences, which are 
witnessed in the unity of intentional-constitutive 
consciousing activity, says Husserl, opens up a conscious 
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...awareness of the world-whole ((what we 
have chosen to refer to in passing as the 
totality )) in its own peculiar form, that 
of spatio-temoral endlessness (( i.e., 
infinity)). Throughout every change in 
consciousness the universe — remains as 
the existing background of our whole 
natural life. (80) 
Thus, the reduction does not do away with the 
factual world. These facts simply bear no mention, since if 
they are mentioned they must be constituted as meaning 
something. In my experience lies a factual residuum, like 
the ground my feet rest upon of the wall which my eyes 
"rest" upon. In normal , wakeful consciouness (81) this 
hyletlc data is always there — not because I make it 
materially in my intentional constitution of it ; I do not 
create hyle in my imagination unless I am hallucinating — 
but as inert. 
What forms the materials ((hyletlc data)) 
into intentional experiences and brings in 
the specific element of intentionality is 
the same ((;this infinite range of ideal 
possibilities Husserl calls the 
transcendental ego.)) as that which gives 
its specific meaning to our qse of the 
term "consciousness", in accordance with 
which consciousness points eo ipso to 
something of which it is the 
consciousness. (82) 
19. "The" world becomes my world as I constitute it. 
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With the relativization of all categories all 
notions of what the world which I share with others means 
are equally relativized. What this means is that they all 
become equally valid in their own right. While it should be 
clear that all such opinions are not equaly evidentially 
fulfilable, each opinion nevertheless has its own validity. 
This also includes my opinion of the world. In returning the 
world to me as my meaning of the world, my idea of it, the 
"natural" order of things in capitalistic society where ray 
world is my factual possessions has been reversed so that my 
own ideal world is now my possession. 
20. The move to the social world. 
What brings the"world", "reality" into being as 
meaningful is my ,(or ostensibly any other subject's), 
constitution of it as such. It is imaginable that one could 
exist in a world without meaning. But in such a condition, 
it would be impossible for this existence to be known be me. 
Caught within the world of straightforward 
constitution, in which my attention is always trained on the 
object which I perceive, this object appears as its own 
explanation. Within this attitude, the meaning of this 
object appears to be self-understood as pregiven. From a 
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phenomenologically reduced vantage point of detatchment I 
can extricate myself from such a position. Because the 
activity to which I am currently (that is, gentically 
speaking, prior to the epoch*) attatched is strictly 
speaking my activity and no-one's and nothing else's, I must 
perform this act of detatchment in relation to my own 
meaning as I perceive it to have an existence prior to my 
knowledge of it as a phenomenon. In rather graphic terms, 
Husserl describes this as the "splitting of the Ego" (83), 
but this is not some sort of Oympian achievement. This 
occurs when someone finds himself proof reading something 
which he has written, as if it were not his work — when 
this piece of work appears to speak for itself. Again, it 
can be experienced in the plastic and graphic arts when the 
stone cutter stands back from his work and lets the piece of 
stone with which he is working tell him what to do next. He 
confronts it anew with every new cut and lets his artistic 
intuition guide him as he judges where he will make his 
mark next. And lest we forget, in this discussion of the 
finer arts, this takes place in the process of labour of any 
kind which is not merely mimetic, but which is creative. It 
is not without reason that Husserl starts the Prolegomena 
with the example of the creative artist,(84) and again, in 
Ideas Husserl points to the work of the creative artist as 
the expression of an already clarified understanding. (85) 
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But such detatchment is achieved 
Only by virtue of this new attitude 
...((through which)) I see that all the 
world* and therefore whatever exists for 
me naturally exists for me only as 
accepted by me, with the sense it has for 
me at the time — that it exists for me 
((It may exists 'for itself but I can 
never know this.)) only as cogitatum of my 
changing and, while changing, 
interconnected cogitationes; and I now 
accept it soley as that. (86) 
Thus, within the stream of my own consciousness , 
I have the flux of particulars as well as the constancy of 
irreal formations, or ideas, which defy any attempt to 
categorize them in existential terms as either being or not 
being. They also defy theoretical description (86), being 
only expressible by analogy. However, these irreal 
formations: 
Like other products of the mind 
...admit...however to physical embodiment: 
in their case, an embodiment by sensuos 
verbal signs; and thus they gain a 
secondary spatial existence (that of a 
spoken or written sentence). Every sort of 
irreality, of which the ideality of 
significations and the different ideality 
of universal essences or species are 
particular cases, has manners of possible 
participation in reality. This in no way 
alters the essential separation of the 
real and the irreal. (87) 
It remains only for Husserl to broaden this 
statement and say that ideas can as well be realized 
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sensuously in other empirical forms,and we are immediately 
again with Marx, if not in word, at least in spirit for 
Husserl has established the precident for the instantiation 
of ideas in material form, of realization, with language. 
Thus it is not without reason that Marx says that industry, 
( and its products, as commodities, we might add), is the 
"open book" of the expression of the meaning which a 
society, now understood as a collection of constituting 
agents, or egos, expresses in material form. Thus, along 
with Marx, we can say that social relations are not pregiven 
facts, but are relations amongst subjects, not as some sort 
of vacuous flow but as a dialectic evidenced through objects 
which are virtually drenched in meaning. 
As well, we have the makings of a dialectic of 
material creation which need not end with the coming of a 
revolutionary consciousness, as Lukacs, much to his own 
chagrin we are sure, found when he posited the proletariat 
as the "identical subject-object".(88) The dialectic of the 
flow of my own living experience will continue until I die. 
The dialectic need not end simply because of a theoretical 
'requirement*. 
Here we encounter the problem of how one can 
i 
explain one's recognition of the other. Husserl comes 
closest to resolving this problem to his own satisfaction in 
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the Crisis (89). In Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl 
cites the presupposition which plagues traditional analytics 
as precisely the problem of a shared life-world of 
intersubjective understanding. Ostensibly, it is this 
presupposition which Husserl hopes to phenomenologically 
clarify through his descriptions in Formal and 
Transcendental Logic, but apparently he is unsatisfied with 
his solution in this book as well. If, as we have argued, 
the problems which arise in relation to traditional 
analytics and formal ontology find their source in an 
ontologization (fetishization) of abstract forms, then this 
can be seen as the source of these theoretical approaches' 
presupposition of the meaning of the intersubjective world. 
If Husserl himself is doing theory, then perhaps his problem 
with the recognition of the other finds its source in the 
same kind of abstraction. While what we are saying here is 
clearly speculative, it is surprising that Husserl should 
have a problem with the recognition of the other if, indeed, 
what he is calling for in the return to the things 
themselves is a move to experience as a unity of theory and 
praxis, the latter now clairfied in relation to their mutual 
inter-dependence but mutual irreducibility. 
However, for the purposes of this paper, we will 
assume that Husserl is calling for a dialectical synthesis 
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of the irreal and real foundations of experience. It should 
be remembered that throughout this essay we have attempted 
to maintain a position which has denied the efficacy of 
metaphysical interventions. Unless we are willing to excuse 
ourselves from this position at this juncture, it must be 
maintained that any experience will have its hyletic 
referents, either as a memory or as an actual event. If this 
is maintained to be the case, and it must be unless we want 
to involve ourselves in a mysticism at this point, it would 
be reasonable to say that since I have access to my own 
meaning through artifacts which I realise in material form, 
( as we have argued in relation to artistic , creative 
activity), it is possible to conceive of myself as viewing 
"my" artifacts as if they were not mine, so to speak, 
through the "splitting of my ego". In confronting the 
material world, I find objects which I know that I have not 
produced but which I find have been produced in such a way 
that they are useful or beautiful, and so on. I recognise 
the intelligence of the other through his material activity 
as it is expressed in the material objects which he 
produces. He is not these objects any more than I "am" the 
material objects which I produce. But because I can have 
access to self-evident truths which hold universally, this 
means that they must hold for the other as well. To be sure, 
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I may be wrong about the apodicticity of these evidences, 
but that's life. Nevertheless, if these self-evidences are 
transcendental, then they will transcend my particular 
location and my particular instance as a living being. The 
same must hold for the other as well. Since these 
self-evidences are transcendental, they can never be 
exhausted by any particular material expression of them. 
However, they do admit to material expression. 
We can say, then, that I may know the other 
inasmuch as I know the meaning which he expresses through 
the factual, material expression of this meaning which he 
realizes. This is in complete accord with Marx; the social 
world is the world of mediations which men themselves 
produce. Such a move to the social through a recognition of 
the object as the other's, requires me to again "split my 
ego" and bracket what it is that I would like these objects 
to mean and let them speak for themselves, not in a 
metaphysical sense, but rather, in the following way: In 
having these objects as objects of my consciousness, I 
already will have constituted them as meaning something. If 
I correspondingly see that these objects are the product of 
someone else's labour, I must bracket what I would like them 
to be, or how I would do differently what he has done , or 
how it is that this product may either agrandise my own 
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perception of what I "am", or contrarilly, how this product 
of the other's 
of the other's labour labour may threaten my conception of 
what I am, and see that what it is that I now hold 
reflectively in my grasp is what I make it to be. With this 
stage of constitutive sense investigation being reached, I 
am now in the position to focus on the meaning of what I 
have constituted the meaning of this object to be and to 
move to the essence from their, ever mindful that it is 
still not my product. It finds its origin with the person or 
if you would prefer the abstract statement of this, the 
subject, who actually produced it as a function of his 
judicative activity, and as a result of his physical, 
material activity. 
The facts of this activity — how much did the 
materials cost, how long did it take, did he use a 
jack-knife or a jigsaw — are as irrelavant here as they 
are in the Geisteswissenschaftliche example of psychologism. 
What all this amounts to in the jargon of the everyday 
reduces to two things:First, this recognition of the other 
is a simple "Putting myself in the other guy's shoes" (90); 
and second, in the social world, we judge people by their 
actions, which clearly may also include their words. But I 
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judge the other by his actions. Inasmuch as I judge the 
other, this judgment like any other judgment, may be reduced 
to its phenomeonolgical or essential elements. If I can 
accomplish a splitting of my ego in relation to the other, 
then at least I will be capable of understanding what I mean 
when I judge other people in relation to their worth or what 
I understand to be their intent. All of this remains 
relative to my own experience and self-understanding, 
however. In a way, I can only know the other as an analogy 
of myself. However, if I can transcend what I suppose myself 
to be, I can discover the other as simply another expression 
of what I apperceive as the compossibility of any "I" 
whatsoever. 
Obviously ((as Husserl says)) it can be 
said, that as an Ego in the natural 
attitude, I am likewise and at all times 
a transcendental Ego, but that I know this 
only by executing 
phenomenological reduction. (91) 
Nevertheless, the other is experienced by me as a real 
phenomenon, not as a spectre . But this other subject, who 
in one respect is a "fact", also expresses meaning which is 
there in the products which I perceive. Only a blind man 
refuses to see the existence of others. And one would be 
equally blind if one were to deny others the ability to 
express themselves meaningfully. 
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Here we have the possiblity for a logical 
explanation of what Marx conceives society to be when he 
says that society is the mediations which subjects realise 
amongst themselves in material form. It is the intention 
which lies hidden behind the material appearance of these 
phenomenon which is not clarified within a naive or 
ideologized attitude. Within such an attitude the abstract 
appears to be concrete, and in the case of mysticism, this 
relationship is simply reversed. The source of ideology 
therefore may be seen as a question of attitude. In order 
for Marx to transcend such an attitude he must have 
performed a reduction. As Husserl says in Ideas, the ability 
to perform a phenomeonological critique implies that the 
reduction has already been performed. Marx's method, that 
ephemeral thing which we hoped to make clear, is the method 
of Husserl's reduction. 
Clearly, certain modifications must be made to 
Marx's theory as we currently find it. Succinctly put, 
anything in Marx's theory which diverts us from an 
unattatched perspective or that demands that we must believe 
what Marx is telling us simply by merit of the fact that 
Marx is telling us must be avoided or at least observed with 
a great deal of candor. Most of all, if we cannot find it in 
ourselves to rise above the ludicrous character of the 
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absurd world which Marx presents to us and have the ability 
to laugh at the extraordinary confusion which whirls about 
us in this everyday world of a capitalist society, we are 
most certainly lost in an existential attatchment to 
whatever neurotically constituted circularity we may happen 
to find ourselves In. 
Ideology, then, may be said to be a matter of 
attitude. Within an ideologized attitude the subject fails 
to clarify the meaning of his intentions, preferring to 
allow some sort of externally posited "system" to act as the 
source of the sense of his "being". 
As well, by opening up the whole range of 
intentional possibilities as what may be expressed through 
material labour, Marx's economic and political studies may 
correspondingly be opened up to encompass the whole range of 
social mediations and expressions. In the same way, through 
the recognition of the judging, or more broadly stated, the 
intentional, activity which subtends material expression, 
the apparent problem which Husserl encounters in the 
expanation of the recognition of the other is at least 
breached even if not fully explained. Husserl's infinity is 
now complete; we have discovered to the other as a scentient 





In the introduction to this essay we said that our 
examination of Marx's method was performed backwards. The 
second moment of Marx's theory was examined first in order 
to move from what Marx himself said about his method. With 
the nature of Marx's method now established as 
phenomenological, we are in a position to apply this method 
to itself. 
Since the essence of this method is a radical 
shift in attitude we must now look at Marx's theory in a 
detatched fashion. When this is done the programatic 
elements of Marx's theory which move primarilly from his own 
fetishization of labour (1) fall away as contingencies. 
Included amongst these are the categories of class and 
interest which both depend upon a naive acceptance of "my" 
being and the relation of how I constitute this relative to 
the world of others. This does not deny the existence of 
class or of class interest. Rather, these phenomena should 
be understood now as existing only in an ideal and not in a 
real sense. They may exist, but they do so only in people's 
minds. As such, to treat them as really existent would 
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effectively fetishize these concepts. Thus, what we have 
left over in relation to Marx's method is a way of viewing 
the world which asks the performing subject to rise to the 
abstract but to then move to the concrete, not in a linear 
fashion, but in a synthetic way which allows the subject 
experience of an essential grounding for his understanding 
of phenomena. 
The problem which Lukacs encounters in History and 
Class Consciousness may be resolved in the same way. What 
Lukacs lacks is an explanation for what it is that is 
reified by the subject. Since it is what the subject reifies 
which in turn alienates him the explanation of what it is in 
actuality which the subject alienates will provide us with 
a potential solution to Lukacs's remetaphysicalization of 
Marx's theory. From what we have seen in the preceding 
chapters of this essay, we can see that what is alienated is 
ideal. What is alienated is a conception or idea. When an 
idea is posited as existing outside the subject it will have 
effectively been granted an ontological status. This applies 
to the subject's idea of his own meaning as well. Getting in 
touch with the meaning or essence of such an idea is the 
teleological end of Husserl's epoch* and, we feel, of Marx's 
method if the latter is properly understood as the move 
beyond the appearance of pregiveness. This applies either to 
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facts or to spiritual entities which are conceived of as 
self-determinant of their own meaning. 
If the radical shift in attitude which Husserl 
recommends and which we have argued by inference that Marx 
must perform to achieve the sense of detatchment necessary 
to do his critique of capitalism is carried out then 
meanings themselves may be encountered, unencumbered by 
presuppositions concerning what these ideas ought to mean. 
But we run into a problem here, for Marx claims that truth 
is realized in activity and Husserl claims that truth is 
realized in reflection. Indeed, in Capital Marx condemns 
reflectionist theory as post festum. But what Marx is 
condeming here is a kind of reflection that stops too soon, 
a kind of reflecion that moves only to the categories which 
are generated at the second level of judgment and which 
become ends in themselves; to what Marxists refer to as 
abstractions.From what we have seen in relation to the telos 
of Husserl's method, this is not what Husserl intends to do. 
Husserl wishes to move to the things themselves. The 
question now emerges as to whether this can be accomplished 
in reflection or whether this must be accomplished in 
activity? We can answer this in the following way: If I 
want to realise the truths I understand within a social 
context this will demand expression in mediate, material 
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form. If I wish to clarify things for myself I need not do 
anything but reflect. On the other hand, in order to have 
knowledge of something which I wish to realise I must have 
clarified this meaning initially. The source of this meaning 
is to be found in my originary opining, however, and in this 
opining, barring the intervention of a mystical source of 
experience, there will have been a unity of quality and 
quantity; of the abstract and the concrete. There is no 
resolution to the question of whether the abstract precedes 
the concrete or vice versa, to understand these two ways of 
grasping phenomenon as opposed to one another can only lead 
to absurdity because the one mode cannot be properly 
understood without the other. What remains important here is 
the quest for clarity and this clarity can be had only if 
one is willing to accept the paradox of the dialectic of the 
abstract and concrete. Or, to put this another way, a 
theory may guide me towards a presuppositionless experience, 
but no theory can in and of itself ever claim to be 
presuppositionles since the very commitment of theory to 
paper tacitly assumes that it will be read and understood by 
others. Hence, any theory will be inevitably "one-sided" 
unless it is read with a desire to clarify its meaning. 
The final move to clarity therefore demands a move 
beyond theory itself. It demands a move to the things 
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themselves but these things themselves are con-jointly 
concrete and abstract. How one can explain this situation 
theoretically without first adopting one pole of this 
relation as prior to the other I have no idea. But the 
selection of either pole as prior distorts the very reality 
which theory hopes to describe. 
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Notes 
Chapter 1. (1) The term ideological is used in this thesis 
to denote a belief or set of beliefs which is premised upon 
the acceptance of an essentially unexamined presupposition. 
The presupposition of such an unexamined premise effectively 
sets this premise as immutable and beyond question. In 
effect, the subject who holds such a belief and who is thus 
responsible for the holding of it as valid abrogates 
responsibility for accepting this belief as valid. In so 
doing, this subject posits this belief as standing beyond 
his control, as something which is self- understood as 
objectively valid. In this way, the belief comes to appear 
as its own justification, or, as we shall refer to it in 
this thesis, as a being for itself. (See Herbert Marcuse 
Reason and Revolution ( Boston:Beacon Press, 1954) 
pp.141-142.) 
Related to this ideological believing is the 
phenomenon of reification or hypostatization. Both these 
terms derive from the same German root, Verdlnglichung. In 
Marxist writings, for example Georg Lukacs History and Class 
Consciousness (London: Merlin Press,1971), this term takes 
on added significance, for it is this positing of something 
which has no factual existence as something which does have 
factual existence which creates the preconditions for an 
ideological understanding on the part of the subject 
involved in this process. When such an understanding 
remains untranscended, alienation of the subject occurs. 
This alienation is performed by the subject because he 
believes that what he has reified has an existence outside 
of his own. As we shall see, (chapter 4, sections 4 - 9 ) 
such an object takes on a being for itself in the subject's 
process. This reified object can have either a material 
object as a referent or it may have a purely ideal object as 
its referent. In either case, this object acts as a fetish 
object; it is something which has no ontological status in 
reality, but it is effectively attributed an ontological 
status by the subject. This difficulty in explaining such a 
situation arises because the subject himself may not be 
aware of his having done this. Indeed, If he were aware of 
what he had done, he would not be alienated by this fetish 
object which he himself has reified and which acts as his 
negation. Any explanation in which a fetish object, either 
ideal or real, is posited as psychophysically located or 
temporally moored and within which this object is 
correspondingly accepted as pregivenly valide may be said to 
be ideological. Thus, the terms ideology, reification , 
alienation, hypostatization, fetishization and objects which 
are refered to as naively accepted as pregivenly valid, and 
so on, are used interchangeably in this thesis because they 
are understood to be structurally equivalent. 
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As well, we should differentiate the use of the 
terms real and actual. The terms real is used to denote 
something which has a factual existence. Actuality is used 
to denote something which is truly the case. As we shall be 
dealing with irreal objects which are refered to variously 
as essences, qualities, ideas, senses or meanings,and 
judgments the distinction between the actual and the real is 
a necessary one. 
As well, Husserl's idea of occlusion is viewed 
within this paper as equivalent to the Marxist use of the 
word reification, with the corresponding terminological 
implications which we cited above. 
I want to take the opportunity at the outset of 
this paper to apologise for the turgidity of my style. In 
part, at least, this may be accounted for because I have for 
so long my sources in translation from the German been 
reading. 
(2) This terms is used in the same sense as it is in Edmund 
Husserl The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness 
(Bloominton: Indiana University Press,1964), pp.48-52. 
(3) The term realization is used in the same sense here as 
in Karl Marx Capital (London:Penguin Books in association 
with New Left Review,1976) translated by Ben Fowkes with an 
introduction by Ernest Mandel,.p.283. 
(4) What follows in this thesis is interpretive both in 





(9) Karl Marx "Theses on Feuerbach" in Writings of the Young 
Marx on Philosophy and Society edited and translated by Loyd 
Easton and Kurt Guddat (Anchor Books:Garden 
City,1968),pp.399-401. 
(10) Edmund Husserl Experience and Judgment 
(Evanston:Northwestern University Press,1972) pp.50-51. 
(11) Karl Marx Preface and Introduction to a Contribution to 
S Critique of Political Economy (Peking:Foreign Languages 
Press,1976),p.3. 
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(12) Fredrich Engels Anti-Dtlhring (Peking:Foreign Languages 
Press,1S76),pp.179-181. 
(13) Karl Marx Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of 
Political Economy (Rough Draft) translated with an 
introduction by Martin Nicolous (London:Penguin Books in 
association with New Left Review). 
(14) Capital,pp.283-284. 
(15) JOrgen Habermas Knowledge and Human Interest translated 
by J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press,1968),pp.28-29. 
(16) Edmund Husserl Formal and Transcendental Logic 
translated by Dorion Cairns (Den Haag:Martinus 
Nijhoff,1972). 
(17).Edmund Husserl Logical Investigations translated by 
J.N. Findlay including volume I, the Prolegomena and volume 
II, the six investigations(London:Routledge and Kegan 
Paul,1970). 
(18) Grundrisse,p.363. 
(19) Edmund Husserl The Crisis of the Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology translated with an introduction 
by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern Universtiy 
Press, 1970), from here forward refered to as the Crisis. Of 
the books by Husserl, this one has attracted the most 
attention by Marxists. See especially Enzo Paci The Function 
of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man translated with an 
introduction by Paul Piccone (Evanston:Northwestern 
University Press,1972). In part, the attention paid to this 
text by Marxists is a result of the fact that this is the 
only work by Husserl which has as its principle theme 
something which is a generally socially shared object as 
its starting point. Because of this, orthodox Husserlians 
may tend to disregard what Paci attempts to accomplish in 
this book. 
On the other wide, we have the radical Marxists 
who tend to view any other book by Husserl as a waste of 
time. In this thesis we do not wish to adopt either of these 
approaches. 





(3) Critique of Political Economy,pp.1-7-
(4) Ibid.,p.3. 
(5) For an instance, see Capital,pp.283-284, where Marx 
re-fetishizes the concept of labour. 
(6) "Economic and Phiosophic Manuscripts",p.291. 
(7) See above, chapter 1,pp.21-22. 
(8) Formal and Transcendental Logic,p.250. 
(9) For instance,Gj^undrisse,p.p156-l62;pp.213-215, and so 
on. 
(10) Karel Kosic Dialectics of the Concrete: A Study on the 
Problems of Man and his World (Boston:D. 
Reidel,1976),pp.17-32. 
(12) Grundrisse,p.84. 
(13) Karl Marx "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts" in 
Easton and Guddat,p.306 . 
(14) Istvan Meszaros Marx's Theory of Alienation 
(London:Merlin Press,1970),pp.76-84. 
(15) "Economic and Phiosophic Manuscripts",pp.310-311. 
(1^) Critique of Political Economy,pp.1-2. 
(17) In anticipation of the results which we shall arrive at 
below, we shall say that the commodity acts as an 
intentional object. See below, chapter 4, section 15. 
(18) Grundrisse,p.96. 
(19) Critique of Political Economy,p.3• 
(20) Grundrisse,p.86. 
(21) Ibid.,p.83. 
(22) On this point, see Kosik, on the "Metaphysics of 
Everyday Life",pp.37-42. 
(23) Critique of Political Economy,p.3-
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(23) Critique of Political Economy,p.3. 
(24) Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels "The German Ideology" in 
Easton and Guddat,p.4l4. 
(25) Grundrisse,p.449. 
(26) Ibid. 
(27) On the eidetic inter-relation of different moments of 
production see Formal and Transcendental Logic, pp.154-155. 
(28) The word bracketing is used here in its 
phenomenological sense. See, for instance, "The Origin of 
Geometry" included in the Crisis,pp.353-378. The move which 
we hope to outline in the current section of this essay is 
parallel to Husserl's move in relation to the apparent 
objective historical pregiveness of geometry. In our case, 
we are dealing with the historically embedded norm of 
capital. 
(29) On "common sense", see Crisis,p.200. 
(30) "These on Feuerbach",p.400, first thesis. 
(31) In brief, a psychological description accepts the world 
as it appears to be and then describes the subject's 
psychological relation to this 'reality'. A genetic 
description describes how this reality comes into being in 
the subject's mind. These two approaches run parallel to one 
another, however. See: Edmund Husserl Cartesian Meditations 
translated by Dorion Cairns (Den Haag:Martinus 
Nijhoff,1968),p.33; Crisis,sections 56-61;Ideas translated 
by B. Gibson (New York:MacMillan and Co.,1934), the entire 
"Preface" to the English Edition is dedicated to the 
clarification of this question. 
(32) A good source of examples of alienation which occurs in 
inter-personal relations may be found in R.D. Laing Knots 
(New York:Pantheon Books,1970). For example: 
Jill:I'm upset that you are upset. 
Jack:I'm not upset. 
Jill:I'm upset that you're not upset that I'm upset 
that you're upset. 
Jack:I'm upset that you're upset that I'm not upset that 
I'm upset when I'm not. (p.21.) 
The deductive circularity starts with the assumption that 
something which cannot be known without a metaphysical 
ability is known. Hence, the other's mood is reifed and the 
subject alienates himself in his belief of knowing what the 
other feels. 
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(34) This can be seen in Capital because money, for Marx, is 
the culmination of this process. 
(35) Capital,p.125. 
(36) Marx employs this example throughout the first chapter 
of>
 Capital, but any other would do as well. See 
pp.125-177,passim. 
(37) Capital,p.129. 
(38) Delia Moneta Graham,p.221, volume 3 of Custodi's 
collection entitled Scrittorie Classica italiani di economia 
polltica, Parte moderne (Milan:1803), Marx's 
note,Ibid.,p.167. 
(39) See chapter 3, section 8, on Husserl's criticism of a 
Humean attempt to justify the meaning of mediate data by an 
appeal to mediate data and the absurdity which derives from 
this. In the same way, Marx points out that exchange-values 
are mediate and as such can never express their own value 
except as something relative. For an instance, Marx says, " 
Two coats can therefore express the magnitude of value of 40 
yards of linen, but they can never express the magnitude of 









(48) Grundrisse,p.160;also Capital,p.165, "...the products 
of labour become commodities, sensuous things which are at 





(52) Ibid.,p.160. Or, as Marx says on page 155 of the 
Grundrisse "...this symbol has the property of not merely 
representing, but being exchange value in actual exchange." 
In relation to reification as the positing of the ideal as 
ontologically given, and as such as pregiven, see below, 
chapter 4, section 8. 
(53) Grundrisse,p.201. 
(54) Ibid.,p.96. 
(55) On the wage labour relation see the Grundrisse,p.284. 
(56) Ibid.,p.255. The citation from the Grundrisse deals 
with circluation as the circulation of commodities but 
inasmuch as labour is understood as a commodity within 
capitalistic society, the comment holds here, as well. 
(57) "The German Ideology",p.443. 
(58) "Economic and Phiosophic Manuscripts",p.292. 
(59) This term is used in the same sense as it is in Formal and 
Transcendental Logic,p.154. 
(60) "Economic and Phiosophic Manuscripts",p.311•" One basis 
for life and another for science is a lie." Marx is 
concerned with doing true science and for Marx this must be 
grounded in an understanding of the subject as he actually 
is; as a unity. This unity is evidenced in human activity as 
this draws the subject into social life. Thus, for Marx, 
"my essential activity is emotion which thereby becomes the 
activity of my nature." "Economic and Phiosophic 
Manuscripts",p.312. 
(61) As an example of a similiar observation concerning 
individuals who see no difference between quality and 
quantity in terms of the value of a commodity, we cite the 
following: 
Gary: Do you like Americans? 
Perowne: Five years ago you could still impress them by 
showing them a reproduction of Van Gogh. Two years ago 
you had to show them the real thing. Now you have to 
give them his ear. 
(from AC/DC by Heathecoate Williams ) 
cited in David Z. Mairowitz The Radical Soap Opera: Roots of 





(65) Ibid. Marx continues in this passage by stating that 
money can act as the pledge of society only "because of its 
social property; and it can have a social property only 
because individuals have alienated their own social 




(68) Ibid.,p.l64;see also, Capital,p.170. 
(69) Grundrisse,p.164. 
(70) On analytic categories as fetish objects, see below, 









(80) Ibid.,p.253;see also, Capital,p.175. 
(81) Joseph Heller Catch-22 (New York:Dell 
Publications,1954) 
(82) Capital,p.251: "The complete form of this is therefore 
M-C-M', where M'=M plus delta M,i.e., the original sum 
advanced plus the increment. This increment or excess over 
the original value I call 'surplus value'((Mehrwert))." 
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(83) Grundrisse,pp.317-318-




(88) Idem., The Poverty of Philosophy (New York:Progress 
Publishers,1976), pp.120-21. Marx goes on to point out that 
in terms of European feudalism, the bad side, the 
anarchistic peasantry, won out over the good side, the 
feudal barrons. Good and bad still remain normative and 
hence, relative categories. 
(89) Grundrisse,pp.164-165. 









(98) In other words, the precident for transubstatiability 
is already set in relation to the fetishism of commodities 
and the money relation. 
(99) Grundrisse,p.361. 
(100) Grundrisse,p.325. 
(101) This unity is to found in the unity of theory and 












(112) Idem., The Holy Familie cited in Robert Heiss Hegel, 


















(12) Robert Sokolowski The Formation of Husserl's Concept of 
Constitution (Den Haag:Martinus Nijhoff,1970),p.7. Here 
Sokolowski cites Husserl's Philosophie der Arithmetic (Halle 
a. S.rC.E.M. Pfeiffer,1891),p.103 "We are faced with the 
task of explaining 'such concepts... which because of their 
elementary character, are neither capable of a definition 
not in need of one.' Explanation of such critical concepts 
does not consist in defining them, but rather in provideing 





























Marx makes the same observation in relation to 





Formal and Transcendental Logic,p.155. 
See above,chapter 2,p.93. 
Ideas,p.256. 
Formal and Transcendental Logic,p.172. 
See chapter 1, note 1. 
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(33) Formal and Transcendental Logic,p.15. For Husserl, 
ideal objects are produced in the subject's judging 
processes. 
(34) Capital,p.284. 
(35) Formal and Transcendental Logic,p.69. 
(36) Ibid.,p.100;Crisls,p.46. 
(37) Suzanne Bachelard A Study of Husserl's Formal and 
Transcendental Logic Translated by Ester Embree 
(Evanston:Northwestern University Press,1968),pp.55-56. 




(**2) Formal and Transcendental Logic,p.56 . 
















(60) Logical Investigations,pp.435-489. 













(6) Formal and Transcendental Logic,p.257. 
(7) Ibid.,p.17. 
(8) Crisis,p.187;See note 81,below. 







(15) Experience and Judgment,p.12. 
(16) Ideas,p.354. 
(17) Crisis,p.145. 
(18) See chapter 2, note 1. 
(19) See above, chapter two, sections. 
(20) Formal and Transcendental Logic,p.155.;Grundrisse, 
p.363. 
(21) See above, re: note 15, this chapter. 
(22) Formal and Transcendental Logic,pp.102-103. 
(23)Grundrisse,p.162. 






(30) As is the case with capital. 
(3D Crisis,p.151. 
(32) Edmund Husserl Cartesian Meditations translated by 
Dorion Cairns (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff,1973),pp.33-34. 
(33) Crisis,p.50. 
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(34) See above, chapter three, section 9,part B. 
(35) Formal and Transcendental Logic,p.71 and the moves 
from level to level of enquiry. 
(36) What I want to outline here is a potentiality which 
exists in Husserl's formal ontologistic solution to the 
problem of the inadequacy of abstract, theoretical 
approaches to questions of knowledge. It is clear that 
Husserl himself is aware of this potentiality. However, 
without a concretizing move of the sort which Marx 
recommends Husserl cannot get out of the bind which he finds 
himself in. Husserl says that: "...it is wrong for a 
criticism of sensuous experience, which naturally brings out 
its essential imperfec'ton (that it: its being at the mercy 
of further experience!), to end with rejecting it — 
whereupon the critic in his extremity appeals to hypotheses 
and indirect arguements, with which he attempts to seize the 
phantom of some (absurdly) transcendent "In-Itself". All 
transcendental-realistic theories, with their arguements 
leading from the "immanent" sphere of purely "internal" 
experience to an extra-psychic transcendency, are 
attributable to a blindness to the proper character of 
"external" experience as a performance that gives us 
something itself and would otherwise be unable to provide a 
basis for natural-scientific theories." Formal and 
Transcendental Logic,pp.161-162. 
The tendency which Husserl condemns is one which 
abrogates sensuous experience, holus-bolus, to a position of 
inferiority in relation to experience of the transcendental. 
Of course, sensuous experience in and of itself cannot 
explain anything. Even Marx, according to Marcuse,(Reason 
and Revolution,p.271) accepts the actuality that sensous 
experience cannot be appealed to as a final seal of 
justification of anything. But the tendency which I see in 
Husserl's work derives from his perpetual residency in the 
abstract. If Husserl were a solopcist, then this tendency 
would never need emerge. However, Husserl insists that 
phenomenology is not a transcendental solopcism. (Cartesian 
Meditations,Meditation V;Formal and Transcendental 
Logic,section 96). It is one thing to make such an 
assertion. It is quite another to demonstrate it. Husserl 
asserts that the intersubjective is known as one knows his 
own subjectivity. With this I have no disagreement. However, 
I know this in reflection. In reflection I must reflect on 
something. What I reflect upon is something which I once 
sensuously experienced. If I have not sensuously experienced 
the other, then the other has been experienced in an absurd, 
transcendent experience of, to use Husserl's expression, a 
"phantom". When Husserl asks us to return to the things 
themselves, one thing which we must remember is the 
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distinction between that which occurs in imagination and 
that which occurs in social reality. This distinction can be 
properly drawn if we remember what it was that was derived 
from sensuous experience and what it was that was only 
imagined. If Husserl really wants to avoid a charge of 
solopcism, he must openly declare this distinction. This Is 
something which, as far as I know, he never does, because 
the formal ontological solution to fetishization only goes 
as far as to point out the metaphysics which arises from not 
understanding the being of meaning as distinct from the 
being of facts. The formal ontological solution does not 
embrace the material world because it keeps the subject in 
constant reflection, which is abstract. It retains the 
theoretical attitude to the very end, which is the 
quintessence of the abstract, and so by necessity, never 
makes the radical return to the life-world which is 
necessary if Husserl's project is to be completed. On the 
other hand, Husserl does accept the material world, and so 
we are caught in the position of Husserl's presupposition of 
the material world just as Marx is caught on the material or 
sensuous side of the dialectic without a proper 
clarification of the abstract. Both Husserl and Marx, in 
their own ways, are aware, I belieye, of this situation. 
Both Marx and Husserl establish the efficacy of one or the 
other poles of the dialectic- But the apparent 
phenomenologistic passion with deriding Marx as some kind of 
intellectual Facist and the Marxistic penchant for 
condemning Husserl as a know-nothing pipe-dreamer are both 
only partly true. The tendency which I hope to point to in 
the present section of this essay is the tendency of 
orthodox Husserlists to simply and conveniently overlook the 
obvious need on Husserl's part for a material foundation 
which can be provided with an intelligent understanding of 
what Marx was talking about. As with the died in the wool 
Marxists who deny that anyone but Marx had anything 
worthwhile to say, such phenomenologists will never find 
what they are looking for "within" Husserl, just as Lukacs 
ends up in confusion by claiming that all the answers can be 
found "within" Marx's works. 
(37) Roman Ingarden On the Motives which led Husserl to 
Transcendental Idealism translated by Arnor Hannibalson (Den 
Haag: 
Martinus Nijhoff,1975) 




(40) Ideas,pp.247-248. Hyle are sensory data. 
(41) Karl Marx "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Law"in Guddat and Easton.p. 257. 
(42) S. Aveneri The Social and Political Thought of Karl 
Marx (Cambridge;Cambridge at the University 
Press,1969),pp.65-95,passim. 
(43) Formal and Transcendental Logic,p.118-19. 
(44) Crisis,p.175. 
(45) Ideas,p.256. 




(50) David Carr Phenomenology and the Problem of History: A 
Study of Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press,1974),p.14. 
(51) Ibid.,p.13. 
(52) This thesis will suffer somewhat from this point 
forward because there is no proper deliniation of the 
noematic and noetic modes of description. For an 
explanation of this difference, see:Cartesian 
Meditations,pp. 36-39-
(53) Ibid.,p.36. 
(54) Formal and Transcendental Logic,p.135-36. 
(56) Ibid.,p.250. 
(57) Ibid.,p.135. 
(58) See above, note 47 this chapter. 
(59) Ibid.,p.155. 
(60)Formal and Transcendental Logic,p.237. 
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(61) "German Ideology",p.441. 
(62) Rene Descartes "Discourse on Method" in The_ Light of 
Reason edited by Martin Hollis, this selection translated by 




(65) Cartesian Meditations,p.34. 
(66) Ibid. 
(67) Cartesian Meditations, p.34. 
(68) Ibid. 
(69) Crisis,pp.186-87. 
(70) Kosik,p.47 ;See also, note 73, below. 
(71) See chapter 3,p.129. 
(73) For Husserl, may decision that material objects preceed 
me is my judging that this is so. However, if I actually 
start from this position then what is it which I am 
reflecting upon? If I reflect upon something which is 
"immanent" to my consciousness in its origin, then I will be 
involved in a mysticism, (see above, note ). The 
actuality of the situation is that both the qualitative and 
the qunatitative are co-given as as unity. (Formal and 
Transcendental Logic,p.157) To arbitrarilly "start" from one 
pole of experience or another is equally lop-sided which 
ever one I choose. But two things come into question here: 
First, what happen to the hyle in reflection? Husserl 
insists that the meaning I have of these hyle is valid and 
that they do not determine their meaning as 
beings-for-themselves. From this point of view it would 
appear that if one is to escape a collapsing of the ideal 
and the real, then one must acknowledge the a priori 
character of the abstract and hence, start from this pole. 
However, Husserl presupposes normalacy, and 
because of this, he also presupposes the ability of the 
subject to distinguish between the "as if" of phantasy and 
actual events. The second point emerges here, for "actual" 
events, barring mysticism in which a phantom of some sort is 
experienced by me, entail the material and this is 
unaviodably so in relation to the social. What this means is 
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that Husserl himself, in writing philosophy is involved in a 
social enterprise. Since his writings must be shared by 
others, this demands that he acknowledge the material as his 
starting point and not only move from this to the abstraot, 
but he must return to this if he is not to leave his reader 
1n the abstraction which we have understood him to condemn 
traditional analytics and formal ontology of never 
completing. For an inferential arguement which may be seen 
as an attempt to extricate Husserl from the kind of 
criticism refered to in note see: J. Huertas-Jourda "On 
the two foundations according to Husserl, the 
epistemological or legitamizing, and the occaisional or 
actualizing," presented at the Society of Phenomenological 
and Existential Philosophy, October, 1973. 
(74) Crisis,p.150;Cartesian Meditations,p.37. 
(75) "The Origin of Geometry",p.356. 
(76) Ibid. 
(77) Formal and Transcendental Logic,p.185. 
(78) Ibid. 
(79) Ibid.,p.168. 
(80) Carter ian Meditations,p.37. 
(81) Husserl accepts "normalacy". However, her asks how it 
is that what is so "obvious" about normalacy can be 
understood.See Crisis,p.187. 
(82) Ideas,p.249. 
(83) Cartesian Meditations,p.35. 
(84) Prolegomena,p.58. 
(85) Ideas,pp.200-201. 
(86) Cartesian Meditations,p.37. 
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(88) See chapter 1,pp.15-16. 
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(90)0r, as Robert Zimmerman once said: 
I wish that for just one day 
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And then you'd know what a drag it is 
Just to see you. 
from "Positively Fourth Street". 
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